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Noticias de Rupia | Nouvelles de Roupie | Rupiennachrichten | новости рупии | 卢比新闻 | Roepienieuws | Rupi Nyheter | ルピーニュース | Notizie di Rupia | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا | RUPEE NEWS | November 24th, 2008 | Moin Ansari | معین آنصآرّی | اخبار روپیہ |

China’s Gibralter (Gwader) and Guantanimo (Hambantota) defies India in the oceans. India’s paranoid cries of wolf elicit a yawn and ridiclue among the think tanks. The port in Gwader is already functional and is being linked via high speed train, road and fiberoptics to beijing. The Sri Lankan port of Hambantota is raising hackles in New Delhi and with the defeat of the Tamils on the horizon, Lanka will remain a hostile state for India.It might as well be called “Asian Ocean”, there is nothing “Indian” abut it anyway. Muslim Maldives joins China’s-string of pearls-threat to India. China is back in the Arabian Sea, the Gulf and the Asian Ocean (aka Indian Ocean). After failed Indian Navy fiasco China to prevent Somali piracy

After the fiasco of the Thai trawler sunk by the Indian Navy, the world is now looking for a real Blue Water Navy to protect the shipping of the coast of Aden.  Pirates have in the past few months attempted to hold ships at ransom. For some reason the Indians happened to send a frigate to the region. It turned out to be a total botched screwup. The world was appalled after the frigate sank the wrong ship. The Indians haven’t been invited back.“Mothership” Somalis hijack Indian ship: Where is INS Tabor?

Encircling India: China’s string of pearl strategy. The Chinese have surrounded “India” with a string of pearls strategy with bases in all of India’s neighbors–in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Mayanmar (several ports), and the Malacca straits. India is powerless to do anything about being surrounded except for sounding off, turning on an occasional alarm bell and trying to impress Washington by raising a red flag about the grave threat from Mao’s People Liberation Army. India’s ocean is Chinese lake: “String of pearls” threaten India

The “String of Pearls” strategy has been discussed for several years in many American and international papers.

Of China, the report states that its current emergence from isolation is “the most significant single event on the international horizon since the collapse of the Cold War.” China’s buildup of large numbers of nuclear submarines and an increasingly global navy reflects “worries that the U.S. Navy possesses the ability to shut down China’s energy imports of oil — 80 percent of which go through the straits of Malacca,” the report said. It quotes a Chinese naval strategist as saying: “the straits of Malacca are akin to breathing itself — to life itself.” According to the report, 15 million barrels of oil transit each day through the Strait of Malacca, and 17 million barrels pass daily through the Strait of Hormuz. The report includes a graphic showing China’s political influence and military presence near oil-shipping lanes. Among them are the development of naval bases, overland supply routes, commercial port facilities, a planned canal through Thailand and two military bases in the South China Sea. Washinton Times. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/01/inside-the-ring-84163751/ 

We’ve previously reviewed the strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca, noting that it is one of the world’s top choke points. It is heavily used by oil tankers and bulk carriers, seeing approximately 80 percent of Korea and Japan’s oil supplies. There are a number of proposals on the drawing board on how to avoid the crowded strait

PROPOSAL 1: Malay Pipeline
Another proposal, currently being pushed by Malaysia’s government, is to build a US$14 billion oil pipeline across Malaysia, which would lower transportation costs and avoid risks of pirate attacks on tankers. The pipeline would link two posts and would include an additional coastal refinery to pump refined gasoline on to tankers bound for Japan, Korea, and China. Construction on a pipeline began in October 2004, and construction is expected to finish in 2011.

 PROPOSAL 2: Kra Canal
A canal through the Kra Isthmus was suggested as early as 1677, when the Thai King Narai the Great asked the French engineer de Lamar to survey the possibility of building a waterway to connect Songkhla with Marid (now Myanmar). It turned out too impractical with the technology of that time. In 1897, the British empire pushed Thailand to agree to not building a canal to protect the regional dominance of the harbour of Singapore. A Japanese plan for a canal in 1985 would have used over twenty nuclear devices ala Project Plowshare to compete with Port Klang and Singapore.

