The thief: Abdul Kalam heists and false titles

English: Former Indian President Dr. Abul Pakir Jainul Abedin Abdul Kalam. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

There is a thief that has gotten away with theft. All doctoral degrees of “Dr” Kalam are honorary, conferred due to his official sinecure status after he superannuated as a space department staffer. Kalam was later made president of India by a grateful Vajpayee India in return for his services to him as a “nuclear scientist.”

The credentials of Kalam, then considered the highest authority on the subject, are questioned by many scientists, including Homi Sethna, another former chairman of the AEC, who was the guiding force behind India’s first nuclear test in 1974.

The most profound statement made by Kalam, who later became president of India, immediately after the tests was not scientific – but political. He said how a nuclear-armed India “will be free of foreign invasions which have constantly remolded the ancient Hindu civilization“. Those who believe that this was the statement – more than the bomb itself – that endeared Kalam to the leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ruling at that time, may have a valid point. Sethna has suggested that Kalam’s statement refuting Santhanam was that of a politician. Asia Times. India battles with nuclear fallout By Ninan Koshy

Major source: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_03/March-IndiaFeature

Delhi recently set off a rocket to the moon. This set off alarm bells in Washington. Richard Speier a reputable American defense analyst wrote an excellent article (U.S. Missile Nonproliferation Policy and India’s Path to an ICBM Capability Richard Speier) on the apprehensions of the US administration as well as the concerns of the US military with respect to the transfer of technology form the American Scout program to the Bharati corridors of duplication and reverse engineering. We have produces sections of that article and a plethora of other information from reputable sources to trace and track the thefts, stealing of sensitive US information by Bharati scientists with approval from the highest icons of power in Delhi. Richard Sepier lists the chronology clearly describing the chain of events.

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The path to India’s ICBM capability has spanned more than four decades and is largely based on space-launch vehicle technology obtained from foreign sources. The United States has taken measures over the last several decades to restrict missile proliferation, but the policies took effect only after India’s missile program had begun. Moreover, U.S. nonproliferation policy has also not been consistently applied, particularly in India’s case. Indeed, the relationship between space launch vehicles and missile proliferation seems to have been obscured. U.S. Missile Nonproliferation Policy and India’s Path to an ICBM Capability Richard Speier

English: Syed Akbar during an interview with The Former President of India and Aerospace Engineer Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam during the occasion of 63rd Indian Independence Day (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

While this theft is known in the intelligent community, it is often overlooked by the Murdockized press.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s2iBXKgkcIg

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s2iBXKgkcIg]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1f6vbiuUt0

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1f6vbiuUt0]

There are many dimensions to Bharat’s arms. First it is using all means necessary to come to a level to challenge other powers in Asia. However as Speier and a large body of American, Western and Russian arms experts note that it is donwright dangerous for the US or even Russia to arm Bharat. Russia takes the money and has refused to transfer technology. The US multinationals will never commit commercial sucide by sharing the secret “Coke formula” with the locl counterparts. However Bharat has used underground netwroks to acquire technology. This has been reported in the press but not highlighted.

English: BJP 2004 election poster in Durgapur. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Mr. Spier raises concerns about US help to Bharat.

1) Do not be naive about the nature of India’s program.

After more than two decades of reports about India’s interest in an ICBM, includ ing reports from Russia, statements on India ’s ICBM capability by the U.S. intelligence community, and the firing of an Indian official after he publicly described the Surya program, there should be no illusions. The reports consistently state that India’s ICBM will be derived from its space-launch vehicle technology.

The United States should not believe that it is possible to separate India’s “civil ian” space-launch program-the incubator of its ballistic missiles-from India’s military program.

The United States would be the primary target of an Indian ICBM, which would be used to protect India from the theoretical possibility of “high-tech aggression.”

The U.S. intelligence community should resume its semi-annual unclassified report ing to Congress on India’s nuclear and missile programs, which was discontinued after April 2003.

2) Do not assist India’s space launch programs.

