Tag Archive | "Taliban"

Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan were the Cana...

Politley defying US pressure: Refuting Lisbon goals

Posted on 26 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

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NATO soldiers in Afghanistan

If the Taliban in Afghanistan will not be vanquished or reconciled, how on earth, the public wonders, does it benefit Pakistan to earn their ire and dash prospects of having an equable relationship with the most powerful grouping in neighbouring Afghanistan. Especially when taking on the Afghan Taliban, in cahoots with the Americans, would invite immediate retaliation

The 28-member NATO alliance spends over a trillion dollars annually on defence. An astronomical amount, considering how desperately strapped members are for cash nowadays, and for what? To fight off the likes of penniless North Korea, nuke-less Iran and homeless terrorists of the bin Laden gang? Actually, there are few threats to NATO that good intelligence, a modicum of prudence, imaginative use of modern technology and international cooperation cannot avert at a fraction of the cost. Hence, when recalling the trillion dollars that are spent annually by NATO for keeping ‘the dear leader’ et al at bay, Shakespeare’s caution comes to mind: “Heat not, a furnace for your foe so hot that it do singe yourself. We may outrun by violent swiftness that which we run at and lose by over-running.” And, one could add, not only ‘over-running’ but also overreaching.

What was meant to protect the North Atlantic now functions on three continents and is primed to go wherever the US takes it, and to stay as long as Washington wants “to make America safe” (Obama). NATO has indeed become “the ultimate transformer global Robocop, consigning, in the process, the helpless UN to a New York sand box,” as one analyst said, judging by the importance Washington attaches to NATO summits as compared to the annual humdrum UNGA sessions.

Consider the decisions taken at Lisbon earlier this week to which none of the battleground states or the regional countries were asked to contribute. NATO decided that there would be no let up in the Afghan war till 2014 — actually longer — if the US continues to feel ‘unsafe’. As the US is never likely to feel ‘safe’ in a region where ill will for it is exploding, its occupation of Afghanistan, under whatever guise or headdress, seems endless. Confirmation was forthcoming from the British Army chief, Sir David Roberts, who let the cat out of the bag by saying that the British are “planning for a 30-40 year scenario”.

It bothers NATO not a wit that such a posture would be hotly contested. In any case, NATO listens only to local leaders who are in hock to the west, and then not very attentively. It cares a fig for the vast segment of their population who have rejected western imperialism as much as western norms and values; whose disillusionment with western concepts such as socialism, capitalism and democracy is profound and who far prefer systems more suited to the basic concepts of Islam.

Instead, the public worry that their flaccid and corrupt leadership will be unable to withstand the pressure exerted by the US to ‘do more’.

All this worries the public not because of their fondness for the Taliban, far from it, or because they believe that India is the ‘eternal enemy’. Indeed, were relations with India on the mend they would have no objection to the relocation of forces to ward off the new danger. Alas, that is far from what is happening. India-Pakistan relations remain stuck in the old rut with India ever on the qui vive to inflict harm on Pakistan at the first opportunity.

Similarly, if the American cause in Afghanistan had been popular or a winning one, that too may have been reason enough to back Washington, but it is not. Actually, it is a lost cause for sundry reasons, including history, which shows that in the past 50 years no nationalist-based insurgency against a foreign force anywhere has ever been defeated.

If then the Taliban in Afghanistan will not be vanquished or reconciled, how on earth, the public wonders, does it benefit Pakistan to earn their ire and dash prospects of having an equable relationship with the most powerful grouping in neighbouring Afghanistan. Especially when taking on the Afghan Taliban, in cahoots with the Americans, would invite immediate retaliation. Were, for example, the Haqqani suicide bombers to be unleashed on Pakistan, it is doubtful if there would be much trace of commerce and industry in any of our major cities.

Of course, that is not to say that Pakistan must live in dread of the Taliban and their pernicious version of Islam. We are taking on the Pakistani Taliban and would take on their Afghan ilk, if they prove recalcitrant or try and inflict their pernicious ideology by force on Pakistan. But only in a manner and a time of our choosing and, most importantly, on our own and not as part of some American-led effort ‘to make the US safe’.

While welcoming American assistance, the public rejects US dictation. They know that it will not earn them either the respect of the enemy or their own people. Allowing drones to bombard Quetta, for example, would amount to the kind of capitulation that would rob Pakistan of all self-respect. The mere notion that such a request is being canvassed by Washington says much for the utter lack of feel that the US has of the current mood and Pakistan’s predicament. But when has the US ever been anything but indifferent to our feelings when its interests clash with ours?

Unfortunately, an inordinate amount of Pakistan’s energy is consumed not so much in fending off the extremists, whose measure we should have in due course, but the US, which seems recklessly determined for its own reasons to pit us in battle when we are neither psychologically ready, popularly willing, or militarily able to do so. That we must resist Washington’s pressure and the outcome of Lisbon goes without saying. But does the present bunch at the helm have the guts? Nothing thus far suggests that it does. The Lisbon effect —Zafar Hilaly. The writer is a former ambassador. He can be reached at charles123it@hotmail.com

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Emblem of Afghanistan

Quetta shopkeeper dupes NATO, MI6, CIA, RAMA, Karzai

Posted on 26 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

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Emblem of Afghanistan
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The US spin doctors at the various agencies are trying to put up a nice face to the episode of the Taliban impostor. Apparently the entire might of America, Europe and Afghanistan could not discover the true identity of a Quetta Shopkeeper who posed as a major Taliban leaders. How can the US bring credibility to Kabul, when even the Afghan don’t know who the Taliban are.

Islamabad is chuckling!

Karzai aide blames British for bringing Taliban impostor to talks: WP

President Hamid Karzai‘s chief of staff on Thursday said that British authorities were responsible for bringing a Taliban impostor into the presidential palace and that foreigners should stay out of delicate negotiations with the Afghan insurgent group.

In an interview, Mohammad Umer Daudzai said that the British brought a man purporting to be Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, a senior Taliban leader, to meet Karzai in July or August but that an Afghan at the meeting knew “this is not the man.”

Afghan intelligence later determined that the visitor was actually a shopkeeper from the Pakistani city of Quetta, he said.

“This shows that this process should be Afghan-led and fully Afghanized,” Daudzai said. “The last lesson we draw from this: International partners should not get excited so quickly with those kind of things. . . . Afghans know this business, how to handle it. We handle it with care, we handle it with a result-based approach, with very less damage to all the other processes.”
The episode has embarrassed Afghan and Western officials, and it has undercut the notion circulated earlier this year by senior U.S. officials that there was some momentum toward possible peace talks.

Daudzai’s comments were the most direct assignation of blame so far, though U.S. officials have also said that the fake Mansour was primarily a British project. U.S. officials have long characterized the British as more aggressive than the Americans in pushing for a political settlement to end the war.

