Obama must avoid creating a backlash in neighboring Pakistan by heavy-handed U.S. military intervention there: David Kilcullen

Categorized | Afghan, Current Affairs, Pak CA, US CA, US Int Rel.

Obama must avoid creating a backlash in neighboring Pakistan by heavy-handed U.S. military intervention there: David Kilcullen

Posted on 20 March 2009. Tags: Afghan, David Kilcullen, Pakistan, USA

There is a growing anti-war movement in America. The Thinktanks are now reflicting the popular mood of American’s demanding an Exit strategy.

The Australian David Kilcullen is an advisor to President Obama on Afghanistan. He is part of the critical brain trust that make up the important triad with Bruce Reidel and Marvin Weinbaum. He makes a strong argument and has a sane plan which includes an exit strategy out of Afghanistan. Apparently Mr. Kilcullen is aware of the dangers of getting sucked into Pakistan. Hope that the U.S. will get sucked into Pakistan.” Osama bin Laden

“All we have to do is send two mujaheddin to the furthest point east to raise a cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the [U.S.] generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses . . . so we are continuing this policy of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.“ Osama bin LadenThe London Times published a report by Christina Lamb on Sunday that Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, the Saudi intelligence chief, visited Islamabad, Delhi and Kabul in January to talk to both Taliban and Afghan government officials. Bin Laden used Reagan’s USSR strategy to Destroy US Capitalism

There are several dimensions to the puzzle. The security concerns of Pakistan, the concerns of China, and the future survival of NATO are all pieces of the puzzle that Mr. Kilcullen seem to have considered. Brizinski: Don’t start new wars. Use diplomacy in Pakistan. US Qaeda strategy flawed’ Rand report: End GWOT. Defeat Al-Qaeda with police & Dollars

Last October, the Bush administration arranged a briefing for aides to Barack Obama and John McCain on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Among the expert advisers was David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency guru who had been one of the architects of the U.S. troop surge in Iraq.

“We said the situation was extremely difficult in Afghanistan, with a security crisis and a political crisis occurring at the same time,” Kilcullen remembers. Obama had been talking on the campaign trail as if Afghanistan’s problems could be fixed by adding more U.S. troops. The briefing was a wake-up call that the next president would face some agonizing policy decisions.

Now President Obama is in the final stages of his strategy review for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And Kilcullen, meanwhile, has just published a book that distills the advice he has been offering to the White House (Bush and Obama, both) and to Gen. David Petraeus, the Centcom commander. The book, “The Accidental Guerrilla,” offers the clearest road map I’ve seen for moving ahead in Afghanistan.

Obama’s policy choices for Afghanistan are usually presented in stark terms: Either he authorizes a major new escalation, well beyond the 17,000 additional troops he has already approved, or he scales back the mission to a narrower counterterrorism effort aimed at preventing al-Qaeda from mounting attacks.

Kilcullen argues that either of these extreme options would be a mistake. “It would be the height of folly to commit to a large-scale escalation now,” when the political climate in both Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan is so uncertain. We should use the extra 17,000 troops to stabilize the situation but delay the big decision about escalation until after Afghanistan’s presidential election in August. Road Map for Afghanistan, By David Ignatius, Thursday, March 19, 2009; Page A15. The writer is co-host of PostGlobal, an online discussion of international issues. His e-mail address is davidignatius@washpost.com.

While the policy for Afghanistan is going through another review and will be finally presented at the NATO summit in April, the ongoing peace negotiations are have taken a life of their own. The Saudis are working with the Pakistanis to bring sanity back to Kabul.

The London Times published a report by Christina Lamb on Sunday that Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, the Saudi intelligence chief, visited Islamabad, Delhi and Kabul in January to talk to both Taliban and Afghan government officials.

Lamb also reported that Taliban Chief Mullah Omar had given his approval to peace talks with the Afghan government for the first time, citing a “mediator” with the Taliban, Algerian former mujahideen fighter in Afghanistan Abdullah Anas and an Afghan government official involved in the negotiations as the sources.

The Afghan government negotiator told Lamb that government officials “have been in contact both with Mullah Omar’s direct representatives and commanders from the front line”. Asia Times. Chinks exposed in Obama’s Taliban plan By Gareth Porter

The Obama Administration is not pressured in by an ideological cabal that wants to conquer the world. The sagacious advice is coming from a diverse group of advisors that include the Afghans and the Pakistanis.

