Oil wars: Georgia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine

Posted on 01 September 2008. Tags: Afghan, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Oil wars

It seems it all about oil. It is! Whether its about Operation Iraqi Liberation (OIL) or the war in Afghanistan (Conoco) or the belligerence in Georgia–its all about oil. This article is under construction. As the haze of war clears in Georgia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, we will update this article. Some of the maps need to be updated.

“The energy crisis we are in today is entirely different from the temporary problems we experienced in 1973-74, 1979-86, 1990-91 and 2000….. There was always sufficient worldwide geological capacity to produce additional barrels of crude oil to meet the world’s needs. No longer. In the next major energy crisis, that capacity will likely be eroded. So the crisis should have a severe impact, be global in scope, and be difficult to solve. Plainly, it will be unprecedented…. Over the next 25 years, a new world energy economy will arrive in three waves. We are near the top of the first and smallest one, a warning wave. A second more powerful wave likely will hit in the 2009-2010 period when the non-OPEC world may reach its all-time highest output of crude oil, subsequently declining to become ever more dependent on OPEC for incremental barrels of production. The final wave should break around 2020, or earlier, as even OPEC’s vast reserves are tapped at a maximum rate of production. After that, oil volume should head down and keep falling, never to revive….. An international economic disturbance of this magnitude will create potential conflicts between nations and civil competition within societies. These could be a trial for us and for our children, made worse in the early years by our lack of preparation and our failure to understand what is already happening to us.” The Gathering Storm Energy Bulletin, 15 November 2004

Oil is transported via pipelines. These are the major pipelines.

Oil Exports to the West

Four main pipelines, the BTC, the Baku-Novorossiysk, the Baku-Supsa, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) line carry or will carry the majority of the region’s oil and gas resources to the West to major markets in Turkey, Europe, and the Mediterranean. The Baku-Supsa, Baku-Novorossiysk and Baku-Batumi rail routes also transport oil and gas, but these may be phased out as the larger pipelines are expanded even further. More information on these supplementary pipelines is available in the Caucasus Regional Brief and the Azerbaijan Country Brief . Some proposals are currently being negotiated and studied to transport possibly sizeable oil and gas resources from the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea.

CPC

The CPCproject connects Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea area oil deposits with Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Oil loaded at Novorossiysk is then taken by tanker to world markets. Although the CPC pipeline transverses Russia and was developed in conjunction with the Russian government, the pipeline was the first to give the Caspian Sea region and Kazakhstan a viable alternative to the Russian dominated northern export routes (namely Atyrau-Samara). See the Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief or the CPC Consortium’s website .

One downside to additional Caspian oil exports through the CPC pipeline is higher export levels will increase congestion in Turkey’s Bosporus Straits, which connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Oil flows through the Bosporus range from 2.8 – 3.1 million bbl/d. The CPC expansion could add an incremental 750,000 bbl/d of oil through the Strait.

Turkey has raised concerns about the ability of the Bosporus Straits, already a major chokepointfor oil tankers, to handle the additional tanker traffic, since most of Russia’s existing oil export pipelines also terminate at Novorossiysk. Turkey has stated its environmental concerns about a possible collision (and ensuing oil spill) in the Straits as a result of increased tanker traffic from the launch of the CPC’s pipeline. As a result, there are a number of options under consideration for oil transiting the Black Sea to bypass the Bosporus Straits.

Baku-T’bilisi -Ceyhan (BTC)

The Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, is exporting Azeri (and possibly up to 600,000 bbl/d of Kazakhstani) oil along a 1,040-mile route from Baku, Azerbaijan via Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This will allow oil to bypass the Bosporus Straits (see map above). A BP-led consortium (see table below) will operate the pipeline. Construction of the 1-million-bbl/d BTC pipeline was completed in May 2005, with the first tanker deliveries began in June 2006. Oil exports via BTC averaged roughly 210,000 bbl/d from June-September 2006, and volumes are expected to climb to 500,000 bbl/d by early-2007. The capacity will be upgraded to 1 million bbl/d sometime between 2008 and 2009.

Tariffs for members of BTC to transport oil from the Sangachal terminal to Ceyhan, including loading in Ceyhan, will be as follows: $3.3 per barrel during the first phase (2005-10), $4.6 per barrel during the second phase (2010-16) and $5.5 per barrel during the third phase (2016-29).