The false Mansour was “the Brits’ guy,” said a senior American official familiar with the case. “It was the British who brought him forward.”
A spokesman for the British Embassy in Kabul declined to comment.
The story of how this man came to sit across from Karzai, and who he actually is, remains the subject of considerable dispute.

Daudzai said Afghan authorities first made contact with a man claiming to be a representative of Mansour about six to eight months ago. He was ready to arrange peace talks, and he said Mansour wanted a timeline for foreign troop withdrawal and a constitutional change to incorporate Islamic law. But the palace, Daudzai said, chose not to meet with Mansour’s associate “because he was unknown, very junior.”

But then the British took over, he said, and used that contact to arrange for Mansour to visit Kabul. Daudzai said British representatives, but not Americans, were present during the meeting with Karzai.

Americans were skeptical

American officials said they had doubts from the beginning. Mansour is well known, having served in the former Taliban government as minister of civil aviation. But this visitor was a few inches shorter than their intelligence indicated Mansour is, and he didn’t come with the people he said he would bring. CIA officers, including the Kabul station chief, were particularly skeptical, but British intelligence believed that the contact was real, according to the senior American official.

“The agency expressed skepticism early on that this was Mullah Mansour,” another U.S. official said. “There was very healthy skepticism.”

A former senior Afghan official who was involved in the case disputed that the British did anything more than provide logistical help to bring Mansour to Kabul. He characterized Daudzai’s position as a political attack on the West when in fact the Afghans were responsible for the meeting.
The former official said that the public discussion of the case risks the life of the man who attended the meeting, as well as those of Afghan agents in Pakistan, and has “ruined the entire process.”

“And if he’s not the person – and there has never been evidence produced that he is not that person – then they jumped to a conclusion before looking at the evidence,” the official said, adding that the man who attended the meeting passed identification screening tests with 95 percent certainty.
The senior American official cast doubt on the Afghan claims that the Taliban impostor is a shopkeeper. The man’s comments indicated that he knew Taliban positions on issues and that he seemed to have some knowledge of the movement’s inner circle.

Daudzai said the impostor may have been dispatched by Pakistan’s spy agency to “test the system,” but “we can’t say for sure.”

Either way, he said, Britain and other European countries “are in haste” to move peace talks with the Taliban forward, perhaps to speed up their troops’ departure. Afghanistan‘s 70-member peace council, which includes former Taliban officials, should be leading the process, Daudzai said, because it is familiar with the enemy.

‘Very bad things going on’

Daudzai also weighed in on the political turmoil surrounding the Sept. 18 parliamentary elections.

In the palace’s first extended comments on the final results of the vote, Daudzai said that he supports the attorney general’s investigations of fraud allegations and that some election officials – among the 96,000 recruited for the task – appear to be involved in wrongdoing.

“That’s not to say that the commission, and the leadership of the process, are involved in it. As far as we know, they did a good job. But within the system, there have been very bad things going on,” he said.

On Thursday, the Afghan attorney general’s office announced that authorities had arrested nine people on allegations of participating in voting fraud. Six of the suspects work with money-exchange companies, and three are construction company owners who were parliamentary candidates.
Afghan authorities have also issued an arrest warrant for a United Nations official who allegedly promised the construction company owners that they would be elected in return for tens of thousands of dollars, money that was entrusted with the money-exchange officials, Nazari said.

Four election officials have been summoned for questioning on Saturday.
The crackdown on the election officials, along with harsh criticism from the attorney general’s office of the legitimacy of the results announced this week, threatens a prolonged crisis.

Deputy Attorney General Rahmatullah Nazari said in an interview that the investigations will probably “come up with a result which will definitely question the legitimacy of the recent parliamentary elections.”

The Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced final tallies for 33 of Afghanistan’s provinces on Wednesday but said technical problems had prevented it from certifying the results in the eastern province of Ghazni.
Karzai’s supporters fared poorly in the elections. His ethnic group, the Pashtuns, suffered particularly in Ghazni, a majority-Pashtun province, because the Taliban insurgency prevented many people from voting. The top 11 finishers there are from the Hazara minority.

Daudzai said that the attorney general “may have meant that his assessment, his investigation, may change the result.”

If the legal system finds “serious wrongdoing” in Ghazni and other provinces, Daudzai said, “then the IEC will have no choice but to announce reelection there.” (Washington Post)

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Post-Nato Afghanistan: Pakistan cautions against civil war in Kabul

Posted on 25 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

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Retreating Soviet forces from Afghanistan

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan on Thursday welcomed Nato plans for a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning next year, but warned against any move that could plunge its neighbouring country back into civil war.

At a summit in Lisbon last week, the 48 countries with troops in Afghanistan agreed to begin transferring parts of the battlefield to local police and military, and move Western troops into a supporting role by the end of 2014.

“We will welcome the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan as and when it happens,” Pakistani foreign ministry spokesman Abdul Basit told reporters in Islamabad.

“But obviously we would not like Afghanistan to be left on its own,” he said.

“We would like this process to go ahead in tandem with a stabilisation in Afghanistan because we would not like the situation to once again plunge into anarchy or into civil war in Afghanistan.” Pakistan expressed concern about whether Nato would be able to train Afghan forces sufficiently to take responsibility for national security.

“We hope that by 2014 the coalition forces would be able or to have developed the Afghan national army and other security forces in Afghanistan, enabling them to take full charge of the country.

“So that is the only worry or concern we have,” he said.

Afghanistan slipped into chaos after Moscow withdrew Soviet troops 10 years after their 1979 invasion, sparking years of bloody civil war that ended when the Taliban seized power in 1996.

Pakistan, whom US and Afghan officials accuse of harbouring Taliban insurgent leaders, has repeatedly offered to help with Afghan peace efforts.

“We do not expect the coalition forces to stay in Afghanistan forever and Pakistan will continue supporting the process of bringing about stability in Afghanistan in whatever way the Afghanistan government wants us to do.” The United States has warned that “hard fighting remains ahead” and has not ruled out combat operations continuing beyond 2014.

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Obama's blunderous War Extension

Posted on 25 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

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Extending the Opium War

President Obama extended by years America’s commitment to the Afghan war, which is hard to understand given his strategy’s lack of success and competing threats. Congress must demand that the President justify this extension.

Last weekend at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) annual conference in Lisbon, Portugal, Obama declared, “My goal is to make sure that by 2014 we have transitioned; Afghans are in the lead, and it is a goal to make sure that we are not still engaged in combat operations of the sort we’re involved in now.” Those are overly optimistic goals given our lack of success and the radical time adjustment to his strategy.