A current Chinese strategy is to underwrite construction of a canal, complete with Chinese port facilities and refineries, as part of its “string of pearls” strategy of forward bases and energy security. The Chinese plan called for construction over ten years employing roughly 30,000 workers and costing between US$20 and 25 billion American dollars-almost twice the price tag of the pipeline, but providing ships much more flexibility of transport http://cominganarchy.com/2007/05/06/bypassing-the-strait-of-malacca/ 

China of course is not a newcomer to the Indian Ocean. In 1405, during the reign of Emperor Yung-lo of the Ming Dynasty, a celebrated Chinese naval commander Ching-Ho visited Ceylon (presently known as Sri Lanka) bearing incense to offer at the renowned shrine of the Buddha in the hill town of Kandy. But he was waylaid by Sinhalese King Wijayo Bahu VI, and he escaped to his ships. To seek revenge, China dispatched Ching-Ho a few years later. He captured the Sinhalese king and his family and took them away as prisoners. But on seeing the prisoners, the Chinese emperor out of compassion ordered them to be sent back on the condition that the “wisest of the family should be chosen king”. The new king, Sri Prakrama Bahu, was given a seal of investiture and made a vassal of the Chinese emperor. That was how Ceylon remained until 1448, paying an annual tribute to China.

Chinese string of pearls ports strategy map

How Abdul Kalam Stole US secrets for Delhi’s rockets Delhi’s Tejas World Record: 500th Flying coffin crashes

Russian FGFA: Tricolor paint

Junk jets for Japan

More Flying coffins?

$10 billion for which plane

F-16s or F-35s

Lockheed’s bait and switch

Moscow sale to Delhi: Russian Mig 35s are simply Mig 29s with new decals

Delhi’s missiles

Brahmos: Faster than the speeding bullet

Abject failure in indigenous arms production forced Delhi to buy weapons without Transfer of Technology

After Moscow’s grounding, when will Delhi ground the New Flying Coffins?

Chinese string of pearls ports strategy map

Admiral Mehta has a worthy example in front of him, provided he can coax his reluctant country to flex its muscles in Africa for the first time in its ancient history. His best argument would be that unless he took an early lead, Ching-Ho might reappear in the Indian Ocean. But then there is an inherent risk insofar as the pirates who disappeared into the mist on Tuesday evening might also return looking for the INS Tabar. Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

The String of Pearls scares Bharat a lot.

“ The geopolitical strategy dubbed the “String of Pearls” is arising as foreign oil becomes a center of gravity critical to China’s energy needs. China’s rising maritime power is encountering American maritime power along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to vital energy resources in the Middle East and Africa. The “String of Pearls” describes the manifestation of China’s rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf. ..

Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a “pearl.” An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/indian_ocean/060701string_of_pearls.htm

The pearls in the Chinese strategy.

 Chittagong Bangaldesh 

 Sittwe Burma

Coco, Burma Hianggyi

Khaukphyu, Burma 

Mergui Burma

Zadetkyi Burma 

Kyun; and in Thailand and Cambodia

Noticias de Rupia | Nouvelles de Roupie | Rupiennachrichten | новости рупии | 卢比新闻 | Roepienieuws | Rupi Nyheter | ルピーニュース | Notizie di Rupia | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا | DefensebriefsIntellibriefs Translate this page on to one of these languages: Subscribe to our RSS feed: | RUPEE NEWS | July 16th, 2008 | Moin Ansari | معین آنصآرّی | اخبار روپیہ | Save/Share

APPENDIX A

This is the html version of the file http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/sumathy/India’s%20and%20China’s%20Intrests%20in%20the%20Malacca%20Straits.pdf.
Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.

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1India’s and China’s Strategic Interests in the Straits of Malacca By Sumathy Permal sumathy@mima.gov.my

