There is s spectrum of opinions in Pakistan. There was the traditional right and the old left. These have all been replaced by mainstream and anti-religious forces. In effect the “leftist” elites of Pakistan find themselves engulfed in a sea of non-secular forces. For decades these elites and “wanna be elites” controlled the media and the dissemination of information to the masses. Several times in the past six decades this minority has attempted to impose their agenda on Pakistan. Three times the Pakistan signed a contract among themselves, in 1956, in 1962 and in 1973.
The traditional differences between the socialists, capitalists, religious socialists and have been obfuscated and do not really exists. Alliances in Pakistan have been formed across the political spectrum without regard to ideology.
Pervez Hoodbhoy, Najam Sethi, and Ahmed Rashid are a few of the most vocal proponents of the US agenda in Pakistan. “To beguile the time, look like the time–look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent underneath it”. This the motto. Najam Sethi is the smartest with the sweetest tongue–whose message is seven layers deep–always smiling, and never confronting. His program on Dunya TV seems rational and logical–however his message is the same as that of Hoodbhoy. Hoodbhoy is crass and blunt revealing his true self within seconds. Ahmed Rashid sell his words by the pound–saying what the Americans want to hear. They are neither leftists, nor rightists–they want Pakistan to be Non-Nuclear, and compliant to the wishes of foreign capitals. Their model is a secular state where there is no mention of Islam.
Counterpunch is a playground for these wanna elites who try to portray an image of Pakistan that helps them create a compliant and obsequious Pakistan. Whether for profit or for political gain, this Fifth Column in Pakistan has no constituency except the one that resides in London, Washington and even Delhi.
Yes Its really India!! Rebuttal to Delhi apologist Pervez Hoodbhoy
Counterpunch is also site where the Anti-Pakistan Fauzia Afzal claptrap is refuted. Shahid Alam is one of those that has repudiated Pervez Hoodbhoy and other Fifth Columnists on the internet.
http://thedawn.com.pk/2009/12/19/alam-vs-hoodbhoy-response-to-groveling-pakistani-native-orientalist/
Here ye, Counterpunch readers! The victory of Native Orientalists – the ones which the late Edward Said had warned us about – is nearly complete in Pakistan. It has been led by “the minions of Western embassies and Western-financed NGOs” and includes the likes of “Ahmad Rashid, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Najam Sethi, Khaled Ahmad, Irfan Hussain, Husain Haqqani, and P.J.Mir”. Thus declares Mohammad Shahid Alam, a professor of Pakistani origin who teaches at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachussetts. [CounterPunch, 2 Dec 2009]
This particular writing describes the forces which for ten years have waged an incessant war on the people of Afghanistan in the name of destroying the so called Taliban. In return, the USA, ISAF has lost 80% of Afghanistan–and are now talking to the same people, whom they promised to annihilate and never negotiate with.
- Does the US consider India relevant in Afghanistan?
- Plausible Deniability: ‘Rogue’ Pentagon Death Squad
More than eight years after dismantling the Taliban, the United States is still mired in Afghanistan. Indeed, last October it launched a much-hyped ‘surge’ to prevent a second Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, not imminent yet, but eminently possible.
The first dismantling of the Taliban was a cakewalk.
In 2001, the United States quickly and decisively defeated the Taliban, killed, captured or scattered their fighters, and handed over the running of Afghanistan to their rivals, mostly Uzbeks and Tajiks from the Northern Alliance.
Unaware of Pashtoon history, American commentators were pleased at the smashing victory of their military, convinced that they had consigned the Taliban to history’s graveyard.
Instead, the Taliban came back from the dead. Within months of their near-total destruction, they had regained morale, regrouped, organized, trained, and returned to fight what they saw as a foreign occupation of their country. Slowly, tenaciously they continued to build on their gains, and by 2008 they were dreaming of taking back the country they had lost in 2001.
Could this really happen? That only time will tell, but prospects for the Taliban today look better than at any time since November 2001.
- Delhi’s exist strategy from Afghanistan: Bluster, Projects with ‘changed nuances’
- After massive Foreign Policy failure Delhi needs new strategy
In 2001, the United States had captured Afghanistan with the loss of only twelve of its own troops. Last year it lost 316 soldiers, and the British lost another 108. The numbers speak for themselves.
The United States had occupied Afghanistan with 9000 troops. When Obama took office in January 2009, these numbers had climbed to 30,000. In October, US troop strength in Afghanistan had more than doubled. This does not include tens of thousands of foreign contractors and some 200,000 Afghan troops armed and trained by the Americans.
Yet, NATO could not deter the Taliban advance.
That is when President Obama ordered a troop surge. US troop strength will soon reach 100,000. At the same time, the United States is inviting Taliban fighters to defect in return for bribes. In tandem, President Karzai – for the umpteenth time – is offering amnesty to defecting Taliban fighters. So far, there have been no high-ranking defections.
Can the United States defeat these men – returned from the dead – it calls terrorists? It is a vital question. It should be, since the United States claims that if the Taliban come back, Afghanistan will again become a haven for Al-Qaida, their training ground and launching pad for future attacks against Western targets.
- Kerry-Lugar Peanuts: 50% of US Aid fills pockets of US consultants
- The resilience of Pakistan and the nation’s continuing collective refusal to do what the west would like it to do
- The pugnacious Pakistanis
How did the Taliban stage this comeback?
Simply, the answer is: by finding strength in their handicaps. If you had compared the defeated Taliban in December 2001 to the Mujahidin in 1980, you would conclude that history had closed its books on them irrevocably.