Last December Obama announced a three-part Afghan war strategy and a deadline to begin withdrawing our forces by July 2011. His strategy includes a surge of 30,000 additional troops, which he promised would “reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.” He promised to “accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces” and said “our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership in Pakistan.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates promised at the time, “If it appears that the strategy is not working and that we are not going to be able to transition in 2011, then we will take a hard look at the strategy itself.” It is now time for the strategy’s annual review.

But General David Petraeus, the overall U.S. commander in Afghanistan, dismissed the “hard look” promise to say that he did “not want to overplay the significance of this [annual] review which … will only be three or four months since the full deployment of all of the surge forces.” Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy echoed that view, noting that the review would simply “be a bit of a deeper dive” than the President’s regular assessments.

Obviously the administration isn’t going to take a “hard look” at its strategy. But the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, which constitutionally funds wars, must question the President’s strategy and how more investment will keep America safer than using those resources elsewhere.

The first part of Obama’s strategy was to surge our forces to 100,000—doctrinally not enough for that Texas-sized country with 33 million people—and then accelerate operations. Our higher operational tempo and the bringing of more troops into combat contributed to the loss of 448 American lives so far, making 2010 the bloodiest year to date for the Afghan war. It is noteworthy that just as America surged, key allies like the British and Canadians announced plans to shift their troops from a combat role.

The proof of concept for Obama’s strategy was “to reverse the Taliban’s momentum” in Marja, a community in the Helmand province, which began in February. After initial successes, progress became a tortuous effort to prevent the insurgents from filtering back. And just as troubling, the governance piece of the strategy for Marja—delivering services and leadership—lags because of the Afghan government’s incompetence.

Obama obviously underestimated the enemy’s resilience in Marja, Kabul’s competence, and apparently the same problems apply to Kandahar as well. The battle for Kandahar, the ancestral home of the Taliban, began late this summer, rather than in the spring, as originally planned. Kandahar was expected to be the turning point of the war, but now officials indicate that it will be next spring at the earliest before we know if that effort will bear fruit.

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided a rather tepid endorsement of Obama’s Afghan strategy. Last week, Mullen told a Harvard University audience the conflict is “at the stage where it’s fairly chaotic, but security is starting to turn—it’s very fragile and it’s very reversible, but it’s going to take us some time.”

Second, Obama’s strategy also promised to “accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces” beginning in 2011, but there is now recognition that much more time and resources are required before those forces will be ready to assume responsibility.

The Afghan security forces will total 250,000 members by year’s end, but many units, especially the police, remain poorly trained and unable to battle the insurgency. It is also feared that the country would relapse into anarchy if we turned over security to the existing force too soon.

A large part of the Afghanis’ training problem has to do with our allies’ failure to meet commitments to provide trainers, retarding efforts to create capable forces. The U.S. military, which does most of the fighting, lacks additional personnel to accelerate that training due to other global commitments.

It is noteworthy that Obama’s strategy hasn’t earned the Afghan government’s full support, which is a serious impediment. In 2010 Afghanistan’s problems with corruption, contracting, and secret talks with the enemy have contributed to mistrust. Additionally, President Hamid Karzai is openly critical of allied efforts, but as Secretary Gates said, “We will continue to work with him [Karzai] as a good partner.”

Finally, Obama linked his strategy to neighbor Pakistan, which he said “is built on a foundation of mutual interests, mutual respect and mutual trust.” But our Pakistani partner, President Asif Ali Zardari, is a fragile leader whose government is near collapse.

In spite of that government’s fragility, we continue to pour billions of aid dollars into Pakistan, expecting Islamabad to take the fight to the Taliban and al Qaeda. But all we get for our investment are ambushed supply convoys, complaints about our drone attacks on enemy leaders hiding in that country, and excuses why the Pakistani army can’t defeat our mutual enemies.

The obvious lack of success for Obama’s three-part war strategy begs the question: Where is the security return for our $100 billion annual investment and the loss of American lives?

In 2010 our terrorist problems came from Pakistan, Yemen, and now there is evidence that new threats will come from the Horn of Africa. But Obama committed our military to what he calls the Afghan “war of necessity” for at least another three years without demonstrating the nexus of that conflict to these and other threats.

Worse yet, Mark Sedwill, NATO’s senior civilian representative to Afghanistan, said that Obama is likely understating our commitment. Sedwill told The Washington Post that 2014 is “not an end of mission.” He cautioned that the transition to Afghan control could go into “2015 and beyond.”

Obama extended our Afghan commitment without a thorough review of his yet-to-be-proven strategy. That’s why Congress should exercise its constitutional oversight responsibility to demand that the President demonstrate the necessity to continue our Afghan effort, as opposed to targeting those limited defense dollars and troops to address other threats.

Mr. Maginnis is a retired Army lieutenant colonel, a national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television and a senior strategist with the U.S. Army. Obama’s Unjustified War Extension by Robert Maginnis. 11/24/2010

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Poder letal

NATO: Surge and Cut, Transition and Run

Posted on 19 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

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Poder letal

The M1 in Afghanistan is a sign that the war is not going well. Image by Arguez via Flickr

NATO’s pretend word: Surge hides Cut. Transition disguises Run.

A lot of words are being thrown about. The bottom line is that the US is retreating from Afghanistan and now the face saving exercises have begun.

President Obama announced the withdrawal from Afghanistan and then camouflaged  it under the guise of a (so called) surge–which didn’t really materialize ’till this year. He was severely criticized for announcing a timetable and a schedule. Even President Pervez Musharraf said that the schedule should not have been announced. Mr. Khalil Nouri of the Afghan Study Group describes it eloquently Afghan Presdient Hamid “Karzai has  joined this “milonguero” renaissance slow slow dance, with the infamous Afghani style tempo of “Asta-Boro” – go slow in Dari”. How slow can NATO move? Conventional Military doctrine says that informing the enemy of a departure plan may encourage the enemy to become more aggressive.

This time around, President Obama has hedged his bets by fudging the end date of the withdrawal by calling is “transition” and then leaving the end date a bit open ended.

The surge is not going well. It is no accident that after 9 years of war America’s latest counterinsurgency tool in Afghanistan is the M1 Abrams tank. things must be really bad to send more than a dozen of M1s to Afghanistan. What will the M1 be used against? Well it can go thorugh walls and demolish mud bricked homes. A panicky Karzai asked NATO to stop all night operations. Ackerman calls it “Awe and Shock” and Rajiv Chandrasekaran writing for the Washington Post describes is “as taking the gloves off”. What can the M1 do that the hundreds of Soviet tanks could not? In fact the tanks are nuisance, cannot go where the guerrillas are and require tankers and convoys to support them–all easy targets. Mullah Omar still rejects any negotiations with ’till he gets a withdrawal schedule from Afghanistan.

President Medvedev of Russia informed the trilateral meeting with French president Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the French town of Deauville he said: ”Russia’s cooperation with NATO is an important format. I would go to Lisbon. This would facilitate the dialogue”.  With Russia in the loop, the road for the withdrawal is all set.

