Rupee News

NEW DELHI—: Circa 2010. Some more details of the 2-day special conference of the commanders of the joint Forces of India that ended here yesterday have surfaced.

Highly credible defiance sources revealed that on the last day of the conference, the participants where appreciated the Military Intelligence Chief General Loomba there they showed their utmost resent over his failure in pre-empting the Pakistan Army’s Joint exercises with Pakistan Air Force, code named Azm-e-Nau that are in full swing at the moment. Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee Air Chief Marshal P V Naik grilled the MI Chief general Loomba for not collecting the sufficient intelligence about the ongoing war exercises’ of Pakistan Army. The sources say that Loomba completely failed to give any reasonable intelligence output to the participants the war games that the Pakistanis were conducting in the southern part of the Punjab Province of their country.

Circa 2008: According to news reports filtering in, there was constipation in the Bharati diplomacy as well the armed forces. Egged on by the right wing BJP and the war frenzy created by the sensational and irresponsible Bharati media, the Indian National Congress wanted to execute its much heralded “Cold Start Strategy” and attack Pakistan will full force.

India’s defence capability inadequate: Antony

NEW DELHI: Pointing out India’s inadequate defence capability, Defence Minister AK Antony said India was surrounded by harmful elements. “We know very well that what we have is not enough. This is less than 30 percent of the capability we require,” Antony said while addressing a gathering in Panaji (South India) during the commissioning of the Indian Coast Guards fast patrol vessel, ‘Samrat’. The government had embarked upon a programme to modernise the forces and Coast Guards as quickly as possible because “India is surrounded by so many elements harmful to the country”, Antony said. “Our armed forces must always be in a state of preparedness.” app. The Daily Times.

Steven Cohen the much quoted Pakistanphobe hinted about this and most Bharati analysts boasted about it. As they say, the devil is in the detail. When it was time for Bharat to attack the army wimped out, informing the Prime Minster of Bharat that it could not undertake a war with Pakistan. The Bharati army was scared of a resounding defeat by Pakistan and was scared that it would cede territory to Pakistan which would cause a huge embarrassment to Delhi.

Following the Mumbai attack, New Delhi’s inclination was to launch a quick strike against Pakistan to impress domestic opinion, and then be prepared for a short war, given the pressures that would be exercised by international powers for a ceasefire to prevent nuclear war breaking out.

The expectation of New Delhi was that the war would go beyond the traditional skirmishes involving artillery fire that take place at the Kashmir border, essentially to check infiltration by militants, or the brief but bloody exchanges at Kargil in 1999. Kapoor said. Asia Times. Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. He can be reached at sidsri@yahoo.com.

Pakistan thus won the war without firing a single shot. Now Bharat is going to put more emphasis on covert actions–stuff that RAW is already doing in Baluchistan and FATA.

The bottom line is that Bharat despite spending billions of Dollars on defense does not have conventional military superiority over Pakistan. All this without bringing in the nuclear equation.

Various experts, former generals and independent reports have voiced concern over the past few years about the state of preparedness of the Indian army.
For example, the Bofors gun scandal of the 1980s stymied the army’s artillery modernization plan, with no induction of powerful guns since the 1986 purchase of 410 Bofors 155mm/39-caliber howitzers. The army has been trying to introduce 400 such guns from abroad and another 1,100 manufactured domestically, without success.

The latest report by the independent Comptroller and Auditor General said the state’s production of 23mm ammunition for Shilka anti-aircraft cannons and 30mm guns mounted on infantry combat vehicles lacked quality. Further, supply was nearly 35% short of requirements.

India’s huge tank fleet is in bad shape due to a shortage of Russian spare parts, while indigenous efforts, such as the main battle tank Arjun, have failed.

Signs of trouble emerged during the Kargil war when it was revealed that India’s defense forces were dealing with acute shortages in every sphere.
In remarks that underscored the problems, the then-army chief, V P Malik, said his forces would make do with whatever was in hand, given the fears of a full-scale war that was eventually avoided due to pressure by America, then under president Bill Clinton.