The views expressed are entirely of the author and do not represent the official views of MIMA The Straits of Malacca is located between the east coast of Sumatra and the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, stretches for about 520 miles. The Strait of Singapore, about 100 miles long, is located between south of the island of Singapore and south eastern tip of Peninsular Malaysia, and north of Indonesian Riau islands. At its western entrance, the Malacca Straits is spacious and the littoral coasts of Indonesia, Malaysia are separated by about 200 miles of water. The straits, however, begin to take on the shape of a funnel as vessels proceedthrough it in a southeasterly direction. By the time a line of latitude is reached just South of 3°N and just below One Fathom Bank the territorial waters of Indonesia and Malaysia begin to overlap. The narrowest breadth between opposite shores of the Strait of Malacca – at the south-western tip of the Malay Peninsula – is 8.4 nautical miles though the navigable channel for deep draught vessels is much less. The narrowest breadth of the Singapore Strait is only 3.2nautical miles and throughout its length it is constantly less than 15 miles. At its eastern outlet into the South China Sea, where it is bounded solely by Malaysian and Indonesian shores, the breadth of the sea passage is 11.1 nautical miles.The linked Straits are the shortest sea route forming the main seaway betweenthe Indian Ocean (via the Andaman Sea) and the Pacific Ocean (via the South China Sea). It is also the shortest route for tankers trading between the Persian Gulf and East Asian countries. The Straits of Malacca is a critical and strategic waterway in the global trading system; with more than 60,000 vessels transitingits waters every year carrying more than a quarter of world trade and almost all oil imports to Japan and China.
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The volume of traffic averages about 250 ships on a daily basis of which 36% are oil tankers. About 3.23 million barrels of crude oil and refined products were transported from the region en route to Japan through the South China Sea. Approximately, 80% of Japan’s oil imports pass through the Strait For more than a thousand years, trade, religion and the civilization of India, China , the Muslim world and the Europeans have flowed through Straits of Malacca . Threats to shipping in the Malacca Straits primarily emanate from piracy and transnational crime. There is also possibility for threat of maritime terrorism in the straits. This raises considerable global concern since any disruption to theflow of maritime traffic through the Straits of Malacca would seriously affectworld economy. Thus the security of the Malacca Straits is not only an important commitment to the littorals but also to the international community.