The Militarisation of the Eastern Mediterranean: Israel’s Stake in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by Michel Chossudovsky

The Strategic Re-routing of Central Asian Oil

Diverting Central Asian oil and gas to the Eastern Mediterranean (under Israeli military protection), for re-export back to Asia, serves to undermine the inter-Asian energy market, which is based on the development of direct pipeline corridors linking Central Asia and Russia to South Asia, China and the Far East.

Ultimately, this design is intended to weaken Russia’s role in Central Asia and cut off China from Central Asian oil resources. It is also intended to isolate Iran.

Meanwhile, Israel has emerged as a new powerful player in the gl

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L9618164.htm

Approximately 70% of BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline) costs are being funded by third parties, including the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, export credit agencies of seven countries and a syndicate of 15 commercial banks

The BTC Co. shareholders are: BP (30.1%); AzBTC (25.00%); Chevron (8.90%); Statoil (8.71%); TPAO (6.53%); Eni (5.00%); Total (5.00%), Itochu (3.40%); INPEX (2.50%), ConocoPhillips (2.50%) and Amerada Hess (2.36%). (source BP)

Russia Jets Bomb Georgia Oil Pipeline
The Daily Telegraph via NY Sun ^ | August 11, 2008 | DAMIEN McELROY

Posted on Monday, August 11, 2008 4:05:59 PM by neverdem

RUSTAVI, Georgia ? Russian jets targeted a key oil pipeline in Georgia yesterday with more than 50 missiles in a raid that raised fears that the conflict would tighten Moscow’s stranglehold on Europe’s energy supplies.

Deep craters pockmarked the landscape south of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, in a Y-shaped pattern straddling the British-operated pipeline. The attack left two deep holes less than 100 yards either side of a pressure vent on the pipeline. Shrapnel of highly engineered munitions littered the area, but there was no visible damage to the pipeline.

The reopening of BTC pipeline remains unclear as repair continues The BP Plc-led Baku-Tbilisi-

Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast

BP-Led Oil Pipeline to Resume Shipments Next Week (Update2) By Eduard Gismatullin and Ayla Jean Yackley

Aug. 20 (Bloomberg) — The BP Plc-led Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, will resume tanker loadings next week following fire damage earlier this month.

BP, Europe’s second-largest oil company, and other exporters of Azeri oil have been unable to use the 1,768- kilometer (1,100-mile) link since Aug. 5 when a blaze engulfed the pipeline in Erzincan province in northeastern Turkey.

BP, StatoilHydro ASA and partners had to reduce production at oil fields in the Azeri part of the Caspian Sea after flows halted through the pipeline, which has a capacity of 1 million barrels a day, about 1 percent of the world’s supply. The military conflict in Georgia also highlighted risks for crude oil and natural gas transportation across the Caucasus.

BTC Co., which operates the link, will start “testing of the line today before a move to full operation,” the Turkey- based company said in an e-mailed statement. “This will involve some limited and intermittent flow of oil through the pipeline.”

Inspection of damage at BTC shows no sign the fire was caused by a bomb, Energy Minister Hilmi Guler said Aug. 18. He denied claims by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey, that it attacked the link as part of its campaign for autonomy in southeast Turkey.

Shipping Schedule

A statement was sent to transporters so that “the shipping schedule can be updated today for loadings to begin next week,” Murat Lecompte, external affairs director for BTC, said in a telephone interview. Repairs are completed and exporters will be putting oil into the pipeline, while the testing will take a few days to complete, he said.

Another pipeline, which pumps 100,000 barrels of crude a day from the Azeri capital of Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa, has been shut on security concerns because of the fighting in Georgia. Shippers declared force majeure on exports from the Supsa and Ceyhan ports, a legal clause that exempts them from meeting contracts because of circumstances beyond their control.

BP and partners also suspended for two days last week natural gas exports from Azerbaijan to Georgia and Turkey through the South Caucasus pipeline. Gas exports from the Shah- Deniz field in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea resumed on Aug. 14.

