Nunn-Lugar Bill: Another threat to Pakistani nukes

Posted on 11 March 2010. Tags: Nunn-Lugar

Current US Administration accepts Pakistan as Nuclear state. One the one hand, President Obama invites Pakistan and Bharat to the Nuclear Summit–tacitly and publicly accepting Pakistan’s Nuclear status–on the other hand there are rumbling in Washington about the expansion of the Lugar Nun non-proliferation act to Pakistan. There was much discussion about this in 2009, however there are voices in America that are still trying to expand the bill. This will surely raise hackles in Pakistan, and dampen the recently mushrooming love affair between the US and Pakistan.

Expanding the Nunn-Lugar bill to Pakistan would be a colossal US foreign blunder–a mistake greater than the Symington and Pressler Amendments which alienated sanctioned Pakistan for a decade. There is a general American consensus that it was the errors of the 80s that led to the malaise in Afghanistan and the trauma imposed on the US in 2011.

Washington, May 7 (IANS) An influential US senator has asked President Barack Obama to press Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to accept more US help in securing his country’s nuclear arsenal and raw materials for chemical or biological weapons.
“He must convince President Zardari to accept more assistance and embrace cooperation,” said Richard Lugar, top Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a statement Wednesday.
“President Obama must use this opportunity to gain clarification on the status and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, chemical weapons precursors, and pathogen samples,” said Lugar.
Lugar urged the expansion into Pakistan of the Nunn-Lugar counter-proliferation regime conceived at the fall of the Soviet Union to keep Moscow’s weapons out of the hands of rogue states or terrorists.
The United States should expand the 18-year-old Cooperative Threat Reduction program to secure and eliminate nuclear materials and other potential WMD ingredients in Pakistan, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said yesterday (seeGSN, May 6).
“Initially, Nunn-Lugar was restricted to the former Soviet Union. In 2003, I wrote legislation, signed into law by the president, authorizing the Nunn-Lugar program to operate outside the former Soviet Union,” Lugar said in a statement. “This authority can and should be used to expand significantly our cooperation with Pakistan in the nuclear arena as well as in other critical areas.”
“In addition to nuclear weapons security, there is an opportunity to commence strong collaboration in the area of infectious diseases and pathogens,” he said, referring to the recent swine flu outbreak (see relatedGSN story, today).

The US moves in Congress may be too late. Within the next two weeks, President Zardari’s political party the PPPP is ready to move a bill in the Majlis-e-Shoora (National Assembly) and Aiwan e Bala (Senate) where the tampering to the 1973 constitution will be removed and the constitution will be restored to its original condition as envisaged by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. If Mr. Zardari is able to live up to his promise (he has reneged twice before), he will be remembered as a huge statements a great patriot–washing away all his previous sins when he was Mr. 10$.

If the 17th amendment and 58(2)-b is reversed power will return to the Prime Minister. It will be virtually impossible to accept intrusive bills like Lugar Nunn when parliament regains all its powers and the president becomes a titular head like the Queen of England is in the UK.

Although Pakistan has been accused of conducting research into biological warfare (BW) since the early 1990s, it is not widely suspected of either producing or stockpiling biological weapons. However, it is generally believed that Pakistan has a well developed biotechnology sector that would be capable of supporting limited BW-related research and development if its government elected to pursue such a program. In 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense stated that Pakistan “had the resources and capabilities appropriate to conducting research and development relating to biological warfare,” and “was conducting research and development with potential biological warfare applications.” But the U.S. government has not presented any evidence to corroborate its assertions.

The Pakistani government insists that it has never developed, produced, or stockpiled biological weapons or agents and that an offensive BW program is not part of the country’s defense matrix. Pakistan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, and ratified it in 1974. Since then, Pakistan has remained a vocal advocate for the success of the BTWC. During the various BTWC Review Conferences, Pakistani representatives have urged more robust participation from state signatories, invited new states to join the treaty, and, as part of the non-aligned group of countries, have made the case for guarantees for states’ rights to engage in peaceful exchanges of biological and toxin materials for purposes of scientific research.