The Kargil review committee report noted, “The heavy involvement of the army in counter-insurgency operations cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role, which is to defend the country against external aggression.”

Although there have been attempts to hasten India’s overall defense modernization program, estimated at over US$50 billion over the next five years, gaping holes need to be plugged, including corruption and massive delays in the defense procurement processes. Kapoor said. Asia Times
Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. He can be reached at sidsri@yahoo.com.

• Obama to unveil new policy: Marshal Plan & end to bombing raids in Pakistan
• Peek into Obama’s brains: Bruce Reidel on Pakistan
• Growing consensus in the Obama team: Much of Pakistan’s problems originate in Afghanistan
• Obama advisor Weinbaum predicts total Afghan policy review: Sees focus on talks & Reconciliation
• Afghanistan: Gen. Petraeus’ Pakistani advisers: Indians jittery
• Obama adviser Weinbaum gives deep insights into new Afghan policy

It was in this context that the army made it apparent that it was not equipped to fight such a war, given the military’s presence along the eastern Chinese borders, and that India was at risk of ceding territory should an instant cease fire be brokered with Pakistan.

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• “No one should ever underestimate our capability and determination to foil any nefarious designs against the security of Pakistan”
• “None can dare rob us of nuclear arsenal”: General Hameed Gul
• After dramatic failure of “Cold Start Strategy” India comes up with cockamamy “96 hour Rapid Thrust” scheme
• India is behind Karachi blast: Imran Khan
• Proxy war in Afghanistan: Strategic depth vs Strategic clout.
• “This new doctrine along with the earlier restructuring of the Indian Command structure, particularly the operationalisation of South West Army Command (2005) has increased manifold threats to Pakistan. It has also enhanced Indian capacity for faster action, Prof. Khurshid Ahmad Jamat e Islami.
• Is Delhi preventing the 4th Battle of Panipat or instigating it?

Indian army ‘backed out’ of Pakistan attack By Siddharth Srivastava

NEW DELHI – Reluctance for battle by an ill-prepared army could have resulted in India not launching an attack on Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pakistan-linked terror attack in the Indian city of Mumbai on November 26 in which nearly 200 people died.

High-level government sources have told Asia Times Online that army commanders impressed on the political leadership in New Delhi that an inadequate and obsolete arsenal at their disposal mitigated against an all-out war.

The navy and air force, however, had given the government the go-ahead about their preparedness to carry out an attack and repulse any retaliation from Pakistan.

Over the past few weeks, it has become increasingly apparent from top officials in the know that the closed-door meetings of top military commanders and political leaders discussed the poor state of the armory (both ammunition and artillery), and that this tilted the balance in favor of not striking at Pakistan.

According to senior officials, following the attack on Mumbai by 10 militants linked to Pakistan, India’s top leadership looked at two options closely – war and hot pursuit.

Largely for the reasons cited above, the notion of an all-out war was rejected. Hot pursuit, however, remains very much on the table.

The government sources say that a framework for covert operations is being put in place, although India will continue to deny such actions. Crack naval, air and army forces backed by federal intelligence agencies will be involved. The target areas will be Pakistan-administered Kashmir and areas along the Punjab, such as Multan, where some of the Mumbai attackers are believed to have been recruited.

The coastal belt from the southern port city of Karachi to Gwadar in Balochistan province will also be under active Indian surveillance.
Thumbs down to war

Following the Mumbai attack, New Delhi’s inclination was to launch a quick strike against Pakistan to impress domestic opinion, and then be prepared for a short war, given the pressures that would be exercised by international powers for a ceasefire to prevent nuclear war breaking out.

The expectation of New Delhi was that the war would go beyond the traditional skirmishes involving artillery fire that take place at the Kashmir border, essentially to check infiltration by militants, or the brief but bloody exchanges at Kargil in 1999.

