Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her campaign for the presidency of the United States mentioned “Pakistan’s paranoia” about India’s intentions about Pakistan. Pardon us Ms. Clinton but Bharat has threatened Pakistan will all out war, not once but twice in the past few years. Additionally, it was the Pakhtuns that liberated Azad Kashmir and it is Delhi that occupied Kashmir, Junagarh, Manvadar, Sir Creek and Siachin–not the Pakhtuns (aka Taliban).

India knows that it can never win a conventional warfare because of the Nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). However it still harbors notions of winning a sort of a mini war. India may think it has a Cold Start Strategy, but it may end as a hot nuclear war. Indian Defense planners cannot guarantee that a limited strike will not escalte into a full fledged war. A full fledged war witha nuclear armed labor may destroy both countries. Responding to the “Surgical Strikes”: Neutralizing Delhi’s Cold Start strategy:

While engaging the Kashmir question must be the priority, a much more serious problem is that in less than a decade India has twice threatened us with all-out war in less than a decade, in December 2002 and 2008, using terrorist action by non-state actors as a pretext both times. As the name suggests, the Indian “COLD START” strategy envisages moving Indian forces without any warning or mobilisation into unpredictable locations at high speeds against Pakistan (on the Israeli pattern of 1956 and 1967) seeking to defeat Pakistan by achieving total surprise at both the strategic and the operational levels (remember Pearl Harbour), striving for a decision before the US or China could intervene on Pakistan’s behalf. An unspoken assumption seems to be that “rapid operations would prevent India’s civilian leadership from halting military operations in progress, lest it have second thoughts or possess insufficient resolve”. Does this particular Indian military psyche conform to the so-called civilian control of the Indian military? Facing a foe having 3:1 superiority, and with such a history and such an offensive strategy, we may be forgiven for our “India fixation”.

The military challenges for Pakistan posed by COLD START derails any resolve for sustained peace with India, re-constituting Pakistan’s strategy to take on all five of India’s “Strike Corps” with all our three “Army Reserve” formations presently occupied in FATA, Dir and Swat. Please forgive also our suspicions as to what the many Indian consulates in Afghanistan are doing on our western borders! Ikram Sehgal. The News

Much of this so called “Cold Start Strategy” is based on the Israeli strategy which it tried to implement in Lebanon. Israel was unable to implement its objectives in Lebanon and had to withdraw even from the Litani River. Israel failed to achieve its goals in Lebanon. In Lebanon, Israel was unable to stop the barrage of missiles from Lebanon even on the last day. Many consider this Israel’s defeat.India’s Cold start war strategy and the Pakistani Nuclear response.

Gen Kapoor’s provocative doctrine: Pakistani countermeasures

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Pakistani response to “India’s Cold start strategy”: Limited strikes against targets vs Hot War leading to Nuclear Armageddon

• “No one should ever underestimate our capability and determination to foil any nefarious designs against the security of Pakistan,
• “None can dare rob us of nuclear arsenal”: General Hameed Gul
• After dramatic failure of “Cold Start Strategy” India comes up with cockamamy “96 hour Rapid Thrust” scheme
• India is behind Karachi blast: Imran Khan
• Proxy war in Afghanistan: Strategic depth vs Strategic clout.
• “This new doctrine along with the earlier restructuring of the Indian Command structure, particularly the operationalisation of South West Army Command (2005) has increased manifold threats to Pakistan. It has also enhanced Indian capacity for faster action, Prof. Khurshid Ahmad Jamat e Islami.
• General Kapoor’s sabre rattling stirs up hornets next in Beijing & Islamabad
• Is Delhi preventing the 4th Battle of Panipat or instigating it?

India has been practicing its emerging Cold Start strategy in the border opposite Kasur. Under this strategy, up to four Integrated Battle Groups could move rapidly across the border and occupy a strategic chunk of Pakistani territory up to the outskirts of Lahore in a “limited war”.