The United States should not cooperate either with India’s space launches or with satellites that India will launch. India hopes that satellite launches will earn revenues that will accelerate its space program, including rocket development. U.S. payloads for Indian launches, such as the envisioned cooperative lunar project, risk technology transfer and invite other states to be less restrained in their use of Indian launches.

The United States should resume dis couraging other states from using Indian launches, while encouraging India to re sume the practice of launching satellites on other states’ space launch vehicles.

Given the frequent reports of Russian cryogenic rockets being used in the Surya, the United States should work with Russia to ensure that Russian space cooperation with India does not undercut U.S. restraint.

Because there is no meaningful distinc tion between India’s civilian and military rocket programs, the United States should explicitly or de facto place ISRO back on the “entities” list of destinations that require export licenses.[23]

In addition, Congress should insist that the administration explain its red lines regarding space cooperation with India. If these lines are not drawn tightly enough, Congress should intervene.

3) Review carefully any cooperation with India’s satellite programs.

India is reportedly developing multiple nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles. If India develops an ICBM, the next step will be to develop countermeasures to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Certain satellite technologies can help India with both of these developments.

The United States should review its satellite cooperation to ensure that it does not aid India inappropriately in the technologies of dispensing or orienting spacecraft, of automated deployment of structures in space, or of other operations that would materially contribute to mul tiple warheads or countermeasures against missile defenses.

4) Stop using cooperation in dangerous technologies as diplomatic baubles.

India is the current example of a broader, dysfunctional tendency in bilateral relations to display trust and friendship by opening up the most dangerous forms of cooperation. The United States should not fall further into this trap with India or with any other state.

India needs many other forms of economic and military cooperation more than it needs nuclear and space technology. If India insists on focusing technology co operation in these areas, the United States should interpret that it as a red flag.

The U.S. removal of technology sanctions imposed after India’s 1998 nuclear tests was an adequate and perhaps exces sive display of friendship. Further tech nology cooperation should be limited to areas that do not contribute to nuclear weapons or their means of delivery.

Conclusion: A primary target of an Indian ICBM would be the United States. The technology of an Indian ICBM would be that of a space launch vehicle, either directly via the PSLV or indirectly via the Agni, which is based on India’s SLV-3. The United States should not facilitate the acquisition or improve ment of that technology directly or indirectly. In this matter, U.S. clarity and restraint are what the world and India need.

The United States needs to divert from the present glide path and reorient itself and India onto a more produc tive course of cooperation. It would be a cruel irony if, in the hope of becoming strategic partners, we became each other’s strategic targets. (Richard Speier. Arms Control)

Kamlesh & HE APJ Abdul Kalam (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Proliferation, overlooked by the previous administration will be a major issue for the new Democratic Administration. Already President Barack Obama has outlined this in his various papers. His advisors also have sent the signals to Delhi–making most Bharati leaders nervous and at least one literally having a heart attack!

India as a Space power!

• 1960s: NASA trains Indian scientists at Wallops Island, Virginia, in sounding rockets and provides Nike-Apache sounding rockets to India.[1] France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union also supply sounding rockets.[2]
• 1963-1964: A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, an Indian engineer, works at Wallops Island, where the Scout space-launch vehicle (an adaptation of Minuteman ICBM solid-fuel rocket technology) is flown.[3]
• 1965: Following Kalam’s return to India, the Indian Atomic Energy Commission requests U.S. assistance with the Scout, and NASA provides unclassified reports.[4]

English: With Dr. Abdul Kalam, former president of India (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Sudra Holocaust: Genocide of 1 million Dalits in India since 1947: About three million Dalit women have been raped and around one million Dalits killed from the time of Independence. This is 25 times more than number of soldiers killed during the wars fought after independence. That is why Dalits do not need Aryan culture or Hindu Dharma based on caste any more. …” [Dr. Tulsiram]

