Rupee News

The recommendations that would allow Pakistani textile products into the US have repeatedly run into the powerful textile lobby in the US. Once again a bi-partisan panel has suggested that Pakistani textiles be allowed more access to US markets. This would increase exports to the US to rise by an additional $4 billion.

WASHINGTON: A leading US think tank study has recommended Washington to ease trade restrictions on Pakistani textile exports and increase the military’s capacity to defeat militants on the battlefield as part of efforts to strengthen a cooperative partnership to defeat extremists operating in the region.

“The US commitment to a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan is a critical step in securing Pakistani action against the militant groups within its borders,” a report by an independent task force for the Council on Foreign Relations says.

“The Obama administration’s strategy in Pakistan has resulted in stronger relationships with civilian and military authorities more substantial and targeted aid,” it notes.

Meanwhile, al-qaeda militants are being increasingly targeted in the tribal border regions.

“To reinforce US-Pakistan ties and contribute to Pakistan’s economic stability in the aftermath of an overwhelming natural disaster, the Obama administration should prioritize and the Congress should enact agreement that would grant preferential market access to Pakistani textiles,” former deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger, stress in the report.

This agreement would help revive the Pakistani industry and all of the associated sectors of the economy, including Pakistan-grown cotton, the report adds.

“To further enhance Pakistan’s stability, the United States should maintain current levels of economic and technical assistance to help military and civilian leaders reconstruct and establish control over areas hard-hit by the flood, including those contested by militant forces. American assistance should also encourage private sector investment in conflict-prone and flood-ravaged regions.”

As part of efforts to build Pakistani support for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, the United States “must move rapidly to implement high-profile assistance projects and should also reach out on a sustained basis to nontraditional allies in Pakistani society, including business interests, educators, local media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”

The authors of the report particularly highlight that a continuing robust response to this summer’s epic floods is necessary to prevent Pakistan from sliding into economic and political troubles.

Washington’s first order of business in Pakistan must be to help address the extreme humanitarian suffering and dislocation caused by this summer’s floods. The best way for the United States to address the challenges of terrorism and security is by working shoulder to shoulder with a stable partner in Islamabad.

The report says as it cultivates a closer partnership with Islamabad and contributes to shoring up the Pakistani state and national economy, the United States should seek action against Afghan, Pakistani and other related militant groups.

“By demonstrating American generosity and assistance at a time of grave Pakistani peril, the United States will also make a better case for the strategic benefits of its partnership.”

One of the greatest challenges to improving relations between the people of Pakistan and the United States is the perception that America does not welcome Pakistani visitors, the chairs of the task force note.

“This perception has been reinforced by heavy-handed US border security policies and clumsy implementation,” the authors point out.

Other miscommunications and security precautions have even disrupted official Pakistani travel within the United States. “Although the US government must do what is necessary to secure the borders, future decisions regarding travel restrictions and airport security should do far more to take Pakistani sensitivities, as well as the diplomatic implications of new regulations, into consideration. As a practical matter, an interagency liaison team should be established to manage and avert diplomatic incidents related to security procedures at US airports.”

Focusing on the regional dimensions of the ongoing tensions, the report proposes “to reduce regional tensions that distract from counter terror operations and undermine Pakistan’s stability, the United States should encourage progress in the Indo-Pakistani relationship.”

“Washington should not attempt to impose itself in Indo-Pakistani negotiations.

An indirect approach is better. The United States should help to build new constituencies for peace by helping to fund international development schemes that benefit businesses and people on both sides of the Indo- Pakistani border.”

The United States, the report suggests, should seek creative new ways to encourage Indo-Pakistani trade and investment, including US technical assistance for infrastructure development along the international border and the Kashmir divide.

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While the US pontificates about Nuclear Proliferation and wants to control the nukes of Iran and Pakistan, ignores Israel and encourages India, there is irrefutable evidence that US nukes are under an accident prone system of controls which could have disastrous consequences for the planet. American hypocrisy on its broken arrows (lost nukes) is a matter of much deliberation and discussion.