Pakistan of course with be the 900 pound gorilla in the room with all  eyes on Islamabad. The world knows that all roads to Kabul go through Islamabad. Pakistan has a strategic geography that no other country in the world can duplicate–not Iran, and not Bharat.

Like we said the return of the first soldier will be the most difficult.

  • There is deep skepticism in the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether Gen Petraeus’s surge is actually working.
  • NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is a litmus test for the future of NATO, say some experts.
  • The summit is expected to announce plans for a transfer of control to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
  • Larger countries like Germany, Italy and Spain have caveats that their troops only serve in areas of limited combat.
  • Many others have withdrawn entirely in the face of public opposition.
  • “The aim is for Afghan forces to be in the lead, countrywide, of security operations by the end of 2014.”Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.
  • Iran’s vital partnerships in the region – Russia and India have been damaged.

As they say the road to hell is paved with good intentions. A story in the Guardian now describes the new scenario that will be come out of Lisbon.

James Kirkup describes the Lisbon summit from a Western perspective.

Alliance leaders meeting in Lisbon will on Saturday agree a timetable to transfer responsibility for security to Afghan forces, a process due to start next year and conclude by the end of 2014.

Despite Western leaders’ eagerness to leave Afghanistan, the Nato timetable remains conditional, dependent on the ability of the Kabul government to secure the country against the Taliban.

As the summit began, the Obama administration made clear that 2014 was only “an aspirational goal” and Nato’s secretary-general warned the West must remain committed in Afghanistan “as long as it takes”.

Nato must continue operations ‘beyond our borders’19 Nov 2010
Afghanistan will see ‘eye-watering’ levels of violence after troops leave19 Nov 2010

A senior Nato official also warned of “inevitable setbacks” in the work to complete transition by the end of 2014. Guardian. By James Kirkup, Lisbon 9:00PM GMT 19 Nov 2010

Lord Ismay, famously said the purpose of the alliance was to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.” Lisbon will also attempt to resolve some of the inter-European issues with Russia. While NATO is seriously discussing keeping the Americans out many Americans think that the real challenge is China. The US may not be able to bank on NATO for its next war.

Ahmed Rashid, the paid agent of the CIA in a recent article i the Financial Times thinks that the forlorn Karzai is breaking with the West. There is ample evidence of this.  It is obvious that the Afghan President Karzai is developing common ground with Pakistan and Iran. The US failure leaves him no choice but to deepen his relationship with Pakistan if he wants peace with the Taliban. Karzai was in Islamabad and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani is visiting Kabul. Karzai is wants to rely on just the immediate neighbors to pull him out of his present predicament. He no longer supports the “war on terrorism” as defined by NATO, and he sees Washington’s military surge in the south as futile. He repudiates success metrics based on body counts of dead Taliban. He knows that the Afghans ever more alienated.

Mr Karzai sees th writing on the wall and wants to appear presidential and reassert himself clamoring for Afghan sovereignty. It is pedagogical to note that this is exactly what the communist President Mohammed Najibullah did as the Soviet began to retreat out of  Afghanistan in 1989. Mr Najibullah huffed and puffed but a few weeks after the Soviets left he ended up at the end of a rope hanging from a lamppost in Kabul.

General Kayani has bluntly informed Ambassador Holbrooke that “Pakistan will not open any new fronts” against anyone in the near future, so NATO might as well froget about an operation against North Waziristan. The Pakistan COAS emphasized the need for a political approach to resolve the Afghan conflict, and opposed the US drone strikes in Pakistan, as they were causing more civilian damage and negatively impacts the efforts against terrorists.

James Kirkup in the Guardian further states.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon spokesman, described 2014 as “an aspirational goal” for the US to transfer security operations to the Afghan army and police. He said: “It does not necessarily mean that everywhere in the country [Afghan forces] will necessarily be in the lead and it does not mean that all US or coalition forces would necessarily be gone by that date.”

He added: “There may very well be the need for forces to remain in-country, albeit, hopefully, at smaller numbers, to assist the Afghans as they assume lead responsibility for the security of their country.”

The US military underlined its determination to continue to add resources to the Afghan battle by deploying heavily armoured tanks in Afghanistan for the first time in the nine-year war. The Marine Corps plans to use a company of Abrams tanks in areas of northern Helmand province where British forces were held to a stalemate by the Taliban by early spring.

While Nato’s schedule for transition is conditional, British officials in Lisbon made clear Mr Cameron’s timetable is unconditional. A British official in Lisbon said: “After 2015, we are not going to be in combat role. That’s absolutely clear.”

Britain has 10,000 troops in Afghanistan and has suffered 100 losses this year alone. The Prime Minister has made clear he wants most troops withdrawn before the next general election, due in May 2015.

Mr Cameron told MPs on Thursday that conditions in Afghanistan would not change his plan for 2015 to be the “endpoint” of British combat operations. He said: “I set the deadline of 2015, and yes, it is a deadline.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Nato secretary-general, told the BBC he thought Britain did not have a “concrete policy” on a withdrawal date.

He said: “I’m not aware of concrete policies for withdrawal and I believe all allies are committed to stay committed as long as it takes to do the job.

“We may also see, here and there, withdrawal of troops but the basic message is that we will stay committed as long as it takes.”

James Appathurai, the Nato spokesman, told reporters in Lisbon that the alliance is “fully confident” of meeting the 2014 target. But he added: “I must point out it is conditions-based.” Mark Sedwill, Nato’s senior civil in Kabul, underlined the difficulties the alliance will face in trying to follow its timetable.

“We are not indulging in a load of happy talk about the security situation in Afghanistan,” he said. “We believe we have regained the initiative but the progress is not irreversible. There are many challenges and inevitable set-backs ahead.”

Despite the doubts, the summit will today agree a statement proclaiming “new momentum” in Nato’s Afghan operation, declaring: “Our strategy is sound and our long-term commitment is solid.” Guardian. By James Kirkup, Lisbon 9:00PM GMT 19 Nov 2010

The Afghan president has recently said “The United States must reduce the visibility and intensity of its military operations in Afghanistan and end the increased U.S. Special Operations forces night raids that aggravate Afghans and could exacerbate the Taliban insurgence.”

There have been more than fourteen futile international conferences on Afghanistan:  Bonn, Germany (2001),  Tokyo (2002), Tokyo (2003), Berlin (2004), London (2006), Rome (2007), Dusseldorf (2008), Paris (2008), Moscow (2009), La Hague (2009), Shanghai (2009), London (January 2010), Kabul (July 2010) and now Lisbon (November 2010).

It is clear that there can be no peace in Afghanistan without the advice and consent of Pakistan. Islamabad will not allow an Anti-Pakistan government in Kabul, and wants its western flank secured. The US has to face this reality.