In the wake of Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed sanctions on a large number of government, quasi-government, and private sector entities suspected of participating in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related delivery programs. In the process, the U.S. government also imposed sanctions on chemical and biological facilities on suspicion that they might be involved with chemical warfare and BW programs. These four entities were: the Center for Advanced Molecular Biology, Lahore; Karachi CBW Research Institute; Karachi CW & BW Warfare R&D Laboratory; and the National Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, Faisalabad. Although sanctions against these entities have since been lifted U.S. companies considering trading with them are required to obtain specific license approval on a case-by-case basis for all items contained on the U.S. Commerce Control List. At present there is no independent evidence to suggest that any of the above four institutes were or are engaged in offensive BW programs. However, it is likely that at least two of these entities are engaged in defensive BW research that might, depending on the level of effort, provide a basis for an offensive program in the future if an appropriate decision were made.

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Biological/index.html

“Imagine if the spread were intentional, not natural, and the virus’ lethality had been artificially enhanced. Pakistan has many dangerous diseases and pathogens under its control. The Nunn-Lugar program can help secure the pathogen strains to ensure they do not fall into the wrong hands. Equally important, the U.S. can assist Pakistan in establishing a system designed to detect, characterize and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases,” Lugar said (U.S. Senator Richard Lugar release, May 6).
U.S. President Barack Obama and top officials in his administration met with the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan yesterday to discuss strategies for rolling back recent militant gains in both countries, the New York Times reported (Helene Cooper, New York Times, May 7).
“President Obama must use this opportunity to gain clarification on the status and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, chemical weapons precursors, and pathogen samples. He must convince [Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari] to accept more assistance and embrace cooperation in these critical areas,” Lugar said ahead of the meeting (Lugar release).
France today warned that extremist groups posed a major threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, Agence France-Presse reported.
“Today the Taliban are making progress not just in Afghanistan but in the Pakistani interior itself, and at the end of this road there’s a stock of nuclear weapons,” said Pierre Lellouche, France’s special envoy to Pakistan.

Taliban militants “are nibbling away and fear is settling into people’s hearts,” Lellouche said. “We shouldn’t think of columns of Taliban descending on the capital. It’s more complicated than that. We are seeing the rampant Talibanization of areas close to the capital, a mental Talibanization” (Agence France-Presse/Google News, May 7).

Lugar Wants Expanded Nunn-Lugar Program to Combat Proliferation

Senator focuses on “nexus” between terrorists and WMD

Senator Richard Lugar says the United States must expand its nonproliferation efforts in order to combat the growing threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction.

The Indiana Republican, who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was the featured speaker at a conference in Washington November 19 celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. He praised members of the organization for “important contributions to the policy debates surrounding arms control, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction” (WMD), and warned them of more policy battles to come.

“Even in this age of terrorism, the magnitude of the threat posed by WMD is not widely appreciated in this country or around the world,” Lugar said. “Even when the threat is understood, the political will to take action does not always materialize.”

Lugar focused on the accomplishments of his namesake law, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which provides U.S. funding and assistance to dismantle and dispose of WMD and delivery systems in the former Soviet Union. During its first 10 years of existence, he said, the program has accomplished the separation of 6,212 nuclear warheads from their missiles, with many of the warheads dismantled and their fissile material safely stored. The program has also accounted for the destruction of 520 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 451 ICBM silos, 122 strategic bombers, 424 nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, 445 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 408 SLBM launchers, 27 strategic missile submarines and 194 nuclear test tunnels, he said.

“Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are nuclear weapons-free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program,” Lugar added. Furthermore, at least 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons have been safely stored awaiting destruction, while a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye, Russia, is being constructed — again under Nunn-Lugar auspices, he said.

Lugar noted that since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and its allies have found that “in many cases, we lack the appropriate tools” to address the threats of terrorists using WMD. Some multilateral framework agreements and nonproliferation tools are no longer very useful, he said.

“In fact, several nations have announced their intention to continue to flout international norms such as the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty. This must change,” Lugar said. “The problem we face today is not just terrorism; it is the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. I have no doubt that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda will use weapons of mass destruction if they are able to steal, buy, or build them. It is equally clear that they have attempted to obtain them.”