It was in this context that the army made it apparent that it was not equipped to fight such a war, given the military’s presence along the eastern Chinese borders, and that India was at risk of ceding territory should an instant ceasefire be brokered with Pakistan.

This would have been highly embarrassing, not to mention political suicide for the Congress-led government in an election year. So instead, New Delhi restricted itself to a strident diplomatic offensive that continues to date, and the option of hot pursuit.

The air force, on the other hand, was confident that it was prepared to take on the first retaliatory action by Pakistan, expected at forward air force bases along India’s borders in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Indian-administered Kashmir. The role of the navy in the operations was not clearly defined, but it was to cover from the Arabian Sea.

Not ready to fight

Various experts, former generals and independent reports have voiced concern over the past few years about the state of preparedness of the Indian army.
For example, the Bofors gun scandal of the 1980s stymied the army’s artillery modernization plan, with no induction of powerful guns since the 1986 purchase of 410 Bofors 155mm/39-caliber howitzers. The army has been trying to introduce 400 such guns from abroad and another 1,100 manufactured domestically, without success.

The latest report by the independent Comptroller and Auditor General said the state’s production of 23mm ammunition for Shilka anti-aircraft cannons and 30mm guns mounted on infantry combat vehicles lacked quality. Further, supply was nearly 35% short of requirements.

India’s huge tank fleet is in bad shape due to a shortage of Russian spare parts, while indigenous efforts, such as the main battle tank Arjun, have failed.

Signs of trouble emerged during the Kargil war when it was revealed that India’s defense forces were dealing with acute shortages in every sphere.
In remarks that underscored the problems, the then-army chief, V P Malik, said his forces would make do with whatever was in hand, given the fears of a full-scale war that was eventually avoided due to pressure by America, then under president Bill Clinton.

The Kargil review committee report noted, “The heavy involvement of the army in counter-insurgency operations cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role, which is to defend the country against external aggression.”

Although there have been attempts to hasten India’s overall defense modernization program, estimated at over US$50 billion over the next five years, gaping holes need to be plugged, including corruption and massive delays in the defense procurement processes.

India’s defense expenditure has dipped below 2% of gross domestic product for the first time in decades, despite experts pegging 3% as adequate.
Other defense arms are in dire need of enhancement. Fighter jet squadrons are much below required strength, while the bidding process for medium fighter planes has only just begun and may take a few years to complete.

Meanwhile, the prospects of an India-Pakistan conflict are not over. India’s army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, said last week that Pakistan had redeployed troops from its Afghan border to the western frontier with India. “The Indian army has factored this in its planning,” Kapoor said. Asia Times. Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. He can be reached at sidsri@yahoo.com.

Su-27s and Su-35 Russia chagrined at Into-US relations doesn’t transfer Flanker Su-30 development technology to India. Build plane itself. ———————————
Indian missile failures ——————————————
Pakistan rapidly moving beyond basic JF-17 Thunders. The J-10s J-11s and newer versions of JF-17 ———————————–
The Pakistani hawks in the sky: Y-89 AWACS ————————————
Nothing succeeds like success: Hataf, Ghauri, Babar, Abdali missiles

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JF-17 Thunders: Designed, built and operationalized in a record time of 4 years. Custom built for Pakistani needs ——————————
Serial production of JF-17 Thunder expedited:30-50 per year to 100 per annum ——————————–
Pakistan Vision 2020 ——————————-
IAF vs PAF: Defined by IAF ————————————-
Beyond the Pakistani made JF-17 Thunder Fighter Plane, Chinese made J-10s. When will PAF acquire the J-11s
Pakistan defense based on missile nuclear deterrent hataf shaheen babar and abdali
Pakistan’s 500 Al-Khalid tanks have been in production since 2001. Newer generation tanks now being exported via IDEAS 2008

Filed under: Current Affairs, India CA, Pak CA, Politics | Tagged: Bharati army, India, Pakistan