President Bush and Obama have held multiple reviews on Afghanistan. Let us see what the future holds.

fmeducation adds:

When US wants to attack Balochistan through drones on the pretext of Quetta Shura, it puzzles many minds because Quetta, Balochistan capital, is not a place where attacks on NATO are planned. It is 80 miles from Afghan border and there is no evidence that this city or its suburbs are Taliban safe havens. One reason which comes to mind is that USA and India are already trying to destabilize Balochistan for various reasons and the present plan to use drones is to destabilize Balochistan on fast track. Read more at: http://pksecurity.blogspot.com/2010/11/fast-track-balochistan-destabilization.html. fmeducation.wordpress.com. fmeducation@gmail.com.  Submitted on 2010/11/20 at 3:11 am

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NATOs Open Secret: 'Transition' is a really an 'Exit Strategy'

Posted on 16 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , , ,

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This image geographically depicts the four ISA...

Grand plans for ISAFs occupation lie in dust as withdrawal plans are drawn up Wikipedia

NATO is busy this week ,developing euphemisms to describe its defeat and retreat. NATO calls it “transition”. NATO doesn’t want to call it “Exit Strategy“. The Exit strategy now called “Transitions” and will reduce the ISAF footprint in Afghanistan. Just a few weeks ago, Richard Holbrooke was promising the Afghan, the Pakistanis and the world that the US would never withdraw from Afghanistan. This is total and absolute contradiction to Bob Woodward’s book which describes President Obama’s firm commitment to end the war.

The mechanics of are being defined by NATO. An alliance that could not win the war is now trying to tell the world that it can plan for a “Transition” and can dictate an “Exit Strategy”? The Treaty that has lost control of 90% of the area in Afghanistan has no credibility. While the Taliban rule the Afghanistan, the US and NATO wants to force the Pakistan Army to fight its wars in Waziristan.

The NATO alliance’s first major assignment has been a colossal failure. The European alliance has been unable to bring the Afghans under European control. After a decade of war and gore–NATO realizes that it is stuck in a quagmire and that there is no way out of this cul de sac–except a U-Turn.

Reading the denials from the US officials reminds one of the statements ringing from Saigon. Tall claims from McNamara informed the world that the defense of Vietnam was in the national interests of the USA. Similar claims of US interests are dying on the vine in Afghanistan. As the choppers left the rooftops the world saw a superpower defeated, never to return back to Southeast Asia.

The Reuters story is a case study of wordsmithing and euphemisms that cannot change the realities on the ground.

The NATO summit in Lisbon this weekend will mark a turning point in the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan as it lays out a roadmap to end combat operations by 2014, the top U.S. envoy to the region said on Monday.

But that won’t spell the end of the international presence in Afghanistan, said U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke.

“From Lisbon on, we will be on a transition strategy with a target date of the end of 2014 for Afghanistan taking over responsibility for leading the security,” he told reporters in the Pakistani capital.

“We have a transition strategy. We do not have an exit strategy.”

He stressed that 2014 would not be a repeat of 1989, when the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in defeat and the West turned its back on its former proxy battleground, leaving it a cauldron of Islamic militancy and civil war. The Taliban emerged from this stew as did Osama bin Laden.

“This does not mean international force will leave completely, and it definitely doesn’t mean we’re going to repeat 1989 when the U.S. turned its back on Afghanistan as soon as the Soviets left.”

Many in Pakistan and Afghanistan still point to the abandonment as the United States’ original sin and the cause of many of the region’s problems.

“What happened in 1989 was a straight line to 9/11, and from 9/11 to where we are today,” the U.S. envoy said. “It is the most extraordinary story of unintended consequences I think in American foreign policy history.”

July 2011 would mark the beginning of the withdrawal as planned, he said. U.S. President Barack Obama set next summer as his starting point for the drawdown of U.S. combat personnel following a surge of 30,000 troops he ordered last year.

“One thing you can be sure of is that there will be some drawdown by July of next year,” Holbrooke said. (Reuters) -

There is an elephant present in the horizon. President Obama told the Indian leadership: “Like your neighbors in Southeast Asia, we want India to not only ‘look East’, we want India to ‘engage East’ – because it will increase the security and prosperity of all our nations.” Obama seemed to be pushing Bharat towards a “Look East Policy. No similar statement asked Bharat to engage in Central Asia or Afghanistan. While the US has implicitly acquiesced to the Pakistani demand that Afghanistan be considered as zone of influence for Pakistan, the US also asked Bharat to engage in economic development of Afghanistan as long as it is part of a joint effort with the US. The US wanted Bharat to toe America’s line on Iran and Myanmar.

The next three years will witness the alliances in Afghanistan (ISAF and NATO) planning for an orderly withdrawal and saving the lives of its soldiers. While the politicians continue to force Pakistan into a perpetual war in Afghanistan, the US soldiers will be holding their own and trying to lie low so that they can get out alive from the “Graveyard of Empires”.

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Chief Justice Shinwani from the Supreme Court ...

Is Karzai's time up? or is the US-Kabul tiff a game

Posted on 16 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

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Chief Justice Shinwani from the Supreme Court ...
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Hamid Karzai, right, has himself at odds with the strategy of General David Petraeus, left, over the involvement and withdrawal of foreign troops in Afghanistan

The crucial endgame of the ferocious Afghan war, the most difficult foreign policy crisis currently facing the West, is due to be laid out later this week with plans to withdraw combat forces by the end of 2014.

But the exit strategy, due to be unveiled at the Nato summit in Lisbon, is being overshadowed by strident criticism from Hamid Karzai, the Afghan President, of how the US-led coalition is conducting the war. Mr Karzai said that the presence of a vast number of foreign troops in his country was alienating the population and buttressing the Taliban.

President Karzai’s attack has led to bitter resentment among Western officials while, at the same time, attracted attention to the intrinsic contradictions in Nato’s Afghan strategy. The Afghan leader is accused of undermining the very forces which are keeping his government – viewed as mired in corruption by the international community – in power at a time when the soldiers have suffered their highest losses of the war in a month.

General David Petraeus, the US commander of Nato forces whose strategy is the target of Mr Karzai’s accusations, is “astonished and disappointed” and is said to be even feeling that the situation may make his position “untenable”. His resignation would be seen as a crippling blow to a mission in which Barack Obama sacked the two previous commanders, General Stanley McChrystal and General David McKiernan.

General McChrystal had been painstakingly cultivating President Karzai. But his successor, General Petraeus, with the apparent sanction of the White House, has been harder-edged, pushing through policies such as setting up counter-insurgent militias in the face of opposition from the Afghan leader.

Mr Karzai had said: “The time has come to reduce military operations. The time has come to reduce the presence of, you know, boots in Afghanistan.” But in an assessment due in December, General Petraeus is expected to say that the withdrawal of US forces from July 2011, one of the stipulations President Obama made when he authorised the surge of thousands of reinforcements, cannot take place on any major scale.