For Pakistan, there is no concept of “limited war”.  Any war with India is seen as a total war, for survival. It risks losing everything the moment India crosses its border, and will likely react by attacking India in force at a point of its own choosing under its own Offensive-Defensive strategy. (That is probably why it is moving some of its Strike Force infantry divisions back from the Afghan border to the Indian one.) As the battles escalate, Indian’s numerical and weapon superiority will become critical. If no external intervention takes place quickly, Pakistan will then be left with the “poison pill” defense of its nuclear weapons. Shuja Nawaz is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press 2008) and the forthcoming FATA: A Most Dangerous Place (CSIS, January 2009). He can be reached at www.shujanawaz.com

If there was ever a need, the Comptroller & Auditor General (CAG) of India’s damning reports on the depleted state of Indian military’s readiness took the hot air out of the myth of Pakistan Army specific ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ (CSD). If CAG reports weren’t damaging enough, recent media reports of feeble condition of the Indian military have made it the laughing stock. The rundown condition of the Indian military’s legacy hardware has taken the sting out of its numerical superiority; a far cry from an aggressive strategy of the CSD. Adnan Gill. The Statesman

Some years ago, in a hope to leverage its conventional superiority over Pakistan, the Indian Army announced a new offensive doctrine. The doctrine envisioned a quick mobilisation of Indian strike formations against Pakistan without giving away battle indicators. In a 2004 military exercise, with a huge fanfare, live fire demonstrations and allot of ata-boy pats on their own backs, the doctrine was declared a complete success. In strategic terms, the CSD was conceived to box the Indian civilian-leadership into committing into a Blitzkrieg-like offensive operations.

The Indian military believes long mobilisations give enough time to the Pakistani patrons like USA and China to mobilise world opinion against any military action. They believe, their political leadership easily succumbs to the world pressure, and in the process denies the military its due share of victories. Therefore, at least in theory, the new war doctrine would have lowered the threshold for the leadership to pull the trigger from the outset. However, the rapidly deteriorating health and legendry unreliability of the Indian military hardware severally handicapped the fruitarian of otherwise a brilliant strategy.

CSD was basically an attempt to copy NATO’s “come as you are” war doctrine. It was an integration of three levels. At the top was ‘Combat Command’. The Combat Command headquarters commanded the ‘Battle Groups’, consisting of armoured regiment and mechanised infantry battalions. The Battle Groups were integrated with the attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and squadrons of the Air Force for close support and surveillance. At the bottom were the ‘Combat Teams’; something on the lines of US Army Airborne Rangers. Similarly, the Indian Cold Start Doctrine too was constructed around the idea of rapid mobilisation of the Special Forces and mechanised strike formation supported by the attack helicopters and ground attack squadrons.

This necessitated the relocation of all formations headquarters from central India to the forward positions of Barmer, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, and Suratgarh sectors. It also called for 70 dedicated Indian Air Force (IAF) squadrons for close air support.

Additionally, the Indian Navy’s aviation was to support the diversionary amphibious operations to force Pakistan to fight on several different fronts. Executing such extremely fluid and complex manures would have been next to impossible without a highly sophisticated C4I (Command & Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) network or Net-centric. Adnan Gill. The Statesman

Indian Generals and Commanders have been punctiliously, meticulously and diligently planning for an exercise in futility– the so called “Cold Start Strategy“. Stephen Cohen and others have been coaching the Indians on how to use the threat of a Cold Start  Strategy to threaten and intimidate the Pakistanis into kowtowing to the Indian diktat. It has not worked and it will not work. Pakistan’s War College has scrupulously and diligently run all the permutations of possible combinations in an India Pakistan conflict. Every conceivable action by India has been preempted and planned for.