• 1969-1970: U.S. firms supply equipment for the Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant at Sriharikota.[5]
• 1970s: Kalam becomes head of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), in charge of developing space launch vehicles. During the same time period, the United States begins to consider a broad policy against missile proliferation.
• May 1974: India conducts a “peaceful nuclear explosion.”
• 1980s: The United States and its six economic sum mit partners secretly negotiate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). After one and a half years of difficult negotiations on the question of space launch vehicles, all partners agree that they must be treated as restrictively as ballistic missiles because their hardware, technology, and production facilities are interchangeable. The MTCR is informally implemented in 1985 and is publicly announced in 1987.
• July 1980: India launches its first satellite with the SLV-3 rocket, a close copy of the NASA Scout.[6]
• February 1982: Kalam becomes head of the Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), in charge of adapting space-launch vehicle technology to ballistic missiles.
• May 1989: India launches its first Agni “technology demonstrator” surface-to-surface missile. The Agni’s first stage is essentially the first stage of the SLV-3. Later, the Agni becomes a family of three short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles.[7]
• 1990: The United States enacts a sanctions law against missile proliferation. Two weeks later, the Soviet Union agrees to supply India with cryogenic upper-stage rockets and technology, and the two parties become the first countries sanctioned under the new U.S. law.[8]
• 1993: The United States lifts sanctions on Russia after Moscow agrees to limit the transfer to a small number of rocket engines and not production technology.[9]
• 1994: India launches the Polar Space Launch Ve hicle (PSLV). Stages 1 and 3 are 2.8-meter-diameter solid-fuel rockets. Stages 2 and 4 are liquid-fuel Vikas engines derived from 1980s French technology transfers.
• The earliest reported date for when the Surya ICBM program, using PSLV technology, is said to have been officially authorized. However, India’s space and missile en gineers, if not the “official” Indian government, had opened the option much earlier.
• May 1998: India tests nuclear weapons after decades of protesting that its nuclear program was exclu sively peaceful. The United States imposes broad sanctions on nuclear- and missile/space-related transfers.
• April 1999: India launches the Agni II, an extended range missile that tests re-entry vehicle “technology [that] can be integrated with the PSLV programme to create an ICBM” according to a defense ministry official.[10]
• Kalam quoted in Jane’s Defence Weekly that he wants to “neutralise” the “stranglehold” some nations have through the MTCR, which had tried but failed to “throttle” India’s missile program. “I would like to devalue missiles by selling the technology to many nations and break their stranglehold.”[11]
• May 1999: Defense News cites DRDO officials as stating that the Surya is under development.[12]
• November 1999
• India ‘s minister of state for defense (and former head of DRDO), Bachi Singh Rawat, says India is developing an ICBM known as Surya that would “have a range of up to” 5,000 kilometers. A little more than two weeks later, Rawat is reportedly stripped of his portfolio because of his disclosure.[13]
• 2000s
• April 2001: Khrunichev State Space Science and Pro duction Center announces that it will supply five more cryogenic upper stages to India within the next three years.[14]
• September 2001
• The United States lifts many of the technology sanctions it imposed in 1998. Subsequently, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visits the United States amid agreement to broaden the technology dialogue.
• December 2001: A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate states, ” India could convert its polar space launch vehicle into an ICBM within a year or two of a decision to do so.”[15]
• July 2002: Kalam becomes president of India.
• September 2002: The United States tells India it will not object to India launching foreign satellites as long as they do not contain U.S.-origin components.[16]
• April 2003: The last mention of India as a proliferator or a supplier to proliferators is made in the director of central intelligence’s unclassified semi-annual report to Congress on the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.[17]
• January 2004: President George W. Bush agrees to expand cooperation with India in “civilian space programs” but not explicitly to cooperate with space launches. This measure is part of a bilateral initiative dubbed “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership.”[18]
• October 2004
• A Russian Academy of Sciences deputy director reportedly states that India is planning to increase the range of the Agni missile to 5,000 kilometers and to design the Surya ICBM with a range of 8,000-12,000 kilometers.[19]
• July 2005: Bush agrees to cooperate with India on “satellite navigation and launch,” and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agrees to “adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime…guidelines.”[20]
• August 2005: According to Indian Ministry of Defense sources, there are plans to use the noncryogenic Vikas stage for the Surya and to have the missile deliver a 2.5-3.5-metric-ton payload with two or three warheads with explosive yields of 15-20 kilotons.[21] U.S. Missile Nonproliferation Policy and India’s Path to an ICBM Capability Richard Speier

The Americans are very nervous about helping Bharat and very apprehensive that technology will be stolen again.