Mr Karzai will then have to accept the continuing presence of a large international force if General Petraeus is to continue to run the war in Afghanistan.

A foreign diplomat told the The Washington Post: “For [Karzai] to go this way, and at that particular stage, is really undermining [General Petraeus's] endeavours.” Afghan officials said that Mr Karzai had complete faith in General Petraeus. Another Western official claimed Mr Karzai was “standing 180 degrees to what is a central tenet of our current campaign plan” and was no longer “a reliable partner”.

Speaking about the importance of the Lisbon summit for Afghanistan, the Nato Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said: “I can’t say I agree with everything President Karzai has stated on all issues but we also have to accept that he is the elected President of the country and of course he can express his views as he wishes.”

But Mr Rasmussen immediately added that there was no alternative to fighting to bring insurgents to peace talks. He said: “I consider it of utmost importance to continue our military operations because the fact is it is the increasing military pressure on the Taliban and the Taliban leadership that has stimulated the reconciliation talks.”

A previous Nato meeting at the Estonian capital, Tallinn, had envisaged that some Afghan provinces would be handed over to the control of the Karzai government by the end of the year.

A different timeline is due to be given in Lisbon with areas, rather than whole provinces, being handed over to Afghan control starting next year. The programme will begin with the relatively quiet areas in the north and the west of the country.

Mr Rasmussen and other Western officials stress that the scaling back of combat troops would not mean the wholesale withdrawal of international troops. A viable force will have to remain behind to continue training Afghan security forces and also go to their aid in a crisis.

International troops whose areas are handed over to Afghan control will be expected to help out in other parts still under Nato auspices, rather than go home. “Just because a country’s forces are in Helmand does not mean they should be the last ones to leave,” Mr Rasmussen said.

This would mean that contingents such as the Italian and German ones, in charge of regions which are likely to be among the first transferred, would have to move to the south and east where they bulk of the fighting is taking place, a development to which the respective governments are unlikely to agree. Karzai’s attack on Petraeus puts in doubt US exit strategy By Kim Sengupta and Julius Cavendish in Kabul. GETTY

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Pervez Musharraf

Don't Mess with Pakistan: Pervez Musharraf

Posted on 15 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

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Pervez Musharraf
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Sporadic and superficial global support has made Pakistanis feel dangerously betrayed

The world is watching Pakistan, and rightly so. It’s a happening place. Pakistan is at the center of geostrategic revolution and realignments. The economic, social and political aspirations of China, Afghanistan, Iran, and India turn on securing peace, prosperity, and stability in Pakistan. Our country can be an agent of positive change, one that creates unique economic interdependencies between central, west and south Asian countries and the Middle East through trade and energy partnerships. Or there’s the other option: the borderless militancy Pakistan is battling could take down the whole region.

?Recently, terrorists on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border have plotted, unsuccessfully, to unleash terror as far away as Copenhagen and New York City. Pakistan’s role in a safe, secure world cannot be overemphasized. To appreciate the complex history of Pakistan’s internal and external challenges is to understand how the 21st century could well play out for the world.

Our country was born of violence, in August 1947. Just months after the partition of the subcontinent and the creation of the Dominion of Pakistan, we were at war with India over Kashmir. Pakistan and India’s mutual animosity and history of confrontation remain powerful forces in South Asia to this day. Because of its sense of having been wronged by India—and feeling that it faced an existential threat from that country—Pakistan cast its lot with the West. We became a strategic partner of the U.S. during the Cold War, signing on to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the 1950s, while India tilted toward the Soviet Union. As part of our inalienable right to self-preservation, we formulated a “minimum defensive deterrence” strategy to maintain Army, Navy and Air Force numbers at levels proportional to India’s.

In 1965 we again went to war over Kashmir, and in 1971 over East Pakistan (I fought in both). Our suspicions about India were proved right when it became clear that the creation of Bangladesh was only made possible through Indian military and intelligence support. Among Pakistanis in general, and the Army in particular, attitudes against India hardened. The adversarial relationship between our Inter Services Intelligence and their Research and Analysis Wing worsened, both exploiting any opportunity to inflict harm on the other.

India’s “Smiling Buddha” nuclear tests in 1974 changed everything. Pakistan was forced to resort to unconventional means to compensate for the new imbalance of power. Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initiated Pakistan’s atomic program, and thus began the nuclearization of the subcontinent. India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was an effort to project power beyond its borders; Pakistan’s was an existential and defensive imperative.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 presented Pakistan with a security threat from two directions: Soviets to the west, who wanted access to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan, and Indians to the east. Once again Pakistan joined hands with the United States to fight Moscow.

We called it jihad by design, this effort to attract mujahideen from all over the Muslim world. And from Morocco to Indonesia, some 25,000 of them came. We trained and armed Taliban from the madrassahs of the then North West Frontier Province, and pushed them into Afghanistan. By this time, the liberal and intellectual Afghan elite had left for the safer climes of Europe and the U.S., leaving behind a largely poor, religious-minded population to fight the 10-year jihad. We—Pakistan, the U.S., the West, and Saudi Arabia—are equally responsible for nourishing the militancy that defeated the Soviet Union in 1989, and which seeks now to defeat us all.

The Soviets quit Kabul, and the Americans abandoned Islamabad. Washington rewarded its once indispensable ally by invoking the Pressler Amendment and imposing military sanctions, and by choosing to foster a strategic relationship with India. Pakistan was left alone to deal with the nearly 4 million Afghans who had streamed into our country and became the world’s largest refugee population. The people of Pakistan felt betrayed and used. For Pakistan, the decade of disaster had begun. No efforts were made to deprogram, rehabilitate, and resettle the mujahideen or redevelop and build back war-ravaged Afghanistan. This shortsightedness led to ethnic fighting, warlordism, and Afghanistan’s dive into darkness. The mujahideen coagulated into Al Qaeda. The Taliban, who would emerge as a force in 1996, eventually would occupy 90 percent of the country, ramming through their obscurantist medievalism.

It was also in 1989 that the freedom struggle reignited in India-administered Kashmir. This started out as a purely indigenous and peaceful uprising against Indian state repression. The people who led this first intifada were radicalized by the Indian Army’s fierce and indiscriminate crackdowns on locals. The Kashmir cause is a rallying cry for Muslims around the world. It is more so for Pakistanis. The plight of Kashmiri Muslims inspired the creation of new mujahideen groups within Pakistan who then sent thousands of volunteer fighters to the troubled territory. In terms of identity politics, the boundaries were clearer: the mujahideen set their sights on India; Al Qaeda and the Taliban were focused largely on Afghanistan. With the Taliban to our west and the mujahideen in the north, this arc of anger rent our social fabric. Pakistan found itself awash in guns and drugs.