The strategic nature of the Straits of Malacca as the main sea lane of communication to East Asia has led many countries to want to control the Straits, or to at least project power there, including the United States, China and India.Indeed, the pursuance of strategies to gain control has made the Straits of Malacca a venue of a silent struggle between rising powers. Over 40% of India’s rapidly growing trade passes through the Straits of Malacca, giving it a major interest in securing the safety of shipping through this vital international waterway. Inclusion in its security would therefore be in India’s national interest. The mercantile traffic transiting the Malacca Straits passes close to the Indian area of maritime interest and therefore any unforeseencontingency or development in the Malacca Strait has security implications for India, said Vijay Sakhuja, Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. India’s security analysts argue that India has a stake in maintaining the safety and security of the Straits of Malacca and that the government should pursue an aggressive strategy of contributing to the region’s efforts to keep theStraits of Malacca safe and free from threat. While the littorals of the Straits are
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continuing their own initiatives to take care of this strategic waterway, India, which has a stake in the strait, believes that it has a role to play in the strait’ssecurity system. The Eye in the Sky initiative is part of the larger Malacca Strait’s Security Initiative (MSSI). India is among the countries that are keen to participate in the MSSI. Dr Vijay Shakuja said that although India might not be a littoral, it iscontiguous to the strait at Indira Point — the southern tip of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Thus India aspires to have influence in this region andindeed in flexing its military muscle by sending its naval fleet for visits to Southeast Asian ports. Besides these visits to Southeast Asian ports, the Indian Navy has also been exercising with its Singaporean counterparts as well as the Indonesian Navy and the Thai Navy. The Indian Navy has established a bilateral agreement with Indonesia called ‘IndoIndon’ that involves patrolling the Strait’s western approaches. These navies have conducted a cooperative exercise called IndIndonCorpat (Indo-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol). Similarly, India has alsobeen engaged in maritime cooperation with Singapore that includes joint naval exercises, submarine training and bilateral exchanges. India’s coastal defense strategy in the 1950’s and 1960s was extended to a strategic sea control and sea denial in 1970s and 1980s. Indian naval strategy inthe new century demands more submarines, a strong mine laying and mine clearing capability and naval air reconnaissance capabilities to the Malacca Straits. India is following an important strategic maritime goal in a period of interdependence between world’s geo-economic regions and establishing an overall maritime ‘presence’ in its sea area of strategic interest. This strategic includes India’s desire to project their prowess beyond their interest. Therefore,
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India is working towards building a navy that can take multiple sea challenges tothe mainland. India also underlines its claim as a leading maritime power through strong forward presence in each of its major island territories. Port Blair is a special maritime importance because if its closeness to the Burmese Coco-Island, used by China as a “land-bridge” to the Indian Ocean, the strategically important SLOCs and strategic choke points ,the Straits of Malacca.iIndia’s strategic interest strongly illustrated by another Indian security analyst who argues that the limits of Malacca Straits should be redefine. Rajeev Sawhney argues that; to ensure effective security management ,it is only as a compositesystem that any security measures would be successful, thus to tackle the security of the straits holistically, the eastern limits of the Singapore Straits should defineone end and the ‘Six Degree Channel’ the other end of a composite Malacca Security System. He further explained that Indira Point that separated by “Six Degree Channel” is only 165 kilometers from Sumatra and this proximity makes India as much a part of Southeast Asia as that of South Asia. Therefore, comprehensive security could be ensured only by the inclusion of both India and Thailand as bonafide littorals of a redefined Malacca Straits Security System. iiChina, a rising great power in the East, is heavily dependant on the Straits of Malacca for energy transportation. China’s strategic significance of this straits increases every year. At present, approximately 60 percent of China’s crude oilimports originate in the Middle East, and this figure is expected to rise to 75percent by 2015. Oil from the Persian Gulf and Africa is shipped to the PRC via the Malacca or Lombok/Makkasar straits. Over the past few years Chinese leaders have come to view the straits, especially the Malacca Strait, as a strategic vulnerability. In November 2003 President Hu Jintao declared that “certainmajor powers” were bent on controlling the strait, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability. One Chinese leadingnewspaper quoted saying that “It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China”(China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004).iii
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China’s heavy dependence on the Straits of Malacca for energy transportation has made the Straits one of China’s critical Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) that it must secure, especially from hostile foreign naval forces. One of the ways China tries to seek SLOC security in the Straits of Malacca is through diplomacy. Beijing is active in fostering relationships with the littoral states of the Malacca Straits, especially Malaysia. In September 2005, Malaysia signed a Memorandumof Understanding (MoU) on Bilateral Defence Cooperation with China, the first of its kind between a Southeast Asian country and China. The MoU marks a new dimension in Malaysia-China bilateral relationship after 31 years of formal engagement. According to Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister ofDefence, Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Razak, the MoU provided the framework for initiating bilateral defence activities such as military training, exchange of personnel and visits, exchange of information as well as constant dialogue and understanding each other’s perspectives on regional and security developments. Even though the MoU does not carry much weight in terms of defence cooperation, it is a first step for China to secure such ties to a country that is friendly towards it and that could guarantee the security of its SLOC in theStraits of Malacca.Earlier in an annual Straits of Malacca Conference held in Kuala Lumpur in 2004,Zhao Jianhua, Counselor for the Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs openly expressed China’s willingness to assist littoral states to enhance cooperation in maritime security in the Malacca Strait that covers maritimeenvironment protection, maritime transport and navigation safety and the fight against transnational crimes at sea. It was the first time China publicly announced its intention to be part of the security and safety arrangement of theStrait of Malacca. China realized that if it fails to actively engage the littoral states of the Malacca Strait, its SLOC security will be at a good will of the US Navy asthe latter is dominant in influencing the security landscapes in the region. iv