Lugar mentioned proposed legislation to expand the Nunn-Lugar program beyond the confines of the former Soviet Union in order to help meet the new threats. “If we are to protect ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period,” he said, “we must create new nonproliferation partners and aggressively pursue any nonproliferation opportunities that appear. … Ultimately, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency and safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program. … We must give the administration the ability to interdict and neutralize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” he said.

Following is the text of Lugar’s remarks:

(begin transcript)

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE
TENTH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
NOVEMBER 19, 2003

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

It is a pleasure to be here with you today to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. Over the last decade, the Institute has made important contributions to the policy debates surrounding arms control, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

Mike Moodie and his talented staff have been allies in numerous ventures directed toward safeguarding and eliminating weapons of mass destruction. They played a vital role in our efforts to secure United States Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. They have made important contributions to the efforts of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye in Russia. In addition to Mike and his staff, I would like to recognize good friends such as Ron Lehman, Jim Woolsey, Brad Roberts, Richard Haas, John Hamre, and Joe Nye. Each has played an integral role in the debates that have defined U.S. policy in responding to the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.

I urge all of you to fortify yourselves, because there will be many more policy battles in the future. Even in this age of terrorism, the magnitude of the threat posed by WMD [weapons of mass destruction] is not widely appreciated in this country or around the world. Even when the threat is understood, the political will to take action does not always materialize.

The War on Terrorism proceeds in a world awash with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials. Most of these weapons and materials are stored in the United States and Russia, but they also exist in India, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, Israel, Great Britain, France, China, and perhaps other nations.

Throughout much of the last decade, vulnerability to the use of weapons of mass destruction has been the Number One national security dilemma confronting the United States. The events of September 11 [2001] and the subsequent public discovery of al-Qaeda’s methods, capabilities, and intentions finally brought our vulnerability to the forefront.

We must anticipate that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction if allowed the opportunity. I believe the minimum standard for victory in this war is the prevention of any terrorist cell from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction. We must make certain that all sources of WMD are identified and systematically guarded or destroyed.

To combat the WMD threat in the former Soviet Union, our country has implemented the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Nunn-Lugar has devoted American technical expertise and money for joint efforts to safeguard and destroy materials and weapons of mass destruction. During the first 10 years of Nunn-Lugar, 6,212 former Soviet nuclear warheads have been separated from missiles. Many of the warheads have been dismantled with their fissile material safely stored. In addition, the program has destroyed: 520 ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]; 451 ICBM silos; 122 strategic bombers; 624 nuclear air-launched cruise missiles; 445 SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]; 408 SLBM launchers; 27 strategic missile submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels. Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are nuclear weapons-free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program.

Nunn-Lugar also has worked to contain chemical and biological weapons in Russia. At least 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons have been stored in seven locations awaiting destruction. Although the status of biological weapons is less certain, Nunn-Lugar personnel are working at many bio-weapons sites to establish security controls and dismantle weapons infrastructure.

Despite these successes, some areas need improvement. Last year new Nunn-Lugar projects in Russia were halted for more than six months because of the administration’s decision not to certify that Russia had satisfied six legislatively mandated conditions. Resumption of assistance was possible only after Congress granted, and the president exercised, limited authority to waive the certification requirements in the interest of national security. This authority will expire again at the end of fiscal year 2005. President Bush has rightly requested that Congress make permanent the waiver authority. Unfortunately, Congress has denied this request to date. This bureaucratic logjam must be corrected. I share the policy goals associated with the certification requirements, but the elimination of weapons of mass destruction must be our top priority.

Despite the tremendous progress realized by the Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union, the United States continues to lack even minimal international confidence about many foreign weapons programs. In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans regarding further production or destruction programs.

As the United States and our allies have sought to address the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the aftermath of September 11, we have come to the realization that, in many cases, we lack the appropriate tools to address these threats. Traditional avenues of approach such as arms control treaties and various multilateral sanction regimes have met with some success, but there is still much work to do. In some cases, it is unlikely that the existing multilateral frameworks and nonproliferation tools retain much utility. In fact, several nations have announced their intention to continue to flout international norms such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This must change. The problem we face today is not just terrorism; it is the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. I have no doubt that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda will use weapons of mass destruction if they are able to steal, buy, or build them. It is equally clear that they have attempted to obtain them.