Nine years later, there was bad news from Pokhran. In May 1998, India again tested its bomb. Almost two weeks later, Pakistan responded by “turning the mountain white” at Chaghai. For Pakistanis, our own tests became a symbol of our power in the world, a testament to our resolve and innovation in the face of adversity, and a source of unmitigated pride in our streets. We became a nuclear power and an international pariah at the same time, but furthering and harnessing our nuclear potential remains and must remain our singular national interest.

Of course, the U.S. views India’s nuclear program differently from Pakistan’s. Even our pursuit of nuclear power for civilian purposes, for electricity generation, is viewed negatively. India’s pursuit is assisted by the U.S. In Pakistan, people see this as yet another instance of American partiality, even hostility. Many even believe that the U.S. wants to denuclearize Pakistan—by force if necessary—because it fears the weapons could come into the hands of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or any of the myriad militant organizations who have loosed mayhem in Pakistan. Our nuclear weapons are secure.

Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban government of Afghanistan. We did this because of our ethnic, historical, and geographical affinity with Afghan Pashtuns who comprised the Taliban. In 2000, when I led Pakistan, I had suggested to the U.S. and other countries that they, too, should recognize the Taliban government and collectively engage Kabul in order to achieve moderation there through exposure and exchange. This was shot down. Continued diplomatic isolation of the Taliban regime pushed it into the embrace of the Arab-peopled Al Qaeda. Had the Taliban government been recognized, the world could have saved the Bamiyan Buddhas, and unknotted the Osama bin Laden problem thereby preventing the spate of Al Qaeda-orchestrated attacks around the world including on September 11, 2001, in the U.S.

When America decided to retaliate, we joined the international coalition against Kabul by choice so we could safeguard and promote our own national interests. Nobody in Islamabad was in favor of the religious and governmental philosophy of the Taliban. By joining the coalition, we also prevented India from gaining an upper hand in Afghanistan from where it could then machinate against Pakistan. The Taliban and Al Qaeda were defeated in 2001 with the help of the Northern Alliance, which was composed of Uzbeks, Hazarans, and Tajiks—all ethnic minorities. The Pashtuns and Arabs of Afghanistan fled to the mountains and fanned out across Pakistan. This was the serious downside of joining the global coalition: the mujahideen who were fighting for Kashmir formed an unholy nexus with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban—and turned their guns on us. While I was president, they made at least four attempts on my life.

In 2002, the allies installed a largely Pashtun-free government in Afghanistan that lacked legitimacy because it did not represent 50 percent of the Afghan population, Pashtuns. This should not have happened. All Taliban are Pashtun, but not all Pashtuns are Taliban. Pashtuns were thus isolated, blocked from the mainstream, and pushed toward the Taliban, who made a resurgence in 2004.

Today, the Taliban rule the roost in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are ensconced in our tribal agencies, plotting and launching attacks against us and others. The twin scourge of radicalism and militarism has infected settled districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and beyond. Mujahideen groups are operating in India-administered Kashmir and seem to have public support in Pakistan.

After nine long years, and a longer war for the U.S. than Vietnam, the world wants to negotiate with “moderate” elements in the Taliban—and from a position of apparent weakness. Before the coalition abandons Afghanistan again, it must at least ensure the election of a legitimate Pashtun-led government. Pakistan, which has lost at least 30,000 of its citizens in the war on terror, should be forgiven for wondering whether it was all worth it. Pakistanis should not be left to feel that it was not.

The writer is former president and army chief of Pakistan

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US propaganda leaflet used in Afghanistan.

Omar vs. Laden

Posted on 15 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

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US propaganda leaflet used in Afghanistan.
US Propaganda leaflet in Afghanistan  Wikipedia

There are media reports about the internal conflicts between the ranks of those who oppose the US occupation.

It seems that the so called “Taliban” want to concentrate their struggle within Afghanistan and do not wan to unnecessarily exacerbate the  situation and antagonize America and other world powers. It seems the Afghan National Resistance (Taliban, Haqqani, Hikmatyar, Hizbe Islami etc) wants an end to occupation and does not share the ephemeral goals of those who wish to wage perpetual war against America. Press reports and declassified communication intercepts between Bin Laden and his acolytes seems to suggest that Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan National Resistance is not part of any long term battle with America or the West. The Afghan National Resistance (Taliban, Haqqani, Hikmatyar, Hizbe Islami etc) have Afghan-centric view of the world which would force the end of the occupation. Their war is waged within the confines of the Afghan national state.

  • London, The victory of the Taliban over US-led forces in Afghanistan is imminent, the group’s elusive chief Mullah Omar has said in a rare statement.
  • BBC Thursday quoted the one-eyed guerrilla leader as saying that the Taliban was winning because the Western military campaign aimed at snuffing out the militia had been ‘a complete failure’.
  • In the time to come, we will try to establish an Islamic, independent, perfect and strong system.’
  • At the same time, he directed his guerrillas to observe the Taliban’s code of conduct and not to harm civilians.
  • The US has set July 2011 as the deadline to begin withdrawing its troops if conditions permit. Barack Obama had ordered 30,000 more US soldiers into Afghanistan in December following a resurgence of Taliban. Top I News.

S Iftikhar Murshed writing for The News has presented certain facts about Libby and Bon Laden which if true shed a different light on the dynamics within Afghanistan.

Osama bin Laden has been accused by his former associate and comrade in arms, Noman Benotman, or Abu Muhammed al-Libi as he is known in Afghanistan, of betraying Mullah Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliban. This is elaborated in an open letter of Sept 10, 2010, to the Al-Qaeda chief in which al-Libi alleges that “Afghans, including Mullah Omar and his supporters, asked us to protect their country and its people. Instead, you wanted to use their country as a launch-pad for war against America, Israel, the West and the Arab regimes. What benefit has this brought the Afghan people? Separately, when Mullah Omar asked you on several occasions to stop provoking and inviting American attacks on his country, you ignored him. How can you claim to fight for an ‘Islamic state’ and then so flagrantly disobey the ruler you helped put in place?”

Al-Libi is no stranger to jihad, and his association with Osama bin Laden dates back to the 1980s when they fought alongside the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet occupation forces. He later joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), whose avowed objective was the violent overthrow of the Qadhafi regime and establishing a Shariah-based government in that country. Al-Libi became exceptionally close to bin Laden when the two were in Sudan in the 1990s and this relationship intensified after they were expelled from Khartoum and compelled to return to Afghanistan in 1996. Two years later, the LIFG’s armed struggle against the Qadhafi regime collapsed and its fighters relocated to Afghanistan, where bin Laden was desperately trying to recruit jihadi outfits for his self-proclaimed war against “Jews and Crusaders” through the World Islamic Front he established in 1998.

