Obama’s “Surgers” vs “Exiters” in Afghanistan: A planned Exit strategy now or scrambled hasty retreat later

Posted on February 24, 2009 by Moin Ansari


Afghanistan: Hope is not a strategy: Continuation is not a policy.

Washington is again buzzing with the possibilities. The Pentagon has just completed a study on how to deal with Kabul. The State Department has done its own study. The NEI has given the President another review. Of course the Right wing and Left Wing Think tanks are competing for space with their own agendas and policy preferences. Each new report proposes its own nuances based on the funding it receives and the demeanor and philosophy of its writers. There is a cacophony of voices from the Potomac on how to reduce the blood flowing into the Kabul River. There are the “Surgers” who are in the minority but went along with Obama’s mini-surge, and then there are the “Exiters” who recognize the reality of the Afghan situation and want to do what is good for America.

Noticias de Rupia | Nouvelles de Roupie | Rupiennachrichten | новости рупии | 卢比新闻 | Roepienieuws | Rupi Nyheter | ルピーニュース | Notizie di Rupia | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا | Moin Ansari | معین آنصآرّی |  اخبار روپیہ |  February 24th, 2009 |

Apart from ruling out any substantial drawdown in US troop levels in Afghanistan – which he did during a meeting with senior Democratic and Republican lawmakers on Tuesday – Obama has not yet tipped his hand.

His Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and Obama’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak), Richard Holbrooke, are believed to lean somewhat more in favor of the COIN strategy, while Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who many analysts believe could turn out to be the single most influential voice in the debate, has characteristically kept his cards very close to his chest.

At the same time, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, a former congressman who is particularly sensitive to growing Democratic concern on Capitol Hill that Afghanistan could turn into a Vietnam-like quagmire, is reportedly leaning toward Biden’s view, as is Obama’s increasingly influential deputy national security adviser, Thomas Donilon. Donilon’s boss, General Jim Jones, has reportedly acted primarily as an honest broker.

Republicans, led by their failed presidential candidate, Senator John McCain, have strongly backed McChrystal, whose bleak analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan and recommendation for a major troop increase, was leaked to the Washington Post last month. Since then, McCain and other hawks have repeatedly pressed Obama to urgently grant whatever the military formally requests. “Time is not on our side,” he reportedly told Obama during Tuesday’s meeting.

With some exceptions, the Democratic leadership in Congress is much more wary and has become increasingly vocal in their skepticism about the COIN approach since the leak, which many Democratic lawmakers saw as an attempt by McChrystal and Petraeus to force Obama to accept their recommendation. Jim Lobe’s blog on US foreign policy can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.

Mr. Bruce Reidel, one of President Obama’s main advisors is a “Surger’ who wants to teach the Taliaban a lesson and show that that they will stay in Afghanistan for a long time. Dr. Henry Kissnger is a “Surger” who wants to surround China through bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Pakistan and Afghanistan are also giving feedback on the review of Afghan policy that will be completed in March. Pakistan’’s ten economists are proposing a Marshall Plan for the region. One of the economists has suggested $60 Billion for Pakistan. The review on Afghanistan is a decision on whether Afghanstan becomes Obama’s Vietnam or Reagan’s East Germany. Based on the volume of paper from Washington, it seems the “Exiters” seem to be winning. Even Newsweek magazine, a very sober and somewhat balanced magazine seems to have joined the “Exiters“.

Mr. Ralph Peters once a “Surger” is now an “Exiter“. Mr. Peter’s four possibilities can be listed as choice between an exit strategy or a hasty retreat after the defeat. We see it as follows:

1) Plan an exist strategy and leave with dignity now or

2) Wait for the Taliban to run over Karzai’s forbidden city

The ranks of the “Exiters” is surging because of several interlinked factors—the economy and China. Both are inter-related and the dependencies weigh heavy on the White House. Why the US gave up India as a Strategic partner? Without China’s help, the USA cannot sustain the bailouts or hope for a recovery. China is willing to give the US a reprieve, but may have a couple of strings attached. China will exact a price. It seems that Beijing at this point will require a pullout from Afghanistan and the resolution of Kashmir. We have always considered Kashmir as the silent “K” in Holbrooke’s mission. India’s worst nightmares come true: Long term strategic malaise in a changing world . The People’s Daily leaves no doubt that the resolution of Kashmir is not simply a “nice to have” on the “wish list” of Mr. Holbrooke–it a mandated requirement-China’s pound of flesh for agreeing to buy American T-Bonds. India feels the pain: The US begs Beijing for money