Richard Arms Control mentions the fact that India’s naked ambitions are there to target the USA.

Indian commentators generally cite two reasons for acquiring an ICBM: to establish India as a global power and to enable India to deal with “high-tech aggression” of the type demonstrated in the wars with Iraq.[10] Because there is no obvious reason for India to want a military capability against Europe, there is one target that stands out as a bull’s-eye for an Indian ICBM: the United States. The reported 12,000-kilometer Surya-2 range is tailor- made to target the United States.

Richard Speir also makes some solid recommendations on what the US should do to prevent India acquiring the capability to attack the USA.

The United States now might have dimin ished leverage if India decided to export missile technology to countries such as Iran , given that certain types of MTCR agreements tend to provide a shield from U.S. sanctions.[11]

India historically has had a close relation ship with Tehran.[12] Indian entities have supplied sensitive military technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-re lated items to Iran. In diplomatic talks, the United States and Israel have urged India to cool this relationship, specifically in areas of military and energy cooperation and with respect to deliberations on Iran’s nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency.[13] Additionally, the United States has imposed sanctions on several Indian firms and individuals for providing the militarily sensitive and WMD-related items.[14]

Nonetheless the Indian-Iranian relationship is strong. In January 2003, then-Iranian President Mohammad Khatami joined Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam to watch Agni missiles roll by in the Indian Republic Day parade; and the two presidents signed a strategic accord providing India with access to Iranian bases in an emergency in return for Indian transfers of defense products, training, maintenance, and military mod ernization support.[15] This relationship is strongly supported by India’s left wing, and India cannot seem to extricate itself.[16] Even if the current ruling party could disentangle itself from Iran, the underlying political support for Iranian ties might lead a future Indian government to resume the relationship.

Aside from Iran, Indian entities have engaged in WMD-related transfers to Libya and Iraq,[17] India appears to be seeking new customers. India’s DRDO has aspirations to export missiles-said to be below the MTCR threshold at present-to “many African, Gulf and South-East Asian coun tries,” subject to government approval.[18] Arms Control. Richard Speier

India’s faltering $41 Billion IT economy cannot salvage the lot of the poor. While a triumphalist media discusses the “growth of the Indian middle class”, the reality of India’s penury stricken population is very different. The higher the number the worse off the country. India ranks below Cambodia and Burkino Faso in terms of hunger. It is slightly better off than Haiti, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh. Pakistan’s fares much better and is not listed on this chart. Cuba has taken care of its population and eliminated malnutrition, hunger and child mortality. It has done more with less and is the example that needs to be followed. Cuba produces more doctors for less and offers free medical education to citizens of the world. 1000 Cuban doctors served in cold Azad Kashmir and helped the victims of the earthquake. Richard Speier

How could a country that cannot feed, or clothe its population build space vehicles. How can a country whose entire missile program was scrapped by the military send rockets into space? How can a country which takes 10 years to design a plane creates a dud explore the moon? How can a country where 75% of the population lives below Sub-Saharan poverty find the money to spend on satellite technology (India: More than 75% live below Sub Saharan poverty line ). How can the hungriest country in Asia compete with the Chinese and the Japanese?

• How long to extripate penury from india? 300 years!
• India’s budget– fit for a superpower

It is a paradox of American and Japanese policy that is building India to counterbalance China.

THE COUNTRIES WITH THE WORST RECORD ON HUNGER. THE HIGHER THE NUMBER THE WORSE IT IS. INDI RANKS AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HEAP. On this chart Cambodia is the best and Congo the worst. India is worse than Burkino Faso and slightly better than Zimbabwe, and Haiti.