Congress took important steps in the fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization Conference Report to respond to these threats. I commend Chairman John Warner [Republican senator of Virginia] and Ranking Member Carl Levin [Democratic senator of Michigan] for a bill that expands the president’s authority to confront the threat posed by proliferation.

The outcome was far from certain when the Senate and House passed divergent bills with respect to the Nunn-Lugar Program. The Senate bill included a provision that I had authored, known as “The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act.” This provision gives the president the authority to use the Nunn-Lugar program beyond the former Soviet Union to address proliferation emergencies. The Senate bill also authorized continuation of chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye. Unfortunately, the House took a different approach, denying the administration the ability to use Nunn-Lugar worldwide and placing additional restrictions on chemical weapons destruction. In addition, the House bill restricted efforts to address biological weapon threats.

In the end, however, the House and Senate conferees arrived at a compromise that will permit Nunn-Lugar to continue its important work and, where needed, to expand the winning strategy beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.

As many of you know, I have been working with colleagues in the Senate to ensure that the United States continues its assistance in the area of chemical weapons destruction in Russia. In August, I saw first-hand the progress we have made toward building the unique technologies that will be used to neutralize the chemical munitions at Shchuchye. If current projections are met, the Shchuchye project will begin to destroy live agent in 2007 and the entire complex will be transferred to Russia in 2008. Assuming a destruction rate of 1,700 metric tons of nerve agent per year, it will take six-and-a-half years to destroy the nerve agent Russia stores at Shchuchye. When that task is complete, chemical weapons will be brought from other locations for elimination at Shchuchye.

Despite the obvious national security benefits associated with destroying chemical weapons stockpiles in Russia, the project has faced intense political opposition in Congress and elsewhere. Opposition is all the more perplexing when one considers President Bush’s strong commitment to the Nunn-Lugar program and our efforts at Shchuchye. I have spoken to the president about this issue on several occasions, and each time he has expressed his support and directed his national security team to assist in resolving bureaucratic and legislative obstacles.

Despite the president’s strong backing, Congress placed six conditions on U.S. assistance for chemical weapons destruction. Current law requires that the president certify that Russia is meeting each of the six conditions. Absent such a certification, funds cannot be obligated or expended for chemical weapons destruction. Last year, the administration did not certify that Russia was meeting its arms control obligations in this area. As a result, funding for this project was stopped until a waiver was passed. President Bush signed a waiver for that condition in January 2003. We would have faced a similar prospect this year, had the Defense Authorization bill not extended this authority through September 2005. To date, the Russians have worked to satisfy five of the six conditions, leaving one remaining barrier to U.S. assistance.

The remaining condition requires the full and accurate disclosure of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile. As many of you know, there is disagreement over whether the Russian declaration under the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] is complete. It is very important to reach an acceptable conclusion to this matter this year. It cannot be set aside, as some Russians have proposed.

Under the Global Partnership, known as “10 Plus 10 Over 10,” G-8 leaders have pledged $20 billion over the next10 years for nonproliferation projects. Of this amount, a significant portion has been identified for chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye. Specifically, Canada has committed to fund road construction and facility security; the United Kingdom will contribute funds for critical engineering infrastructure projects; Italy will fund a gas pipeline and facility security; and France will provide secure containers for the shipment of chemical weapons to elimination. I am pleased that the international community is committed to success at Shchuchye. I will continue to work to provide the president with waiver authority so that the project at Shchuchye may continue.

U.S. and Russian experts also must overcome the remaining obstacles to biological weapons proliferation cooperation. I have visited numerous facilities involved in the Soviet biological weapons program, including Obolensk and Vector. Cooperation is ongoing between the U.S. government and most of the facilities involved in the BIOPREPARAT network. American officials, scientists, and contractors are at these sites every day working closely with Russian colleagues to improve security, to take accurate inventories, and to engage former weapons scientists in peaceful projects.

