There are more than 4000 articles published on Rupee News. More than 2 million readers have read them in the past few weeks. When the Guns Fizzed and the Gizmos Fizzled and other Rupee News stories are now featured on news.google.com. Apart from being a source on Google News, our content is also purchased by various purchasers. The reason we bring this up is that everything that have written about Afghanistan and Pakistan is proving to be true and coming to fruition. This validated by the events of the past few weeks. Of course there will be glitches along the way, and Bharati machinations will impede progress towards peace, but nothing can stop the wheel of history from turning.
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The PPPPs brilliant coup de grâce was the London Conference which cut down Bharat (aka India) to size and sequestered its influence East of the Indus. Bharat was evicted out of the bases in Tajikistan, then it was outmeneuvered by the Pakistanis at the London Conference where Delhi got a seat in the second row. The Times of India article validates our position, agrees that India has been defeated in the diplomatic game and notarizes all the points gained by the government and the people of Afghanistan and Kashmir. To this we say loudly and clearly Nas Run Minallah He Fatah un Qareeb.
Frustrated and irked analysts in Delhi burned the midnight oil in coming up with a new regional policy for Delhi. Of course the main thrust of the policy was to try to engage with Pakistan and salvage a piece of the pie for itself.
The Times of India article however has an ominous tilt to it–it laments the lack of “hard power” in Afghanistan. Delhi has used all terror tactics at its disposal to destabilize Pakistan and carve out a “pro-India” Afghanistan. All the kings men and all the kings women have not been able to put together the humpty that looks like pro-Indian Najibullah’s Afghanistan for Delhi. Delhi now faces a Taliban run government in Kabul, which will be friendly to Pakistan and the ECO (Iran, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). This time around Iran and Pakistan will not be at odds in Afghanistan. This time around, Iran and Pakistan wil be part of the mosaic of Afghanistan. Russia is backing this new arrangement, the UK sponsored it, and the China and the US guarantee it.
The diplomatic defeat in London for Bharat has long term implications for Bharat and for Pakistan.
There is a widespread impression in India that this country was marginalised in the London conference on Afghanistan and the Indian view, that there were no good and bad Taliban, was ignored. It was decided to negotiate with the Taliban that will come forward to collaborate with the Karzai government, and substantial funds were earmarked to win over the possible collaborative sections of the Taliban.Tags : Taliban, Pakistan, India.The good, the bad, and the ugly Indian Express | Smaller K. Subrahmanyam, Posted: Monday , Feb 08, 2010 at 2240 hrs
The threats entailed in Bharat’s hard power are the threats of a paper tiger. Kargil and Mumbai have proven that Delhi cannot cross the border or the Line of Control. Abdali, Hataf and Ghauri validate Mutually Assured Destruction and the impotance of the much heralded “Cold Start Strategy“.
While Indrani Bagchi presents a real picture of Post-US Afghanistan, the article has erros in it. Bharat does not have a base in Ayini anymore. Furthermore, if there are limits to American power in Kabul, then surely there is limits to Bharati hard power. One Pakistani colonel who has been fighting in South Waziristan and winning– explained the reasons for his win. Unlike the kids from the UK and the US, we know the terrian and the area, and live in the same neighborhood. We know how hot it is and how cold it gets. Our kids ran up the same mountains, and we shared picnics on the same slopes. This area is known to the Pakistan Army. This is our terrain, we play in it, we grow up in it and we practice war games in it. We don’t have another home ot go back to. This is my land, and we will fight–may the better man win. We have better arms, and better intelleigence–”they” cannot win. We have the determination and we are fighting for our country backed by 170 million people. We cannot lose, we have won, and that that is why we are winning.
In December, 2007, Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, threw out two Britons – Michael Semple and Mervyn Patterson- for allegedly bribing Taliban leaders in Musa Qala, Helmand, where British troops were fighting – not always to advantage.
Karzai, apparently enraged that the British were paying off the Taliban behind his back and demanding that these “leaders” be accommodated in the Afghan government, refused to comply, and in the face of British displeasure, expelled them.