• World power India? Part 2
• India as a World Power: Part 3
  

  64	Cambodia	32.4	23.2
  65	Burkina Faso	25.1	23.5
  66	India	32.5	23.7
  67	Zimbabwe	20.2	23.8
  68	Tanzania	26.1	24.2
  69	Haiti?	35.9	24.3
  70	Bangladesh	32.3	25.2
  71	Tajikstan	n/a	25.9
  72	Mozambique	40.9	26.3
  73	Mali	29.6	26.9
  74	Guinea-Bissau	23	27.5
  75	Central African Rep	32	28
  76	Madagascar	29.1	28.8
  77	Comoros	26.4	29.1
  78	Zambia	29.1	29.2
  79	Angola	39.8	29.5
  80	Yemen	30.7	29.8
  81	Chad	37.5	29.9
  82	Ethiopia	44	31
  83	Liberia	27.3	31.8
  84	Sierra Leone	32.4	32.2
  85	Niger	38	32.4
  86	Burundi	32.6	38.3
  87	Eritrea	n/a	39
  88	DR Congo	25.5	42.7
  Source: IFPRI (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7670229.stm)

India as a Space power!

India as World Power 1

• India: 3500-yrs of massacres of Dalit-Sudra Blacks by Arya-Brahmins
• Eat Rats:Indian officials ask starving Indians to eat rodents (BBC)
• Indian girl Infanticide-Female Foeticide: 1 million girls killed before or after birth per year
• Khumb Mela India: 60 million Filthy Naked Indian sadus

Why does India, a poor country, want to explore the moon instead of using that money to alleviate poverty?

That was the question raised six years ago when India space agency ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) asked the government for $65 million to build and launch an unmanned scientific spacecraft to circle the moon.

The government ultimately sanctioned the funds – the mission is all set to take place early 2008 – but only after critics were appeased by protracted public debates and several seminars….The project, yet to be formally cleared by the government, will cost $2.2 billion in the first phase to put an Indian in orbit by 2014, and at least twice as much in the second phase to land him or her on the moon by 2020 – four years ahead of China.

Indian povertyA country where hundreds of millions live below the Indian poverty line (Rs 1250) and scores of millions live below Sub Saharan penury levels buys a Russian rocket, paints the Tri-Color on it and claims it as an Indian achievement in science and technology. India’s space odyssey – from bullock cart to moon rocket. Submitted by kashif on Wed, 11/29/2006 – 01:53. Features By K. Jayaraman

Amnesty International (AI) 2008 report on issues within India: http://rupeenews.com/2008/05/29/amnesty-int-2008-report-excoriates-horrid-india

Penury in india

Superpower India Pt 2

• Indian missle failures. Program Scrapped!
• Trail of tears and failure: Indian missiles.
• Indian missle failures. Scrap the program?

All of Indi’a Rockets have failed. 1) Agni 2) Pirthivi 3) Akash 4) Trishul and 5) Nag 6) Agni.

Prithvi: Failure: To date the only reliable delivery system inducted is the Pirthvi missile with a range of 300 kilometres. The subsequent versions of this missile are still undergoing tests. The pride of India the Agni missile tested last time landed 200 kilometres off target.

Akash: Failure: After several years of testing has been shelved for reasons best known to the Indians. Akash was meant as a substitute for Pechora. On the Akash missile, which was the subject of the DRDO media conference here on Tuesday, former air chief S. P. Tyagi said:“Akashwas to be ready at a certain time, but it wasn’t. I had to change everything to make up for the delay.” Both missiles were part of a programme to develop indigenous weapons, which began in July 1983, with plans for Agni, Prithvi, Trishul, Akash and Nag missiles.

Trishul: Failure: Trishul is being replaced by Israeli Barak and Russian systems. Trishul, for instance, has been tested over 80 times so far without coming anywhere near becoming operational. It was, in fact, virtually given up for dead in 2003 after around Rs 300 crore was spent on it, before being revived yet again.

Nag: Failure: The Nag proved to be as deadily as the Holy Cow.

Agni:Failure: The Agni-I (range 700 to 800 kilometers) and Agni-II were both products of India’s space program and connected to its Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), itself launched in 1983. Originally, their design used a satellite space-launching rocket (SLV-3) as the first stage, on top of which was mounted the very short-range (150 to 250 kilometers) liquid fuel-propelled Prithvi missile.
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[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nR1WfWPZECo&feature=player_embedded]

News about India’s space program, including commentary and archival articles published in The New York Times.What is amazing is that if a country can’t build a rocket how can it send one to the moon?