Russian Troops

Russia has started withdrawing its troops from Georgia after President Dmitry Medvedevannounced the pullout Aug. 17. Fighting between Georgian and the Russian troops disrupted supplies of about 1.6 million barrels of oil equivalent a day from the Caspian Sea region to world markets, the Moscow-based brokerage Troika Dialog said this month.

BP isn’t aware of any damage to any of its pipelines in Georgia because of fighting, Toby Odone, a London-based spokesman at the company, said today by phone.

Georgian Black Sea ports are running out of crude and oil- product supplies also because Russian military troops have blocked rail lines near the city of Khashuri, Vako Kavzharadze, a shipping agent at TeRo Co. Ltd. in the Georgian port of Batumi, said today in an e-mailed statement. Rail transportation will probably resume in three to four days.

BP, State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, or Socar, and other exporters halted crude and product exports by rail through Georgia to the Black Sea after a bridge was blown up near the village of Grakali on Aug. 16.

Rail Links

An “alternative bridge is fixed, however Russian troops blocked the railways near the city of Khashuri,” about 100 kilometers (60 miles) from Tbilisi, Kavzharadze said.

Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of Russia’s General Staff, denied his military was involved in the bridge attack or was blocking railways.

Azerbaijan will also export oil via Iran after routes through Turkey and the Caucasus were disrupted.

Socar awarded a tender for 300,000 tons, or about 2.1 million barrels, of Azeri Light crude for shipping to Iran by early October, an official with the Baku-based company, who declined to be identified, said by phone today

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The confrontations taking place today in the Caucasus were triggered strategically in the Balkans few months before. Russia was ignored on the shores of the Mediterranean, it responded on the shores of the Black sea. To Moscow, Georgia’s allies are also “too far” when the enclaves would move to separation.

Direct causes

But Georgia’s Government realized the sense of Russia’s statements and still decided to act preemptively. President Mikheil Saakashvili must have calculated that by moving fast on the ground he would avoid the repetition of a Kosovo-like declaration in South Ossetia. His strategic algebra is still unclear to me. Was he hoping for a blitz seizure of Tskhinvali and the formation of a pro-Georgian local government? Was he predicting a slow Russian reaction? Historians will tell. But the chain reaction is clear. Moscow gave the green light to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to follow the Kosovo model, and Tbilisi rushed to abort these moves. Hence Georgian forces were ordered by Saakashvili to “bring back constitutional order” to the breakaway republics — 16 years after a status quo — and Medvedev and Putin responded by sending Russian forces to drive the Georgians out of the two provinces. In its own response Russia was telling the West: South Ossetia is Kosovo and Georgia is Serbia; I am applying your doctrine in the Caucasus.

From August 6 on, the Georgian offensive attempted to seize the capital of the enclave and the Russian counter offensive pushed the Georgians out. Moscow accused Tbilisi’s units of ethnic cleansing and Georgia’s leaders counter-accused the Russians of invading all of their country. The fog of war is still too thick at this point

But on both sides of the Atlantic unease is spreading. Hard core critics of Russia, vestiges of the Cold war, still believe that the Soviet Union changed clothes but is still around. Others boil down the crisis to standing by Georgia as an ally, period. On the left, any alibi is good to demean American policy. In a sum, confusion reigns: how did the West get itself to face off with post Soviet Russia in an ethnic standoff in the Caucasus? Was the Kosovo episode too rushed? Did Washington and Brussels’ East Policies fail in the middle of a war on terror? Or was the Atlantic West dragged by other world powers to re-clash with the East? Again, historians will have to investigate.

But beyond these geopolitical considerations the Kremlin also rejected the US-led Iraq campaign, the isolation of the Syrian regime and the containment of the Iran Khomeinist power. And here lies the distinction. If Moscow’s politico-military establishment feels uncomfortable with NATO coming closer to Russia’s borders, it can express that discontent and address it in bilateral relationships with Washington. The United States, for example, wouldn’t be very comfortable seeing Russian missiles systems installed in Mexico or a strategic defense treaty signed between Haiti and China. These are classical moves in international relations, drawing tensions and counter moves.