Semple, said security officials in Afghanistan, is probably best described as the Afghanistan-Taliban brains trust for the UK’s MI6, its external intelligence arm. In a re-run of the 19th Century ‘Great Game’ adventurers, Semple has been a prime advocate of ‘reintegration’ and ‘reconciliation’ with the Taliban as a key strategy to win the war in Afghanistan.
His background is equally interesting – Semple’s father was a general in the British army and his wife Yamima’s father, General Mirdha, a buddy of former Pakistani president Yahya Khan, putting him on an inside track to military-intelligence decision makers in Pakistan. The idea of wooing over softer Taliban leaders and quelling Pashtun anger isn’t new or novel. Today, it is largely Semple’s doctrine of ‘reconciliation’ that’s driving the present British-led initiative to sift the ‘good’ Taliban from the ‘bad’, and bring the ‘good’ into the tent. It’s a line that Pakistan has pushed, leveraging the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and army’s deep contacts with the Taliban. Islamabad is peddling a promise, once betrayed in 1996 when the group overran Kabul, that the Taliban could be persuaded to control violence and create a backdrop that would allow the West to make a face-saving exit from Afghanistan. Alongside, the Taliban could be persuaded to be a replacement for Karzai, despised by Pakistan and slowly disgraced in Washington. Indrani Bagchi, TOI Crest, 6 February 2010, 09:50am
The Bharati diplomats and the press acknowledge the Pakistani victory in Afghanistan and its deft handling of the situaion.
Described as the “gatekeepers” to the Taliban, Pakistan would have a crucial role in delivering the Taliban to the table, either through coercion or persuasion. But it is being careful not to be seen as muscling in to impose its own agenda in Afghanistan. The mantra in Islamabad is that the process should be “Afghan-led”.
“Pakistan is perhaps better placed than any other country in the world to support Afghan reintegration and reconciliation. Why? We speak the same language, we have common tribes, a common religion, we have a commonality of history, culture and tradition” Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi told the Guardian. “But it [Pakistani mediation] depends on whether we are asked to do so. If asked, the government of Pakistan would be happy to facilitate.” Pakistan: vindication on Afghanistan, assertive with India // Nirupama Subramanian. Hindustan Times.
LONDON MOVE STUNS INDIA
The Afghanistan conference in London last week was a shocker for Indian mandarins who had hoped to muscle in and get a larger say in Afghan policy given the money and effort New Delhi has put into the reconstruction efforts. But what happened was that India got blindsided by the British swallowing the Pakistani line that Islamabad could deliver peace by negotiating a deal with the Taliban. Shivshankar Menon, the new national security adviser, along with foreign secretary Nirupama Rao, is leading a massive review of India’s own Af-Pak policy, which will determine not just India’s approach to Afghanistan, but also craft out a new policy of engagement with Pakistan. The announcement on Thursday of resumption of foreign secretary-level talks between New Delhi and Islamabad is a movement in that direction.
Pakistan has pushed hard to remain in the driver’s seat on Afghan policy. And, at least for now, it appears to be winning by hard-selling the line that without the involvement of the ISI, re-integration will remain a non-starter. That was evident first at the Istanbul Af-Pak meeting leading up to the January 28 London conference , where Pakistan insisted India be kept out of the talks, and even a feeble attempt by Karzai to get India to the table was brushed off. India fretted and fumed impotently, but found itself completely dealt out of the game by Pakistan and the UK leading the charge, letting Karzai announce that he was going to draw his brothers back into the tent, and requesting the Saudis to mediate a ‘reintegration and reconciliation’ with the Taliban.
This was only formalizing a process that had started in 2009, when the Taliban leadership had met with the Afghan government in the desert kingdom . These meetings broke the ice, even quietly blessed by US special envoy to Af-Pak , Richard Holbrooke. After the London conference, Saudi envoy to India Faisal Tarab told Crest in a carefully worded comment, “We are ready to mediate with the Taliban, but we will not talk to terrorists.” Saudi King Abdullah has just met Karzai and the outcome of that conversation could determine the success or otherwise of the proposed venture.