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Chinese security analysts see that the U.S. and Japan are using the threat of terrorism as a pretext to expand their naval presence in and around the strait.China is also concerned on India’s enhanced presence in the area, especially the modernization of military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. TheU.S.-Indonesia military cooperation which focuses on maritime cooperation for the Straits of Malacca is perceived as a threat to China. Thus China does not want to be left out and has offered the littoral states its assistance to improve securityin the strait. At an International Maritime Organization (IMO) meeting held in Jakarta in September 2005, China voiced out its willingness to assist the Straits of Malacca littoral states in the areas of maritime security and navigational safety.The Director General of China’s Ministry of Transportation, Ju Chengzi, said that his government was keen to assist the littoral states through technical support, navigation aids, training programs, capacity building and hydrographic surveys. China’s core maritime interest in the region are amongst other to develop asufficient force to deter Taiwan’s declaration of independence, deter and delay U.S. involvement in a potential conflict over Taiwan and securing the Malacca Straits, through which 80 percent of China’s oil imports flow, and resolving long-standing maritime territorial disputes in the region. China has adopted a multi-pronged approach in expanding its naval presence in the region. China has been integrating its civilian and military infrastructure in which, China now has theworld’s third largest shipbuilding industry, which accounts for ten percent of the global market in terms of dead weight ton production with many merchant shipyards co-located with military shipyards. China is also pushing to acquire a national fleet of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) that could be employed in the case of supply disruptions brought on by an accident or terrorist attack along the Malacca Straits or a U.S.-led blockade during a conflict over Taiwan. Currently, only ten percent of China’s crude oil imports come aboard Chinese vessels. China’s growing anxiety over the securityof its oil imports was demonstrated in June 2004 when China conducted its first
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anti-terrorism exercise simulating an attack on an oil tanker. China has also assisted in the development of port facilities in the region in order to bypasschokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz in case of disruptions caused by accidents or conflict along the waterways. This “String of Pearls” strategy, as it has been characterized, has been demonstrated by China’s development of port facilities at Gwadar in Pakistan, at Akyab, Cheduba and Bassein in Myanmar, at the Coco Islands, and at Chittagong in Bangladesh.vHowever, China cannot avoid the Strait of Malacca because the strait provides theshortest and cheapest route for its oil shipment from the Middle East. Besides the plan to seek alternate route for its energy shipment is expensive, time consuming and problematic. Realizing the strategic importance of the SLOC in the Straits of Malacca, Chinaexpressed the position of the Chinese government on the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore at the IMO sponsored Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the “Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Enhancing Safety , Security and Environmental Protection” held in September 2006. The Chinese delegate said that China is unambiguous, explicit and consistent with their support onefforts by the littoral states in safeguarding the sovereignty and security of the Straits. The delegate expressed their commitment to actively participate in such international and regional mechanisms of cooperation as IMO, ARF and TTEG to ensure the safety of navigation in the straits of Malacca and Singapore. HoweverChina also stressed that such cooperation should be open and transparent. China also commit to undertake the project on replacement of the aids to navigation destroyed by tsunami disaster and to participate in the project on cooperationand capacity building on HNS preparedness and response in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the project on setting up of a tide, current and wind measurement system for the straits of Malacca and Singapore. viIndia’s and China’s keen efforts at involvement in the Straits of Malacca’s safety and security arrangements reflect their understanding that assisting the littoral states to enhance their capacity to ensure freedom of navigation in the Straits
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best serves all users interests. However the littoral states have to be cautious on the rising interest of these nations in the Straits of Malacca. Singapore’s DefenseMinister Teo Chee Hean has mentioned at an International Conference that over the next few decades, the Asia Pacific would be the region where big powers actively jostle for power and influence.viiThese include countries like China, India and Japan. An Indian security analyst has made an assessment that China and India will emerge as a powerful maritime nations in 2025. Both nations would concentrate on maritime economic build up which will lead to high military spending focusing on securing its SLOCs. China and India will build naval forces withgreater strategic reach and power projection whereby strategic geography of their interest will overlap; and the zone of confrontation will be in the Straits of Malacca. MARITIME INSTITUTE OF MALAYSIA10 October 2006 References iSeller, Hanns-Frank (2002). The Security Policy and Maritime Strategy of India in the TwentyFirst Century in Schwarz, Jurgen; Herrman, Wilfried A. & Seller, Hanns-Frank (Eds.), MaritimeStrategies in Asia. Bangkok: White Lotus Press iiRajeev Sawhney, May- June 2006, Redefining the Limits of the Malacca Straits, Maritime Studies, 148,ISSN 0726 6472.iiiIan Storey (2006) China’s “Malacca Dilemma”, ,Volume 6, Issue 8 ,Jamestown Foundation (April 12, 2006ivMokhzani Zubir, Mohd ,Nizam Basiron, (2005)The Straits of Malacca: the Rise of China, America’s Intentions and the Dilemma of the Littoral States, Maritime Institute of Malaysia April vChietigj Bajpaee ”The Emerging Cold War on Asia’s High Seas” http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/february-2006/the-emerging-cold-war-on-asias-high-seasviStatement by People’s Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Enhancing Safety , Security and Environmental Protection, Kuala Lumpur 18 – 20 September 2006. viiSpeech by Mr Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Defence, at the Third Asia-Pacific Security Conference, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resources/speeches/2006/19feb06_speech.html