It is clear that without Pakistan’s cooperation, the US cannot win the war on terror. Therefore, to safeguard its own interests in the fight against terrorism in South Asia, the US must ensure a stable domestic and international environment for Pakistan and ease the tension between Pakistan and India. This makes it easy to understand why Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan issues, and why India is included in Holbrooke’s first foreign visit. In fact, the “Afghan problem”, the “Pakistani problem” and the “Indian-Pakistani problem” are all related. China’s Official Newspaper: The People’s Daily

The other factor weighing in favor of the “Exiters” is the economy. Neither the US, nor the Europeans are in any position to waste another three Trillion Dollars on unsustainable and unwinnable wars.  And then there is the minor matter of finding a supply chain route to Kabul. the one through Karachi gets choked once too often. The one through Iran is a minefield of Iranian demands and Israeli suspicions. The route through Russia in untenable and too arduous with too many strings. The price of transferring “non-military” hardware through Russia is to give up Ukraine and Georgia back to Russia is too big a price to pay. Moscow’s pound of flesh for allowing base & supplies to Afghanistan

The US base at Minas is being “sold” to the Russians cutting off a possible route to Kabul. Russia asserts itself in Central Asia. The politically deaf President Bush wasted a unique opportunity to wrest the Central Asian Republics away from Moscow. If he had worked with Islamabad on a plan to Americansize the region, it would have worked. However he was too busy bombing Kabul to listed to any sane advice.

The $80 Billion Thinktank industry fails to get the nuances of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  They try to use the Middle Eastern paradigm or the Indian thinking. Both fail to understand the region between the Indus to the Amu Darya.

Betrayals & Blackmail in Bakiyev: Cloaking failure as success, hiding the defeat, declaring victory & withdrawing from Afghanistan within 12 months . Mr. Peters calls it a strategy. It is an plan to exit Afghanistan. Mr. Peter’s has read the writing on the wall.

Instead of floundering in search of a strategy, we should consider removing the bulk, if not all, of our forces. The alternative is to hope blindly, waste more lives and resources, and, in the worst case, see our vulnerable supply route through Pakistan cut, forcing upon our troops the most ignominious retreat since Korea in 1950 (a massive air evacuation this time around, leaving a wealth of military gear).

Ranked from best to worst, here are our four basic options going forward:

  • Best. Instead of increasing the U.S. military “footprint,” reduce our forces and those of NATO by two-thirds, maintaining a “mother ship” at Bagram Air Base and a few satellite bases from which special operations troops, aircraft and drones, and lean conventional forces would strike terrorists and support Afghan factions with whom we share common enemies. All resupply for our military could be done by air, if necessary.
  • Stop pretending Afghanistan’s a real state. Freeze development efforts. Ignore the opium. Kill the fanatics.
  • Good. Leave entirely. Strike terrorist targets from over the horizon and launch punitive raids when necessary. Instead of facing another Vietnam ourselves, let Afghanistan become a Vietnam for Iran and Pakistan. Rebuild our military at home, renewing our strategic capabilities.
  • Poor. Continue to muddle through as is, accepting that achieving any meaningful change in Afghanistan is a generational commitment. Surge troops for specific missions, but not permanently.
  • Worst. Augment our forces endlessly and increase aid in the absence of a strategy. Lie to ourselves that good things might just happen. Let U.S. troops and Afghans continue to die for empty rhetoric, while Pakistan decays into a vast terrorist refuge. Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer, a member of USA TODAY’s board of contributors and the author of Looking For Trouble: Adventures in a Broken World. Posted at 12:16 AM/ET, February 24, 2009 in Foreign Affairs – Middle East – Forum,Peters | The mendacity of hope The U.S. essentially has four options — from best to worst — going forward in Afghanistan. By Ralph Peters 

Afghanistan: The writing is on the wall. Can Obama read it? Time is not on the side of the USA. The war in Afghanistan is unsustainable and the Taliban can carry on forever, harassing the supply chain, continuing the hit and run operations against the US forces, keeping the Europeans at bay, and keeping the pressure on Kabul with hard hitting and morale destroying attacks every few weeks.