Though this aspect is a subject of detailed analysis in a separate paper the following observations can be made:

• Pakistan has declared that it will go for nuclear strikes against India when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured. Secondly, when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military military machine has taken place or when Pakistani strategic assets (read nuclear deterrent) are endangered.
• India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine does not seem to be allowing Pakistan to reach at the above conclusions by indulging in deep long range penetrative strikes.
• The Indian doctrine seems to be aimed at inflicting significant military reverses on the Pakistan Army in a limited war scenario short of a nuclear war.
• Nuclear war fare is not a “commando raid” or “command operation” with which its present military ruler is more familiar. Crossing the nuclear threshold is so fateful a decision that even strong American Presidents in the past have baulked at exercising it or the prospects of exercising it.
• Pakistan cannot expect that India would sit idle and suffer a Pakistani nuclear strike without a massive nuclear retaliation.
• Pakistan’s external strategic patrons can coerce or dissuade both sides to avoid a nuclear conflict, but once Pakistan uses a nuclear first strike no power can restrain India from going in from its nuclear retaliation and the consequences for Pakistan in that case stand well discussed in strategic circles. Pakistan would stand wiped out.

In theory, the system optimises resource management for the battle commanders by funneling information of a continuously-evolving complex community of people, devices, information and services onto single platform. However, even the Americans are still trying to debug and streamline a functional Net-centric system. In India’s case, with the exception of the intelligence feed every other piece of Net-centric system is still decades away from becoming a reality.

Such a doctrine is prohibitively expensive strategy. It demands huge stockpiles of spares, fuel and ammunition near the staging bases, heavy-duty air lift capacity, highly sophisticated C4I network, resource hungry training, and the highest levels of mission-readiness all year around. All of which makes raising and maintaining such a force practically out-of-reach of the Indian means. Another key factor keeping the CSD dream turning into a reality is the vintage Soviet hardware, plaguing the Indian Army, Air Force and Navy.

As late as October 2008, CAG warned, India was in real danger of operating with only half its sub-surface force levels, and cast serious doubts on the reliability of the submarine-launched Klub land-attack cruise missiles. It said, only half of its strength was operationally available which were also too old to stay in service. CAG was also highly critical of the IAF preparedness. It revealed gaping holes in India’s air defences.

According to the report, “Shortage of medium power radars needed for ground control and intercept was as high as 53 percent of the projected requirement. IAF’s holding of low-level transportable radars, which are assigned the role of providing early warning, was merely 24 percent of the actual requirement of the IAF.” CAG also rapped Ordnance Factory Board’s for substandard production of ammunition. Indian defence analysts like Manoj Joshi not only echoed CAG’s criticism, but further disclosed the alarmingly low mission readiness levels of the military. He revealed the Army lacked adequate stocks of ammunition and other key equipment to fight Pakistan.

His source claimed, “The 400-odd Bofors guns we bought in the 1980s are falling apart for want of spares, the (600-odd) Shilka anti-aircraft cannon are in desperate need of upgradation. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.”

He added, the tank fleet is also in dire shape, and it did not have any mobile artillery to speak of. Joshi’s following comments serve as a rude reminder of the Cold Myth of Cold Start. He concluded, “Experts admit that notwithstanding the numbers, the armies of the two countries are evenly matched. This means that if India can capture territory in Pakistan, the latter could also do the same in India.”

India’s strategic stockpiles of fuel, ammunition and spares along with its dwindling war wastage reserves will have to be maintained at full levels at all times for the Cold Start Doctrine to have even the remotest chance of hot operations. Nonetheless, CSD’s Achilles’ heel turns out to be the cold-reality of India’s obsolete military hardware and lack of cold-cash to afford such a hotly expensive doctrine. Adnan Gill. The Statesman

The main weakness of Indi’a Cold Start Doctrine is that India needs 70 or 80 squadrons of aircraft. Indian Airforce crying wolf? or facing shortage of jets?. It also assumes that Pakistan will not use tactical or full-fledged nuclear weapons. The other weakness of the India’s military thinking is that the Doctrine is that doctrine assumes that the Pakistani Military will fold instantly and the Indian forces will be able to destroy the Pakistani forces without inflicting damage to the Pakistani civilian population. The Doctrine is based on cold water strategies and does not take into account the irregulars in the that defend Pakistan. Pakistani irregular number a bout 200,000 and then there are the forces energized in FATA and NWFP which would be mobilized. The Doctrine does not take into account the effect of Pakistani missiles, and nuclear assets. However there is much emphasis on “wiping out Pakistan”. The Doctrine fails to understand the problems that India faces in Kashmir, Assam and the Maoist insurgency.

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