Fresh wall chalkings from Occupied Valleys.

VaL VaLA HAI CHARSU NARIYA TAKBEER KA
JAG UTHA HAI MUSLAMAN VADIYA KASHMIR KA.

Bhikari-i-Hind Ghadar-i-Kashmir Omar Abdullah Murdabad.

Bharat kay Hami sub Harami.

Hoshiar Lashkar Dekh Raha hai.

Hum sabz Parchum Wadi-i-kashmir may lehraingy.

Strategic encirclement is a term that haunts Indian analysts quite a bit these days. So when noted Subcontinent watcher Selig S. Harrison reported in late August that 7,000-11,000 Chinese troops had poured into the northern part of Pakistani-administered Kashmir known as the Gilgit-Baltistan region, the feeling that India was being systematically “surrounded” by Beijing was loudly echoed in the Indian media. The revelations follow a recent controversy triggered by China’s refusal to issue a visa to an Indian general on the grounds that his area of responsibility falls in the disputed Kashmir region; Beijing will only issue “stapled visas” to visitors from the area. Together, the two incidents highlight the fact that the geostrategic struggle between India and Pakistan for Kashmir has a third direct player: China.

The Indians have officially conveyed their concern to China over Chinese “activity and presence” in the region and say that they are “monitoring the situation.” Indian military sources also apparently confirmed that a Chinese infantry battalion, or about 1,000 soldiers, has been deployed this month in Gilgit-Baltistan at the Khunjerab Pass, to provide security for Chinese workers engaged in widening the Karakoram highway and building a railroad.

The Gilgit-Baltistan region, also known as the “Northern Areas,” is kept distinct from the so-called Azad Kashmir (or Pakistani-controlled “Free Kashmir”) in terms of its administrative status. However, despite recent moves to give the region a legislative assembly and a chief minister, for all practical purposes it is governed directly by the Pakistani army, whose sizeable presence there serves both to deter India as well as to quell the region’s restive Shiite population.

The region’s key strategic importance stems from its transit routes. In 1963, Pakistan ceded a large tract of Gilgit-Baltistan known as Shaksgam Valley to China in order to facilitate the strategically crucial Karakoram Highway, which connects the region to Xinjiang. Today Gilgit-Baltistan is the last undeveloped node between Xingjiang’s transport grid and Pakistan’s Chinese-built Gwadar-Dalbandin railway, which extends up to Rawalpindi. Its development will allow China to achieve its long-cherished aim of securing a land route for the transportation of container traffic to Pakistan’s Arabian Sea ports of Gwadar, Ormara and Pasni.

Preliminary work on a rail link may have already started, and the Chinese are presently helping Pakistan widen the existing Karakoram highway from 30 to 100 feet. They are also developing additional highways between key towns in the region. In addition to developing transport infrastructure, the Chinese are involved in several large hydropower projects, which India has objected to in the past on the grounds that Pakistani-administered Kashmir remains a disputed territory.

A key driver for China’s efforts to increase its military profile in the region is Gilgit-Baltistan’s potential to serve as a gateway for Jihadi militants to infiltrate Xinjiang, where Beijing faces a Muslim Uighur separatist movement. This, in turn, indicates Beijing’s conviction that the Pakistani military may not always be in a position to protect Chinese interests and investments in the area — or else may not be willing to protect them. Elements within the Pakistani army are known to be not all that unsympathetic to the Uighur cause. Meanwhile, from Pakistan’s point of view, Chinese troops represent an added layer of defense against an Indian offensive in the area.

However, the Pakistanis have denied the reports of Chinese troop deployments as baseless. Acknowledging a Chinese presence, Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit said, “The Chinese were working on landslides, flood-hit areas and on the destroyed Karakoram Highway with the permission of the Pakistani government.”

The Chinese have also denied that they have any kind of military-oriented presence in the area. In fact, they have described the reports as aimed at “destroying” Sino-Pakistani and Sino-Indian relations. Interestingly, however, while referring to both India and Pakistan as friends, the official Chinese spokesperson chose to refer to these areas as “Northern Pakistan,” whereas the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir was dubbed as “Indian-controlled Kashmir.”

Although the Chinese spokesperson reiterated that China would not interfere in the Kashmir dispute, which it sees as a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan, it is nevertheless clear that China wishes to shore up its ally, Pakistan, by calling attention to the disputed nature of the region, through visa incidents for instance. For Indian observers, this is a marked departure from the Chinese position on the issue up until even last year.

China also seems to be coordinating Pakistani moves to somehow disassociate Gilgit-Baltistan from a comprehensive settlement on the Kashmir issue, as both countries would obviously be reluctant to make any concessions to India in the region. The agreement ceding the Shaksgam Valley ceded to China by Pakistan included the proviso that the settlement is subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute.

Although not always noticed, Tibet, Kashmir and Afghanistan represent a continuum not only in terms of geography but also in terms of the challenges and opportunities they present for the Chinese. While seriously concerned about insurgent violence emanating from these regions, Beijing also sees them as mineral-rich areas and the key to pan-Asian infrastructure networks. Freedom of maneuver in these areas while simultaneously thwarting similar Indian imperatives is fast emerging as a crucial component of China’s policy. Pakistan’s continued control of the region, just a stone’s throw from the Tajik border, effectively blocks India from gaining coveted access to Central Asia, where the new “Great Game” is unfolding.

Unfortunately, a competitive schema for operations in these regions may only give rise to similar Indian responses. Already there is talk of India retaliating to China’s new position on Kashmir by reviewing New Delhi’s position on Tibet as well as highlighting proliferation links between Pakistan and China. The Indian military has also been asked to prepare itself for a potential two-front conflict.

Clearly the Kashmir hot zone has just got a lot hotter.

Saurav Jha studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global energy issues and clean energy development in Asia. His first book for Harper Collins India, “The Upside Down Book of Nuclear Power,” was published in January 2010. He also works as an independent consultant in the energy sector in India. He can be reached at sjha1618@gmail.com.

Photo: A section of the Karakoram Highway (Photo by wikimedi