UK Brig. Smith: “We’re not going to win this [Afghan] war”

“Obviously the trends in Afghanistan have been in the wrong direction, and I think everyone is rightly concerned about them…Certainly in Afghanistan, wresting control of certain areas from the Taliban will be very difficult… In both [Afghanistan and Pakistan], in certain areas, the going may be tougher before it gets easier.”   CENTCOM commander Gen. David H. Petraeus quoted from a recent New York Times interview,

“The foreign forces are ensuring the survival of a regime which would collapse without them . . . They are slowing down and complicating an eventual exit from the crisis, which will probably be dramatic… In the short term we should dissuade the American presidential candidates from getting more bogged down in Afghanistan . . . The American strategy is doomed to fail.” Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, fromer British ambassador to Afghanistan, and now the UKs special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanist: Hereportedly wile speaking to the deputy French ambassador to Kabul François Fitou

 

The conflict in Afghanistan is the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. Instead of concentrating on the critical mission of keeping Islamist terrorists on the defensive, we’ve mired ourselves by attempting to modernize a society that doesn’t want to be — and cannot be — transformed.

In the absence of a strategy, we’re doubling our troop commitment, hoping to repeat the success we achieved in the profoundly different environment of Iraq. Unable to describe our ultimate goals with any clarity, we’re substituting means for ends.

Expending blood and treasure blindly in Afghanistan, we do our best to shut our eyes to the worsening crisis next door in Pakistan, a radicalizing Muslim state with more than five times the population and a nuclear arsenal. We’ve turned the hose on the doghouse while letting the mansion burn.Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer, a member of USA TODAY’s board of contributors and the author of Looking For Trouble: Adventures in a Broken World. Posted at 12:16 AM/ET, February 24, 2009 in Foreign Affairs – Middle East – Forum,Peters | The mendacity of hope The U.S. essentially has four options — from best to worst — going forward in Afghanistan. By Ralph Peters

If President Reagan will be remembered for the breakup of the USSR, and the reunification of Germany, President Bush will be remembered for losing wars in Iraq-Afghanistan and losing the Central Asian republics to Russia. Mr. Ralph Peters is wrong when he says that “Afghanistan wasn’t a war of choice“. President Bush had a choice of stationing 5000 marines in Tarbela and smoking out the evil guys. He chose to carpet bomb all of Afghanistan with Daisy Cutters and not work to moderate the rulers of Kabul. He had an opportunity to use a moderate Afghanistan to placate and win over the Central Asian Republics. By listening to the likes of Mr. Peters, Bush lost the battle and America lost the war, and the world lost Central Asia to Moscow. The implications of the IMU activity in Pakistan

Initially, Afghanistan wasn’t a war of choice. We had to dislodge and decimate al-Qaeda, while punishing the Taliban and strengthening friendlier forces in the country. Our great mistake was to stay on in an attempt to build a modernized rule-of-law state in a feudal realm with no common identity.

We needed to smash our enemies and leave. Had it proved necessary, we could have returned later for another punitive mission. Instead, we fell into the great American fallacy of believing ourselves responsible for helping those who’ve harmed us. This practice was already fodder for mockery 50 years ago, when the novella and film “The Mouse That Roared” postulated that the best way for a poor country to get rich was to declare war on America then surrender.

Even if we achieved the impossible dream of creating a functioning, unified state in Afghanistan, it would have little effect on the layered crises in the Muslim world. Backward and isolated, Afghanistan is sui generis (only example of its kind). Political polarization in the U.S. precludes an honest assessment, but Iraq’s the prize from which positive change might flow, while Afghanistan could never inspire neighbors who despise its backwardness.