ENDNOTES

1. Sundara Vadlamudi, “Indo-U.S. Space Cooperation: Poised for Take-Off?” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2005, p. 203.

2. Gary Milhollin, ” India’s Missiles: With a Little Help From Our Friends,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1989.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Vadlamudi, “Indo-U.S. Space Cooperation.”

6. Alexander Pikayev et al., ” Russia, the U.S., and the Missile Technology Control Regime,” Adelphi Paper No. 317, International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1998.

7. Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, ” India’s Nuclear Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sep tember/October 2005.

8. Pikayev et al., ” Russia, the U.S., and the Missile Technology Control Regime.”

9. Ibid.

10. V. G. Jaideep, ” India Building ICBM With 8,000-Plus Km Range,” Asian Age, February 8, 1999, pp. 1-2; Barbara Opall-Rome, “Agni Test Undercuts U.S., Angers China,” Defense News, April 26, 1999, p. 17.

11. Agni IRBM Built to Carry Nuclear Warhead,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 28, 1999.

12. Vivek Raghuvanshi, ” India to Develop Extensive Nuclear Missile Arsenal,” Defense News, May 24, 1999, p. 14.

13. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” Report No. 2000/09, March 23, 2001; Iftikhar Gilani, “Premature Disclosure of ICBM Project, Rawat Stripped of Defence Portfolio,” Daily Times, November 23, 1999.

14. “Khrunichev Space Center to Supply Rocket Boosters to India,” Interfax, April 16, 2001.

15. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” December 2001.

16. . Raja Mohan, ” U.S. Gives Space to ISRO,” Hindu , September 30, 2002, p. 11.

17. Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Re port to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relat ing to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced ConventionalMunitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002,” April 2003.

18. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership With India,” Janu ary 12, 2004.

19. Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, November 1, 2004 (internet news service in English).

20. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” July 18, 2005.

21. N. Madhuprasad, “Boost to Indian Armed Forces’ Deterrence Arsenal; India to Develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” Bangalore Deccan Herald, August 25, 2005.

Richard Speier is a private consultant on nonproliferation and counterproliferation issues. Speier spent more than 25 years in government at the Office of Management and Budget, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, andthe Office of the Secretary of Defense. While in government, he helped negotiate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This article is based on a paper published by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.

1. Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, ” Washington Post Reporters Interview Powell,” The Washington Post, October 3, 2003.

2. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” July 18, 2005.

3. For early reports, see Maurice Eisenstein, “Third World Missiles and Nuclear Proliferation,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1982; “Liquid Fuel Engine Tested for PSLV,” Hindustan Times, December 13, 1985, p. 1; “Growing Local Opposition to India’s Proposed National Test Range at Baliapal, Orissa,” English Language Press, October 1986; “India Faces Rising Pressure for Arms Race With Pakistan,” Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1987, p. 1. The latest detailed report, appearing less than six-weeks after the presidents’ joint statement is N. Madhuprasad, “Boost to Indian Armed Forces’ Deterrence Arsenal; India to Develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” Bangalore Deccan Herald, August 25, 2005.

4. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Scientists Poised to Test-Launch Country’s First ICBM,” Defense News, April 30, 2001, p. 26.

5. International missile nomenclature defines an ICBM as a ballistic missile with a range of 5,500 or greater. However, Indian officials have sometimes exaggerated missiles’ capabilities by bumping missiles into the next range-class.

6. Gary Milhollin, ” India’s Missiles-With a Little Help From Our Friends,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1989; Sundara Vadlamudi, “Indo-U.S. Space Cooperation: Poised for Take-Off?” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2005, p. 203.