For India, global approval of the reconciliation process implies Pakistan, with its ISI and army, is likely to take a leading role. As Holbrooke told MK Narayanan, who was till recently NSA, and Nirupama Rao quietly during his last visit a couple of weeks ago, Pakistan has worked itself into a paranoia about India’s presence in Afghanistan; India would have to be removed from all decision-making on Afghanistan, they insisted. As London showed, Islamabad got its way.
For the US and UK, even though India’s assistance programme punches all the right buttons, India had to be sacrificed . Therefore, when British foreign secretary David Miliband was asked about India’s role, he hummed and hawed saying “by and by” . In London, India insisted on putting in phrases like the process should be “Afghan-led” and “transparent and inclusive” – words to prevent the British and Pakistanis from controlling it. But as every diplomat understands, these are words than cannot , and indeed, will not be enforced.
The Pakistani demand has been succinctly laid out by Munir Akram, one of its top diplomats: “Pakistan’s cooperation should be offered only in exchange for tangible and immediate US support for Pakistan’s national objectives: an end to Indian-Afghan interference in Baluchistan and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas); a Kashmir solution; a military balance between Pakistan and India; parity with India on nuclear issues; transfer of equipment and technology for counter-terrorism ; unconditional defense and economic assistance; free trade access.” Indrani Bagchi, TOI Crest, 6 February 2010, 09:50am
there is confidence in Islamabad that its new importance to international interests in the region can be leveraged to secure its own interests vis-a-vis India.
After years of being seen as part of the problem in Afghanistan, Pakistan is savouring what it calls a vindication of its position on how to end the conflict in that country, and is confident it holds the key to the proposed new plan of “reconciliation” with the Taliban.
As evident from two sets of remarks by the Pakistan Army chief last week about what it seeks in Afghanistan and how its perceives India, New Delhi will need to factor in a resurgent Pakistani military, assertive about its concerns and self-assured of the resonance these carry in the halls of power in the U.S. and Europe.
From Pakistan’s point of view, the flurry of recent diplomatic moves on the Afghan conflict, culminating in the London Conference, was definitely the game-changer. Certainly, the new international mood seems to have played some role in drawing India back to the negotiating table. Pakistan: vindication on Afghanistan, assertive with India // Nirupama Subramanian. Hindustan Times.
The best way to get out of Afghanistan fast is (for) people to think we’re staying.” Sen. John McCain of Arizona.
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KARZAI CORNERED?
Steve Coll in his book Ghost Wars recounts an event in the life of Hamid Karzai that bears repetition, because it might be instructive even today. In 1999, when his father, Abdul Karzai, a respected Pashtun tribal leader, made an overture to Mullah Omar against al-Qaida, he was gunned down by the Taliban leader’s henchmen in Quetta, Pakistan.
The man is now being pushed into dealing with his father’s killers on an equal footing. A weakened, sullen Karzai has been battered into submission in a game where a lot of money ($500 million, $140 million of it in 2010) will be thrown at yet another attempt to win over the Taliban. US officials told Crest that while they maintain a healthy skepticism about flipping the Taliban, the US is not entirely dismissive of the fresh initiative either. This is as much to keep the British by their side as a reflection of the fact that there are serious doubts about the success of the US military strategy in Afghanistan.
The pragmatist that he is, Karzai has been half-way down this path before. In 2004, after Karzai won his first presidential election, he held out an olive branch to the Taliban, in a ‘reconciliation’ exercise. This was called Tahkim-e-Solh (Strengthening Peace). Established in May, 2005, it tried giving Taliban not guilty of criminal activity a way to return to society. It did not work, because the process was imperfect, the reintegration did not happen in many cases, the payments were delayed or not made at all. Since most were neither provided security nor money, they soon returned to the Taliban, which was more lucrative. Officials say that will be fixed, because the US-UK duo will now control the funds. But Gen David Petraeus (who’s credited with the success of the coalition forces in Iraq and now heads the US central command) is skeptical. “If you have an area that is insecure to begin with, then it is difficult, though not undoable, to guarantee security for somebody who wants to come in from the cold.”