Unfortunately, four former military facilities continue to refuse cooperation with the Nunn-Lugar program. Some Russian leaders have maintained the audacious line that concern is unnecessary because a biological weapons program never existed in the Soviet Union. Our Russian partners must get over this denial and obfuscation. We are anxious to assist Russia in transforming these facilities to peaceful purposes. But success depends on honesty and transparency.

As I mentioned earlier, the Defense Authorization Conference Report also contained “The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act,” which permits President Bush to use up to $50 million of unobligated Nunn-Lugar funds for proliferation emergencies outside the former Soviet Union. I worked closely with the administration on this important issue and received the strong support of Dr. Rice and Secretary Powell.

The continuing experience of Nunn-Lugar has created a tremendous nonproliferation asset for the United States. We have an impressive cadre of talented scientists, technicians, negotiators, and managers working for the Defense Department and for associated defense contractors who understand how to implement nonproliferation programs and how to respond to proliferation emergencies. The new authority will permit and facilitate the use of Nunn-Lugar expertise and resources when proliferation threats around the world are identified.

Proliferation threats sometimes require an instantaneous response. We must not allow a proliferation or WMD threat to “go critical” because we lacked the foresight to empower the U.S. to respond. Under Nunn-Lugar the U.S. has undertaken time-sensitive missions like Project Sapphire in Kazakhstan and Operation Auburn Endeavor in Georgia that have kept highly vulnerable weapons and materials of mass destruction from being proliferated.

The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be possible everywhere. Clearly, many states will continue to avoid accountability for programs related to weapons of mass destruction. When nations resist such accountability, other options must be explored. When governments continue to contribute to the WMD threat facing the United States, we must be prepared to apply diplomatic and economic power, as well as military force.

Yet we should not assume that we cannot forge cooperative nonproliferation programs with some critical nations. The experience of the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that American contractors and DOD officials would be on the ground in Russia destroying thousands of strategic systems. If we are to protect ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create new nonproliferation partners and aggressively pursue any nonproliferation opportunities that appear. Nunn-Lugar expansion authority is the first step down that road. Ultimately, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program.

There are always risks when expanding a successful venture into new areas, but I don’t believe we have a choice. We must give the administration the ability to interdict and neutralize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This new venture, like its predecessor, will take time to organize and to establish operating procedures, but I am hopeful that a decade from now, we will look back on this effort and marvel at the successes we have enjoyed.

For 10 years the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute has been on the leading edge of new strategies to combat weapons of mass destruction. I am heartened by your commitment to this important work and your enthusiasm to enter a second decade of close cooperation with us to address the threats facing the American people and the international community. I look forward to continuing my close association with the Institute and being here to celebrate many more anniversaries.

(end transcript)

(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) 20 November 2003

More at : US must press Pakistan to take US help to secure nukes: Senator http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/us-must-press-pakistan-to-take-us-help-to-secure-nukes-senator_100189643.html#ixzz0htqiQMKe

Sources:
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology Assessment website, August 1993, archived at www.wws.princeton.edu/ ~ota/ ns20/ alpha_ f.html; Proliferation Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense website, January 2001, www.fpc.state.gov/ c4729.htm.
Proliferation Threat and Response, January 2001.
Biological Weapons Proliferation, Canadian Security Intelligence Service website, June 2001, www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/ eng/ miscdocs/ 200005_ e.html.
“Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament website, disarmament2.un.org/ treaty Status.nsf.
Rissanen, Jenni, Left in Limbo: Review Conference Suspended on Edge of Collapse, the Acronym Institute website, February 2002, www.acronym.org.uk/ dd/ dd62/ 62bwc.htm.
“Rules and Regulations,” Federal Register website, November 19, 1998, v. 63, 223, frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi? dbname= 1998_ register& docid=fr19 no98-18.pdf.
The Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security website, www.access.gpo.gov/ bis/ ear/ pdf/ 744spir.pdf
Simply on the basis of their names it is reasonable to presume that the Karachi CBW Research Institute and the Karachi CW & BW Warfare R&D Laboratory are engaged in CBW related work of a defensive nature. Any offensive program associated with these centers would violate Pakistan’s treaty obligations.