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s eloquent and independently patriotic Paskhtun politician said it best “the Americans will leave, and we will have to deal with the mess that they created” in Afghanistan. This is the same sort of mess that the Russians left behind. At the time Afghanistan deteriorated into a decade long civil war. US, Pakistani, Saudi and UEA policy makers came up with the Taliban to bring peace to the war ridden region. It worked. Unfortunately the insane elements within the Taliban and the evil people within Al-Qaeda tangled with the USA and brought US intervention. If 9/11 had not happened, the Taliban could have been convinced and coerced into moderation. At the time they were in control of the Pakistanis and could have been molded in a different direction. However President Bush’s Gung Ho Cowboy testosterone “Charge of the Light Brigade” wanted to destroy them with “shock and awe“, humiliate them with Abu Ghraib, and decapitate them with Gitmo. Looking back–it was a failed policy based on fear and reprisals against the wrong people. Imran Khan appearing on GPS with Fareed Zakaria reminded the American people that “The Taliban was not the enemy–the enemy was Al-Qaeda“. American Cut and Paste Armchair analysts, and British  Lazy-Boy Thinktankers were unable or unwilling to differentiate between the various players. the inability to distinguish the differences among the competing forces was a fatal mistake. Perhaps those with a vested interest were happy to see armed conflict.

 

Recalling failures of Vietnam

 

Echoing Vietnam, we’re pouring wealth into Afghanistan, corrupting those we wish to rally; we’re fighting with restrictions against an enemy who enjoys sanctuaries across international borders; and our core enemies are natives, not foreign parties (as al-Qaeda was in Iraq).

If the impending surge fails to pacify the country, will we send another increment of troops, then another, as we did in Southeast Asia? As the British learned the hard way, Afghanistan can be disciplined, but it can’t be profitably occupied or liberalized. It’s inconceivable to us, but many Afghans prefer their lives to the lives we envision for them. The lot of women is hideous, and the lives of nearly all the people are nasty, brutish and short. But the culture is theirs.

Even “our man in Kabul,” President Hamid Karzai, put his self-interest above any greater cause. Reborn a populist, he backs every Taliban claim that the U.S. inflicts only civilian casualties in virtually every effort against terrorists. Karzai is convinced that we can’t abandon him.

We should do just that.

Failure and Defeat in Afghanistan: Inevitable Frustration & misdirected Payback for ally Pakistan . Oblivious to American interests, the  pugnacious Anti-Pakistan Islamphobes will continue their pernicious attacks on Pakistanis and the Pakistani state. Many are on the payroll of India Inc and many are Neocons, rejected and debunked by the American electorate. But the Neocons are still around and will be around. They changed colors before, now they will shed their current skin and put on a new one.

Raplh Peters made famous by his cartography not his intellect is at it again–spouting venom against the most vulnerable population in the world. As ingrates go, is tops the list. He is incapable of finding any reality. The inability to find anything good East of the Hindu Kush is part of his structure and psyche. For Mr. Peters, everything is good West of the Khyber and East of the Indus. Mr. Peters has not read the latest assessment of the situation. India’s worst nightmares come true: Long term strategic malaise in a changing world

 

A reality check

 

In any event, Pakistan, not Afghanistan, will determine the future of Islamist extremism in the region. And Pakistan is nearly lost to us — a fact we must accept. Our strategic future lies with India.

President Obama pitched Afghanistan as the good war during his campaign, while rejecting our efforts in Iraq as a sideshow. He got it exactly wrong. Now our new president either needs to lay out a coherent, detailed strategy with realistic goals, or accept that, by mid-2002, we had achieved all that conventional forces could manage in Afghanistan.