Pakistan is now seen as the gatekeepers of Kabul.
A constructive role by Pakistan is likely to come attached with the demand that the international community address its “legitimate” concerns and issues in the region.
Some of those concerns were articulated by the Pakistan Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani when, in two meetings with journalists this week, he said India remains the primary threat to Pakistan and the focus of the Pakistani military. He spoke of the peace, security and stability of Afghanistan as the main element of Pakistan’s “strategic depth”, and said Pakistan had a more “legitimate” expectation in the matter of training the Afghan security forces than India.
A Foreign Ministry official, who wished not to be identified, was blunter: “We do not really see India playing any role in Afghanistan. Any role for India in Afghanistan can only be problematic”. On the other hand, he said, Pakistan could not be wished away from Afghanistan, and had “a more natural role” in Afghanistan, given the shared border and other links.
Also, U.S. demands to “do more” against the Afghan Taliban holed up in Pakistani territory no more hold any logic, said Imitiaz Gul, author of a book on Al Qaeda and head of the Islamabad-based Centre for Research: “These demands have to a back seat. If we have to talk to them, why antagonise them?” Pakistan: vindication on Afghanistan, assertive with India // Nirupama Subramanian. Hindustan Times.
CAN INDIA PROJECT HARD POWER?
Afghanistan and its future will prove to be India’s real test as a regional power. For the past decade, India has successfully turned itself into a huge presence and influence peddler in Afghanistan – through its biggest-ever use of soft power: roads, hospitals, schools, scholarships, community development projects. India’s financial commitment in Afghanistan is upwards of $1.2 billion. Opinion polls put India’s popularity rating among Afghans at 71%, in extreme contrast to only 2% for Pakistan.
India has refrained from using hard power in Afghanistan, and, in many ways, the Indian presence is guaranteed by the US’ security role. As soft-power author, Harvard University’s Joseph Nye says, “Achieving transformational objectives may require a combination of both hard and soft power.” Soft power is only credible when it is matched by or surpassed by hard power. India is paying the price, because, beyond a point, roads and dams don’t help buy influence. As one top-level Afghan official said, wryly, “We love India, but we fear Pakistan. That is a stronger emotion.” India’s power projection in Afghanistan has been primarily by showing its “goodness” . Pakistan, on the other hand, negotiates with the world with a gun held to its own head. That, as India has discovered several times in its history, is far more persuasive.
For the moment, Pakistan has the upper hand, because both the UK and US need it more than ever. Pakistan is playing an adroit diplomatic game of chicken with the US – and winning. Islamabad may be hopelessly dependent on Washington’s money, but that doesn’t stop it from refusing to give visas to US officials, refusing money that comes with ‘conditions’. Pakistan has made it clear it will not stop supporting the Afghan Taliban; there is absolutely no attempt to tackle al Qaida; and Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura functions unimpeded. In short, it holds veto power over whether the Obama surge succeeds in Afghanistan. Washington, said an Indian official scornfully, is “kowtowing to Pakistan just like they did to China.”
Harsh perhaps, but this view is prevalent in the upper reaches of the Indian government – to the extent that even the PM is believed to have remarked that if India and Pakistan have another fracas, Washington may not weigh in on India’s side.
According to high-level officials in New Delhi, a successful Taliban reintegration is another term for a Taliban takeover in Kabul. “Look at Yemen and you see the Afghan future. If and when that happens, we may be looking at a pre-9 /11 situation,” said one of them.