From mid 2007 onwards, USA started to exhibit its urge to step into FATA to nab top leaders of Al-Qaeda including the most wanted man Osama and to destroy the sanctuaries of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This demand got accelerated after June last year when Taliban militant activity and casualty rate of foreign troops in Afghanistan got intensified. Suicide attack on Indian embassy in Kabul further infuriated US military. Karzai as a mouthpiece of USA and India leveled unsubstantiated wild accusation that the ISI was involved in the attack. Without proving their allegations, both India and Afghanistan suspended talks with Pakistan in a synchronized move. Pakistan was singled out and demonized under a calculated program. USA joined the duo in admonishing and warning Pakistan. While leveling allegations the trio turned a blind eye to the subversive activities of CIA, RAW and RAM and that of leadership of a terrorist group BLA based in Helmand since 2003. US forces should exit from Afghanistan honorably, Tue, 2009-03-17 02:34, By Asif Haroon Raja

Can Obama pull US out of the AfPak quicksand? Choosing China & Pakistan over Bharat (aka India)

Will NATO buy the Obama Doctrine? What’s in between the lines?

Can Obama duplicate Swat peace deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan Fixing Afpak: Inability to define exit strategy spells inevitable US military catastrophe in Kabul Obama’s sane policy: Negotating with the Taliban Betrayals, blackmail in Bakiyev cloaking failure as success hiding the defeat declaring victory withdrawing from Afghanistan within 12 months Obama to unveil new policy: Marshal Plan & end to bombing raids in Pakistan

Convincing the US tin ear of the Pakistani point of view Peek into Obama’s brains: Bruce Reidel on Pakistan Growing consensus in the Obama team: Much of Pakistan’s problems originate in Afghanistan

Obama advisor Weinbaum predicts total Afghan policy review: Sees focus on talks & Reconciliation Afghanistan: Gen. Petraeus’ Pakistani advisers: Indians jittery Obama adviser gives deep insights into new Afghan policy

Why the surge in Afghanistan is doomed to failure?

Hindu Kush Curtain Call: The End Game in Afghanistan

Kilcullen understands the mix of political and military factors that drives the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And although he made his name as the strategist of Petraeus’s troop surge, Kilcullen is actually quite cautious about using military power to combat Islamic militants. He argues in the book that Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq was “an extremely serious strategic error” and that the United States “should avoid such interventions wherever possible, simply because the costs are so high and the benefits so doubtful.” But once we’re in, there’s no easy exit.

The problem in these small wars is that U.S. military power creates a backlash that fuels even more violence. This conundrum is expressed in Kilcullen’s title, “The Accidental Guerrilla.” Most of the people we ended up fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t start with any major grievance against the United States. They were drawn into the fight almost by accident, as they reacted to American efforts to destroy al-Qaeda and other Muslim foes.

Kilcullen offers a four-stage model to explain the radicalization of the typical Taliban supporter in Afghanistan. The process begins with “infection,” as al-Qaeda establishes a presence; next comes “contagion,” as al-Qaeda uses its haven to mount attacks; then follows “intervention” by the United States to destroy al-Qaeda’s sanctuary and its Taliban protectors; and that produces “rejection,” as the local population allies with al-Qaeda and the Taliban against the foreign invaders.

For America, it’s a costly and self-defeating exercise — which is precisely what al-Qaeda intends. Kilcullen quotes a haunting 2004 statement by Osama bin Laden: “All we have to do is send two mujaheddin to the furthest point east to raise a cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the [U.S.] generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses . . . so we are continuing this policy of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.”

Kilcullen argues that the Obama administration can gradually stabilize Afghanistan using the same combination of political and military power that Petraeus used in Iraq. The right strategy is to remove the “accidental” combatants from the battlefield — by negotiating with them, buying them off, sharing power with them or just ignoring them. At the same time, the United States must ruthlessly pursue its deadly adversaries in al-Qaeda and separate them from the Afghan population. Above all, Obama must avoid creating a backlash in neighboring Pakistan by heavy-handed U.S. military intervention there.

Obama inherits a messy war in Afghanistan. Kilcullen’s advice, as I read him, consists of three “don’ts.” Don’t do it again; don’t make it worse by overescalation; don’t think you can pull out now without damaging U.S. interests. For Obama, that means a measured commitment, somewhere between a major escalation and a minimal force. Road Map for Afghanistan, By David Ignatius, Thursday, March 19, 2009; Page A15. The writer is co-host of PostGlobal, an online discussion of international issues. His e-mail address is davidignatius@washpost.com.

Any plan for Pakistan must include an exit strategy. The “Neo Taliban” have a list of demands and this time around the are speaking from a position of strength.

As suggested in the Rubin-Rashid proposal, any deal with the Taliban will have to include a date for withdrawal of all US and NATO forces. In October 2007, The Guardian reported that senior Taliban commanders in Helmand province had sent a list of demands to the Karzai government through intermediaries that included control of 10 southern provinces, a timetable for withdrawal of foreign troops and the release of all Taliban prisoners within six months. Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in 2006.

US AfPak policy review results mimic Chinese demads given to Hillary