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Early on in my days as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we had small, weekly White House breakfasts in National Security Advisor Sandy Berger‘s office that included me, Sandy, Bill Cohen (Secretary of Defense), Madeleine Albright (Secretary of State), George Tenet (head of the CIA), Leon Firth (VP chief of staff for security), Bill Richardson (ambassador to the U.N.), and a few other senior administration officials. These were informal sessions where we would gather around Berger’s table and talk about concerns over coffee and breakfast served by the White House dining facility. It was a comfortable setting that encouraged brainstorming of potential options on a variety of issues of the day. During that time we had U-2 aircraft on reconnaissance sorties over Iraq. These planes were designed to fly at extremely high speeds and altitudes (over seventy thousand feet) both for pilot safety and to avoid detection. At one of my very first breakfasts, while Berger and Cohen were engaged in a sidebar discussion down at one end of the table and Tenet and Richardson were preoccupied in another, one of the Cabinet members present leaned over to me and said, “Hugh, I know I shouldn’t even be asking you this, but what we really need in order to go in and take out Saddam is a precipitous event—something that would make us look good in the eyes of the world. Could you have one of our U-2s fly low enough— and slow enough—so as to guarantee that Saddam could shoot it down?” The hair on the back of my neck bristled, my teeth clenched, and my fists tightened. I was so mad I was about to explode. I looked across the table, thinking about the pilot in the U-2 and responded, “Of course we can . . .” which prompted a big smile on the offi cial’s face. “You can?” was the excited reply. “Why, of course we can,” I countered. “Just as soon as we get your ass qualified to fly it, I will have it flown just as low and slow as you want to go.” The official reeled back and immediately the smile disappeared. “I knew I should not have asked that. . . .” “No, you should not have,” I strongly agreed, still shocked at the disrespect and sheer audacity of the question. “Remember, there is one of our great Americans flying that U-2, and you are asking me to intentionally send him or her to their death for an opportunity to kick Saddam. The last time I checked, we don’t operate like that here in America.” I left the room that day but I never forgot it. I went back and I shared it with the Joint Chiefs—not revealing who the official was—but nonetheless getting into how it had played out. “You may not think those types of things still happen in Washington, but trust me—they do, and I’ve just been exposed to it. Keep your antennas up and do not ever fall into it.” Looking back on the thirty-four years of my career that led up to my appointment as Chairman, I felt comfortable with the man I saw in the mirror. I had earned a solid reputation as an honest, straightforward role model for integrity, ethics, and selflessness—a leader whose moral character was beyond reproach. Now, as I proudly stepped into my position as highest-ranking military officer in all of the United States Armed Forces— the principal military adviser to the President and the National Security Council—I was excited to serve as a living example to the three million-plus men and women of our armed forces that it really is possible to rise to the top of one’s profession through character-based leadership and without its being at the expense of others. But what was I stepping into behind the heavily fortified walls of the Pentagon’s inner circle? Would subsequent White House gatherings attempt to drag me into more revolting conspiracies? I’d had bosses who asked me to steal for them, others to access and falsify their records. I’d seen my share of cowards and relieved them of duty. But never in those thirty-four years had I seen—or even imagined—anything that came close to a senior Cabinet member suggesting I be party to killing one of our great airmen in hopes of starting a war. Was this typical of what really went on at the highest levels of the United States government, the country I had passionately devoted my life to serve? If my first few weeks as Chairman were any indication of the challenges the next four years would bring, I would have countless opportunities to call upon those principles deeply ingrained within me as a young boy in a small North Carolina town called Speed. From “Without Hesitation” by General (Ret.) Hugh Shelton, 14th Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Ronald Levinson and Malcolm McConnell. Copyright © 2010 by the authors and reprinted by permission of St. Martin’s Press, LLC. General Hug Shelton’s book is only is a series of writings about the incompetence of the Clinton Administration about nukes.