Will Karzai survive? Unlikely. But if he is to avoid the kind of fate that befell Afghanistan’s president Mohammed Najibullah - who was tortured and strung up from a light post by the Taliban in Kabul in 1996 after the Soviets withdrew – Karzai needs new and improved survival strategies. These must include working out deals with warlords – tribal leaders who can help him survive the Taliban – because despite everything, the average Afghan still prefers the present government to the harsh rules of the Taliban. He can’t look to the UK, US or Pakistan for help. He can look to India. Will India step up to the table? This would entail getting our hands dirty. So far, India has shied away from a robust security role in Afghanistan. Indrani Bagchi, TOI Crest, 6 February 2010, 09:50am
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A WIN-WIN FOR PAKISTAN? NOT SO SOON
It ain’t gonna be easy for the Pakistanis either. On the face of it, Pakistan faces the welcome prospect of putting its creation, the Taliban, back in power in Kabul, but the very fact that their leadership lives ensconced inside Pakistan means the Taliban have a stake in Pakistan as well. That has implications.
[...]
Dreaded Taliban war veteran Jallaluddin Haqqani and other fighters of the Haqqani clan along the Afghan-Pak frontier operate with impunity on both sides of the Khyber. They have close ties with al Qaida, and with Pakistan’s ISI. Then, of course, there are stand-alone warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami who has changed sides so many times that Afghan watchers have lost count. He now maintains close ties with bin Laden and Co and US officials say he may be one of the first to be flipped!
So let’s assume Pakistan’s dream comes true and the ‘good’ Taliban join the Kabul government. [...]
CAN TALIBAN TURN A NEW LEAF?
After some 1,200 attacks a month through all of 2009 (according to the UN), the Taliban are scenting victory in Afghanistan. A statement by Mullah Omar, rejecting the Karzai peace offer, was telling: “They have tried in the past and are trying now to entangle our Muslim and brave people and their leadership, the Islamic Emirate. Some time, they announce that they will provide money, employment and opportunity to have a comfortable life abroad, for those mujahideen who agree to part ways with jihad. They think that mujahideen have taken up arms to gain money or grab power or were compelled to turn to arms. This is baseless and futile.” It’s a no-brainer that the Taliban leadership will not be bought. Why then, should anyone expect their rank and file to defect, when they haven’t for so long?
[..]But isn’t there even a hint of a silver living? Ahmed Rashid points to Mullah Omar’s Eid message, repeated last week, that the Taliban would “pose no threat to neighbouring countries” as a sign of flexibility in the Taliban position. Indrani Bagchi, TOI Crest, 6 February 2010, 09:50am
AfPak countercurrents beyond the Oxus to AfPakAzUzbKazTurkKyr-istan
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WHAT DOES INDIA DO NOW?
While Pakistan is smoking victory in Afghanistan, it is also pushing for a greater focus on India-Pakistan relations. This argument has been persuasive in Washington since the beginning of the Obama administration, but is gathering currency now. Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, said on Wednesday, “South Asian security tensions and political dynamics significantly impact our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The longstanding animosity and mistrust between Pakistan and India complicates regional efforts…. While we acknowledge the sovereign right of India and Pakistan to pursue their own foreign policies, we must demonstrate our desire for continued and long-term partnership with each, and offer our help to improve confidence and understanding between them in a manner that builds longterm stability across the wider region of South Asia.”
The argument within the UPA government is that if India doesn’t take unilateral steps with Pakistan, it will inevitably get drawn into a trilateral effort with the US. Therefore, the government, even at the risk of being pilloried for ‘succumbing’ to the US, is working to engage Pakistan across a spectrum of issues, starting off with home minister P Chidambaram’s visit to Islamabad end-February . Senior officials are certain this is unlikely to affect Pakistan’s support to terrorists or its position on India in Afghanistan. But not talking with Pakistan is raking in diminishing returns.
Not only has Pakistan won this round against India, it has won it big. It’s even managed to impress upon the world India’s non-relevance in Afghanistan. Will India take this on the chin and continue or, in the eventuality that the Taliban-Pakistan combine returns to power in Kabul, will it cut its losses and run?