This generated sharp differences between al-Libi and bin Laden. The leadership of the LIFG was no less opposed to taking on the US. Not because of any support for American policies but for its concern that such an enterprise would have disastrous consequences for the Taliban movement, which had given refuge not only to Al-Qaeda but also to several other Arab jihadi groups. For his part, Mullah Omar sought and obtained assurances from bin Laden that he would not launch attacks against the United States from Afghanistan.

In his letter, al-Libi claims to have emphatically reiterated Mullah Omar’s concerns to bin Laden during a breakfast meeting at the latter’s home in Kandahar in the summer of 2000. No less intriguing is the revelation that even some Al-Qaeda leaders, notably, the head of the Shariah Committee, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani (killed in an air raid in Pakistan), and Security Committee chief Abu Muhammad al-Zayat (who is said to be in Iran) had opposed operations outside Afghanistan. Particularly the 9/11 attacks which, in their opinion, “were illegitimate without Mullah Omar’s permission” and would eventually result in the destruction of the Taliban regime because of retaliatory US military action against Afghanistan.

These accusations are of considerable importance in the context of the ongoing Afghan conflict and the parallel reconciliation process. If Mullah Omar opposed the 9/11 attacks, then he should not have any compunction in severing all links with Al-Qaeda, thereby enabling his own inclusion in President Karzai’s reconciliation initiative.

Pakistan can play a significant role in facilitating such an outcome because of its obvious influence with Mullah Omar.

Foreign policy formulation in Islamabad often ignores the dictum that, other than national interests and geography, nothing in interstate relations is permanent. Even national interests are liable to be redefined in accordance with the ever-changing security environment. Friends and allies of yesteryear can become the gravest threat to national security, as has been the experience of Pakistan.

Suicide terrorism was unheard-of in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region until, two days before the fateful 9/11 incidents, Ahmed Shah Masood became its first major victim. According to a recent assessment, terrorism-related civilian deaths in Pakistan soared from 189 in 2003 to 9,009 in the first ten months of 2010. When the 3,215 military personnel and the 19,019 terrorists killed are added, the total number of fatalities this year alone is a startling 31,243. The tally for the last seven years is 56,431 civilians averaging more than 8,000 deaths each year.

These frightening statistics can never portray the anguish of those who have lost, and continue to lose, loved ones because of terrorist violence. However, they do drive home the inescapable truth that the gravest threat to Pakistan’s survival is internal and the need for decisive action against terrorist groups is inescapable.

In this context Islamabad can, and should, use its influence with those Taliban leaders who have severed their links with terrorist outfits to facilitate an Afghanistan settlement, but without being intrusive. The process can begin with Mullah Omar if what al-Libi claims is true. The writer is the publisher of Criterion quarterly. Email: iftimurshed @gmail.com.

We disagree with analysis and the historiography of Mr. S Iftikhar Murshed. Pakistan has legitimate interests in Pakistan, and a reasonable right to expect that an Anti-Pakistani government should not be in place in Kabul. The world has accepted this right. Presenting a point  view which would encourage Delhi to have a complaint government in Kabul is unacceptable to the Pakistani people. Washington has accepted Pakistan’s sphere of influence as a legitimate aspiration and has recently encouraged Bharat to look towards the East. In the much heralded trip to Delhi, President Obama did not mention any role for Bharat in Afghanistan–except for art and craft activities which would involve Bharati Dollars.

In the aftermath of America’s conditional  support to Bharat’s aspirations to a UNSC seat–Pakistan has to reevaluate the entire gammit of its relationship with Washington. The mood in Islamabad to bide its time, and let America leave Afghanistan. The bloody nose may keep them away for a while, but the Brits have a nasty habit of finding an excuse to invade Afghanistan every few decades. The beginning of the end will commence in 2011 and end before 2014. A recent bi-partisan CFR report has recommended that the US withdraw from Afghanistan if the conditions don’t improve. It has also recommended that America should reduce its footprint in Afghanistan if the current situation persists. In other words CRF has recommended that the US should withdraw from Afghanistan. If the CFR report is stripped of all the rhetoric, shifting of blame and the threats, it is a simple recognition of the reality of Afghanistan. The CFR report is signed by leading intellectuals of America like Christine Flair, and Richard Armitage (made famous because of his 2001 threat to bomb Pakistan to the stone age).

President Obama will be completing a review of its Afghan policy this December. In all probability, the symbolic withdrawal of US troops will begin in July 2011. Richard Holbrooke in fact reiterated this in a recent statement. The withdrawal of the first soldier will be the most difficult and politically explosive move. After the sticker shock of defeat has been overcome the mercenaries will lose their funding. Then the US forces will begin departing in earnest–even though there may be some delays, and some mini-surges built into the withdrawal time-line. Once a portion of the withdrawal has been completed, the US wil lbe unable to sustain the occupation–and the rest of the forces will leave rapidly.

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During a Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) mis...

Clinton confirms, US trained Osama Bin Laden

Posted on 13 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

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During a Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) mis...

Hillary Clinton admits US trained Osama Bin Laden Image via Wikipedia

Mrs. Hillary Clinton has officially admitted that the US trained Osama Bin Laden. In the ABC show she was saying that Pakistan supported the Taliban, and had changed its mind since 2001.

“That is changing… Now, I cannot sit here and tell you that it has changed, but that is changing,” she told ABC News in an interview, the transcripts of which was released by the State Department.

Ms. Clinton accepted that the U.S. had created certain radical outfits and supported terrorists like Osama bin Laden to fight against the erstwhile Soviet Union, but that backing has boomeranged. “Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahidin force against the Soviet Union (in Afghanistan). We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. And it didn’t work out so well for us,” she said.

The Secretary of the State also said Pakistan is paying a “big price” for supporting U.S. war against terror groups in their own national interest. “But I think it is important to note that as they have made these adjustments in their own assessment of their national interests, they’re paying a big price for it,” Ms. Clinton said.

“And it’s not an easy calculation for them to make. But we are making progress (in Afghanistan). We have a long way to go and we can’t be impatient…Well, the headlines are bad. We’re going home. We cannot do that,” she said.

Appearing on the same ABC show, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates said Pakistan has withdrawn an equivalent of about six divisions of its army from the Indian border and moved them.

“And they are attacking the Taliban. They’re attacking the Taliban — Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and safe havens that are a problem for us,” Mr. Gates said.

“But the other piece of this, we face in both countries what they call a trust deficit, and it is because they believe we have walked away from them in the past at the toughest moments of their history.

“You can’t recreate that (trust) in a heartbeat. You can’t recreate that in a year or two. They both worry that once we solve the problem in Afghanistan, or if we don’t solve it, that either way, we will leave and leave whatever remains in their hands to deal with,” he added.

Keywords: U.S.-Pakistan relations, India-Pakistan relations, terrorist organisations

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