We don’t need hope. We need the audacity of realism.Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer, a member of USA TODAY’s board of contributors and the author of Looking For Trouble: Adventures in a Broken World. Posted at 12:16 AM/ET, February 24, 2009 in Foreign Affairs – Middle East – Forum,Peters | The mendacity of hope The U.S. essentially has four options — from best to worst — going forward in Afghanistan. By Ralph Peters

image(Marines on patrol: What’s needed in Afghanistan is not more U.S. troops or hope./Rafiq Maqbool, AP)

Solution: Fixing “AfPak” expedites the inevitable union between Pakistan & Afghanistan. Bruce Reidel, General Patraeus, Barack Obama, David Brown, David Milliband etc. all see Pakistan and Afghanistan as one entity–”PakAf”. Even sober journals like Newsweek quoting stalwarts have begun to seriously recognize the reality of the union and have been writing about the proposal to formally merge Pakistan and Afghanistan into one entity. Pakistan’s “Do More” list to the USA . Since 2001 we have been proposing a Marshal Plan for Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is the only solution, now being recognized by the Obama Administration. Trade First not Aid First

 

So why not just get out? As always, it’s not so simple. If the Americans pull their troops out, the already shaky Afghan Army could collapse. (Once they lost U.S. air support, South Vietnamese troops sometimes refused to take the field and fight.) Afghanistan could well plunge into civil war, just as it did after the Soviets left in 1989. Already, the Pashtuns in the south regard the American-backed Tajiks who dominate Karzai’s administration as the enemy. The winning side would likely be the one backed by Pakistan, which may end up being the Taliban—just as it was in the last civil war.

Some argue this wouldn’t be such a bad outcome, if the Taliban could be bribed or persuaded to not let Al Qaeda set up terrorist training bases on Afghan territory. According to one senior Taliban leader, a former deputy minister in Mullah Mohammed Omar’s government who would only speak anonymously, some Pakistani officials are urging the insurgents to do something like this now—in return for talks with the Americans. On the other hand, Islamabad could be playing with fire. Given the longstanding ties between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, a jihadist state on its border is a threat to Pakistan, too. And here, U.S. national-security interests definitely do come into play. Newsweek. With Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai

Solutions to AfPak Betrayals, blackmail in Bakiyev cloaking failure as success hiding the defeat declaring victory withdrawing from Afghanistan within 12 months Obama to unveil new policy: Marshal Plan & end to bombing raids in Pakistan
Convincing the US tin ear of the Pakistani point of view Peek into Obama’s brains: Bruce Reidel on Pakistan Growing consensus in the Obama team: Much of Pakistan’s problems originate in Afghanistan
Obama advisor Weinbaum predicts total Afghan policy review: Sees focus on talks & Reconciliation Afghanistan: Gen. Petraeus’ Pakistani advisers: Indians jittery Obama adviser gives deep insights into new Afghan policy

Kabul: The Final assault begins. How long can NATO hang on? Does Obama have the courage to implement the real solutions to Obama’s Vietnam (AfPak)

2009: Obama’s South Asian policy: A Marshall Plan for AfPak

Selective Amnesia of Americans: Pakistan is the most mistreated friend in the world

Fixing AfPak expedites the inevitable union between Pakistan and Afghanistan

The Algeriafication of Pakistan, the Egyptianization of Bangladesh may will yield Iranian type of revolutions

Force is all-conquering, but its victories are short-lived. ~Abraham Lincoln In 1821 Solutions to “Obama’s Vietnam” Kabul: The Final Spring Offensive? End of NATO? Afghanistan: The writing is on the wall. Can Obama read it? UK Brig. Smith: “We’re not going to win this [Afghan] war”
Failure and Defeat in Afghanistan: Inevitable Frustration & misdirected Payback for ally Pakistan US Charge of the Light Brigade into Pakistan is a US failure and has to stop

Pakistan’s do more list for the USA Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan & Swat run by Taliban Huge Migraine for India

Facing the Khyber poltergeist & Ganges hobgoblin NATO war: UK 1880 defeats in Afghanistan
“Charge of the Light Brigade” in Afghanistan AGAIN: Unfortunately the lessons of the unmitigated disaster of “Auckland’s Folly”, (First Anglo-Afghan War 1838–42) have not been taught to the Oxbridge students.

Bin Laden used Reagan’s USSR strategy to Destroy US Capitalism? Cambodiazation of the Afghan war Rescueing the Pashtuns of Afghania from Afghanistan

Unite! Erase the Durand Line Solution: Fixing “AfPak” expedites the inevitable union between Pakistan & Afghanistan

Filed under: Afghanistan, Current Affairs, Pak CA, US CA, US Int Rel., US Poli

« »

Leave a Reply