7. See Arun Vishwakarma, “Agni-Strategic Ballistic Missile,” April 15, 2005. The report states that India is taking a different ICBM approach: developing a 1.8-meter-diameter, solid-fuel rocket that will extend the Agni to intercontinental range and that could be the basis for a longer-range ICBM. The 1.8-meter-diameter rocket represents a combination of PSLV and Agni technology. Such a lighter ICBM makes far more military sense than a PSLV-sized missile. The lighter ICBM might be mobile and able to survive a first strike. However, Vishwakarma consistently reports far higher ranges for the existing Agni missiles than have been reported elsewhere. Given this reporting bias, Vishwakarma may be describing the wish lists of Indian engineers or programs that have not yet been funded. The PSLV exists, and the existence of a 1.8-meter-diameter missile has not yet been reported except by Vishwakarma. The impending test of the Agni-3 may reveal whether a 1.8-meter-diameter rocket stage, which could make possible a mobile ICBM, has been developed. See “Missile Plan,” Bangalore Deccan Herald, November 26, 2005; Rajiv Nayan, “Agni Three Missile: Sino-Centric?” Bangalore Deccan Herald, December 12, 2005; Sayan Majumdar, “Defense Developments for 2006,” New Delhi India Defence Consultants, January 13, 2006.

8. Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, November 1, 2004 (internet news service); Vishwarkarma, “Agni-Strategic Ballistic Missile.” It is possible that either or both of these references have conflated the Surya-1 with the Agni program.

9. John Wilson, ” India’s Missile Might,” The Pioneer, July 13, 1997, p. 1.

10. Brahma Chellaney, “Value of Power,” The Hindustan Times, May 19, 1999.

11. See Richard Speier et al., Nonproliferation Sanctions (Rand Corporation, 2001).

12. For an official Indian history of relations as of 2002, see http://www.indianembassy-tehran.com/india-iran.html.

13. Barbara Opall-Rome and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s BalancingAct,” Defense News, September 15, 2003, p. 1; Sultan Shahin, “India Sticks WithIran, for Now,” Asia Times, September 20, 2003; Patricia Nunan, “U.S. Signals Concern About India-Iran Pipeline Project,” VOA News.com, March 17, 2005; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, U.S. to Boost Tech Flow,” Defense News, December 12, 2005.

14. Those sanctioned, according to the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, include Bharat Electronics Ltd., Dr. C. Surendar, Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad, NEC Engineers, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Projects and Development India Ltd., Rallis India, and Transpek Industry Ltd.

15. ” Iran’s Ballistic Missiles: Upgrades Underway,” IISS Strategic Comments, November 2003; Opall-Rome and Raghuvanshi, ” India’s Balancing Act.”

16. John Larkin, “India Bets on Nuclear Future: Backing Probe of Iran Draws Closer Look at New Delhi’s Ambitions,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2005; Somini Sengupta, “Nuclear Deal and Iran Complicate Efforts by U.S. andIndia to Improve Ties,” The New York Times, January 23, 2006; Jo Johnson and Caroline Daniel, “New Delhi Faces a Diplomatic Balancing Act Ahead of Bush’s State Visit,” FinancialTimes, January 26, 2006; “India’s Left Parties Demand Recall of U.S. Envoy,” AgenceFrance Press, January 30, 2006.

17. Nicholas Kralev, “Firm Helping Arms Program Sanctioned,” Washington Times, February 20, 2003; “Indian Police Arrest Man for Alleged Export of Chemicals to Iraq,” Agence France Presse, October 18, 2003.

18. “DRDO Plan to Export Missiles,” The Hindu, November 21, 2005.

19. Robert D. Blackwill, “The India Imperative,” The National Interest, Summer 2005, pp. 9-15.

20. Israel has already stepped into the breach to contract for an October 2006 Indian launch of an Israeli radar imaging satellite. See Barbara Opall-Rome and K. S. Jayaraman, “India to Launch Israeli Spy Sat,” Defense News, November 14, 2005, p. 1; “India to Launch Israeli Military Imaging Radar Satellite,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 21, 2005, p. 17.

21. Mir Ayoob Ali Khan, “Agni-III to Get Light Motor for Bigger Bombs,” The Asian Age, Oc tober 14, 2005.

22. “Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,” 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1999, H. Rep. 851.

23. Bureau of Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Control Policy: End-User and End-Use Based,” Regulation Part 744. ISRO was removed from the “entities” list under a U.S.-Indian agreement signed on September 17, 2004.

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