At present there are two schools of thought in the Indian establishment . The first says Afghanistan is a graveyard, and India’s had a good run there for the past decade. “The Hindu Kush was so named for a specific reason,” said an official. But if the US security cover goes with the prospect of a Talibanised power structure in Kabul, India should reduce its presence, get its people out, and keep a modicum of influence to prevent the country from becoming a pre-9 /11 anti-India space. Significantly, India hasn’t taken on new infrastructure projects in Afghanistan lately.
But another school says India should not only maintain its presence but add different dimensions to it. This will define how India uses its power for peace in the neighbourhood, which will not happen by cut-and-run policies. Pakistan is in Afghanistan not because it wants to have a strong and stable country next door. It is there because of its flawed doctrine of ‘strategic depth’ against India. It stands to reason that India’s stakes in Afghanistan are vital precisely for that reason. India’s goal therefore should be to prevent a Taliban return.
But the bottomline is that India is on its own in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan will define Indian power more comprehensively than all its ships sailing in the Indian Ocean. So what should India do? In off-the-record conversations with TOI-Crest , senior government officials said India should get a strong foothold in the Afghan administration. It needs to force situations where the Afghans will be able to take their own decisions and not be railroaded by the Pakistanis or the British. “If the Afghans take their own decisions, that’s good for us.”
Second, India needs to support Karzai through a period when he will surely be making existential deals to ensure a life after the US. For India, Karzai is a better bet than the Taliban, so among the first things India should do is to be able to train their officer corps, many of whom already come here for ‘soft’ training. There are supporters in Karzai’s circle like Asadullah Khalid (erstwhile governor of Kandahar) and Gul Agha Sherzai (Nangarhar) whom India can help. Most of all, India can help Karzai govern better.
Primarily, India will have to step up its engagement with the Pashtuns. Since 2001, India has been doing precisely this, and it’s no coincidence that India’s enormously successful small projects are scattered through the Pashtun provinces. As one official remarked, “There is no door in Afghanistan that is closed to India any longer.” But as one security official admitted, the Pashtuns will always have naturally Pakistani leanings, which have to be factored in as well.
India ‘s traditional engagement with Afghanistan has been through the Pashtun tribes. India has picked up a lot of IOUs over the past years, now’s the time to cash in. India’s Pashtun outreach should straddle the Durand Line though there it will be much tougher going. Meanwhile, the Tajiks and Hazaras can be empowered once again though there is no formal Northern Alliance any longer. India can join hands with the Russians and could expect some cooperation from Iran, but Iran is always iffy.
Former Pakistan envoy, G Parthasarathy says, “India’s role cannot be marginalised. We should train the Afghan army and open Indian markets for Afghan produce.”
On the military side, there is a case for more proactive Indian security tasks in Afghanistan, without sending troops. Thus far, India has held back, which is counter-productive . The airbase in Ayni, Tajikistan, can be given more teeth. And if China can think of overseas military bases, so should India.
The prize is not Afghanistan, it’s peace. Is India’s neighbourhood set to get even more dangerous? Indrani Bagchi, TOI Crest, 6 February 2010, 09:50am
A big Indophile Stephen Cohen said it best when discussing the state of Indian-American relations. He said the long term prognosis of the India American relationship is not good at all. The interests of the US and India are not congruent.
The temporary love affair between Bharat (aka India) and the US came about as a result of the flawed Bush policies which saw Bharat (aka India) as a counterweight to China was abandoned by the Democrats. Mr. Akbar said it best “India gets a billion praises at state dinners” and Pakistan get a billion and a half Dollars”. The US “East India Company” is glad to sell Bharat anything and everything (within limits), but when it comes to giving Bharat stuff, thats another matter. Bharat can buy Nuclear reactors, and planes if it wants, but it wont get the “Coke formula”–the US will give it fish, but won’t show it how to fish–something that Russia is also doing.
The future of Pakistan is based on peace and a confederation with Afghanistan. The future of Pakistan is a potent and strong ECO. This is what the poets have yearned for and this is what the people want.