The Mujahedeen brought several advantages to their fight. All Afghan ethnicities opposed the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. They had financial, military and political support from all the Western powers. President Reagan honored them as freedom-fighters. They also had support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. In addition, tens of thousands of foreign fighters would join the Afghan mujahidin.
In comparison, Taliban prospects looked quite dismal after their rout in November 2001. Nearly all the factors that favored the Mujahidin worked against the Taliban. Taliban support was confined mostly to one Afghan ethnicity, the Pashtoons. In the United States and its European allies, they faced a more formidable opponent than the Mujahidin did in the Soviet Union.
There was not a single Muslim country that could support the return of the Taliban: the US forbad it. Worst of all, the Pakistani military, partly for lucre and partly under US pressure, threw its forces against the Taliban. Under the circumstances, few Muslim fighters from outside Pakistan have joined the Taliban.
Their goose was cooked: or so it seemed.
Nevertheless, the Taliban defied these odds, and now, some eight years later, they have taken positions in nearly every Afghan province, with shadow governments in most of them. Is it possible to reverse the gains that Taliban have made in the face of nearly impossible odds?
What can the US do to weaken the Taliban? They have few vulnerabilities because the United States has been so effective in denying them any help from external sources. They have built their gains almost exclusively on their own strengths: and these are harder to take away.
What then are some of these strengths? Unlike the Mujahidin, the Afghan resistance against the United States is less fractious. The Taliban make up the bulk of the resistance. Other groups – led by Haqqani and Hekmatyaar – are much smaller. The Afghan resistance has a central leadership that the Mujahidin never had.
Unlike the Mujahidin, the Taliban do not have the technology to knock out the helicopters, drones or jets that attack them from the air. On the ground, however, they have technology the Mujahidin did not have. They have acquired suicide vests and, more importantly, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) developed by the resistance in Iraq. Indeed, the Taliban claim to have improved upon the IEDs they acquired from Iraq.
Notwithstanding their apparent lack of sophistication, the Taliban leadership have proved to be savvy in their use of videos, CDs, FM radio stations, and the internet to publicize their gains, build morale, and mobilize recruits.
Eliminating Trust deficit in Pakistan: Reparations, Drone technology, Parity, Nuclear Plants
Despite the satellites, drones, spies on the ground, and prize money for their capture, much of the Taliban leadership has evaded capture. In particular, Mulla Omar remains a ghost. He has not been seen or interviewed since 2001. Yet he remains in touch with his commanders through human couriers.
Afghanistan’s corrupt government is another Taliban asset. They have spawned a tiny class of Afghan nouveau riche battened by drug money, government contracts and cronyism. President Karzai implicates the US occupation in the blatant corruption of his own government.
It appears that there is little that the United States can do to neutralize these elusive advantages. Instead, it tries to blame and shift the burden of the war on Pakistan. It continues to pressure and bribe Pakistan’s rulers to mount full-scale military operations against the Taliban support network in Pakistan.
[...]
In addition, President Obama has dramatically escalated drone attacks against the Taliban support network in Pakistan. In tandem, Pakistan too has been launching more massive air and ground attacks against their hideouts. However, none of this has deterred the escalating Taliban attacks against NATO and Afghan forces.
No one suggests that the Taliban can match the credentials of America’s freedom fighters in the late eighteenth century. The latter were committed to the proposition that all men are created equal, barring a few rarely mentioned exceptions. The Taliban are zealots and misogynists, but only a tad more so than the Mujahidin whom the West embraced as freedom fighters.
The West celebrated the Mujahidin’s victory over the Soviets. The same people, fighting under a different name, have now pushed the United States into a costly stalemate. Will the US prolong this stalemate, and push Pakistan too over the brink? Or will it accept the fait accompli the Taliban have created for them, accept its losses, and save itself from greater embarrassment in the future?
Once or twice, the United States has retreated from unwinnable wars and survived. It is likely that the ‘surge’ is primarily a political move to try to pass off the retreat from Afghanistan as another ‘mission accomplished.’ Let’s hope that this stratagem works somehow, because the alternative is likely to be much worse for all parties involved in this unwinnable war.
M. Shahid Alam is professor of economics at Northeastern University. This is an excerpt from his forthcoming book, Israeli Exceptionalism: The Destabilizing Logic of Zionism (Macmillan, November 2009). Contact me at alqalam02760@yahoo.com. Will the Taliban Reclaim Control of Afghanistan? By M. SHAHID ALAM
- India using ‘aid’ to Kabul- to split Afghanistan
- Rebutting Mr. Sameer Lakwani on Afghanistan
- Musharraf is wrong, Sharif is right–for once
- Indian presence in Afghanistan is history!
Reversing Anti-Americanism in Pakistan: Parity, Nuclear Plants
President Zardari has clearly informed the US Administration that if they want to reduce the trust deficit in Pakistan and reverse growing Anti-Americanism in the region–then President Obama has to accord Islamabad parity with Delhi and not hold back on critical technologies that Pakistan needs. The two areas identified are Nuclear and Drone Technology. Pakistan needs both of these in order to resolve the energy crisis and to deal with the terror groups that cross into Pakistan. Since the US is responsible for the spillover of the war into Pakistan, and because Pakistan has been a front line state, first against the USSR, and now against terror–it is Pakistan’s right to demand reparations for the losses incurred.
- President tells National Intelligence Dennis C Blair civil nuclear, drone technologies will help bridge trust deficit
- Blair reiterates US commitment to work closely with Pakistan
- How can US help? A Pakistani American speaks
- Insidious Indian propaganda against Pakistan
Empty promises will not work anymore. The US has to expeditiously deliver ROZ, FTA, nuke plants and Drone technology. This has to be resolved expeditiously. US Pakistani strategic partnership?–Here is a list