But for Russia to actively arm Iran and Syria, this is a feature of cold war, inconsistent with present the international consensus against Terrorism. The Tehran-Damascus “axis” is in an active campaign to support Jihadi terror forces in the region and armed groups involved in the killing of US and Coalition personnel. It would be the equivalent of having the US arming and providing technology to Wahabi Chechen Terrorists operating against Russian cities and military. Hence, while Americans are as anti-terrorist as Russia is when it comes to the al-Qaeda Salafi threat, Russians are still feeding anti-Western forces in the Middle East. Hence there is a difference between Russian discomfort with NATO growth around the CIS and US concerns about Russia’s protection of Iranian-Syrian efforts in the region. Moscow is backing a party at war with the US Coalition while Americans aren’t assisting parties at War with Russia.

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The British Petroleum pipeline that brought Georgia into the international spotlight has been turned off after six days of sporadic Russian bombing in the country.

BP spokesperson Rusiko Medzmariashvili stated that the Baku-Supsa pipeline, the older of two BP pipelines that cross Georgia, has been shut down “as a precautionary measure.” She did not specify a date for the decision.

The larger Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is also not operating due to a fire in eastern Turkey, she said.

Medzmariashvili confirmed that no oil is currently heading out of Baku for the Black Sea cost, although he added that “alternative routes are being considered right now.” Among the alternatives are rail lines and other, smaller pipelines crossing Georgia.

The decision comes after nearly a week of fighting between Georgia and its northern neighbor, Russia.

Russian bombs have hit the western coast of Georgia, including the towns of Senaki, Zugdidi and Poti, which is just 13 kilometers from the Supsa terminal.

Early on August 13, a land attack sank two ships adjacent to the port, according to Alan Middleton, chief executive officer of the Poti Port Corporation. The strike was the second Russian attack on Poti since full-scale hostilities began on August 8.

On August 9, approximately 20 bombs were dropped on the commercial port and the surrounding area. While the port was largely unharmed, the bombs reportedly killed 11 people and injured nearly 80 others. Port employees told EurasiaNet that the bombs disintegrated into shrapnel-like metal balls upon impact.

“[Russia] purely just dropped the bomb to try to kill people and cause mayhem, ” Middleton said in an interview the following day. “[It] certainly did.” The port, however, remains “fully operational.”

Middleton estimated daily losses for both the Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (RAKIA), which operates the port, and the government, at a “conservative” $1 million per day. Ras Al Khaimah, a United Arab Emirates concern, purchased a 51 percent stake in the port this past April; the government holds a 49 percent share. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive.]

During a recent guided port tour, no serious damage to facilities could be seen. The bombing resulted in some holes in metal cargo containers and broken windows in the customs office. Middleton said that the port is working at “limited capacity” because workers refuse to come back.
That sense of wariness can be felt throughout Poti. A day after the August 9 bombing, the usually busy central market was quiet. Most cars were headed out of town, after a government warning that more bombing was expected.

At the Maltaqza Hospital near Poti, doctors remained on high alert. All injured bombing victims were being relocated to other hospitals in the area in preparation for more wounded, according to hospital director Zeinab Charchalia.

Although the hospital had kept over 40 doctors and surgeons on call, the facility suffered from a lack of personnel and equipment, she said.

The attack, according to Nino Mcheglishvili, the assistant director of Poti’s health service, was a surprise for the town.

“We expected to take injured from Tskhinvali or Senaki. Not our own,” she said, adding defiantly that “whatever happens, we will not leave town.”

Middleton also expressed optimism that life at the port would soon return to normal.
RAKIA’s $200 million investment plans are still on track, including the development of a free economic zone near the port, he stressed.

“We are in it for the long-term,” he said.

Editor’s Note: Molly Corso is a freelance reporter currently based in western Georgia.

=============================

RUSSIAN RESPONSE

Meanwhile, Moscow has responded to the US-Israeli-Turkish design to militarize the East Mediterranean coastline with plans to establish a Russian naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus:

“Defense Ministry sources point out that a naval base in Tartus will enable Russia to solidify its positions in the Middle East and ensure security of Syria. Moscow intends to deploy an air defense system around the base – to provide air cover for the base itself and a substantial part of Syrian territory. (S-300PMU-2 Favorit systems will not be turned over to the Syrians. They will be manned and serviced by Russian personnel.)
(Kommerzant, 2 June 2006, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=IVA20060728&articleId=2847

Tartus is strategically located within 30 km. of the Lebanese border.
Moreover, Moscow and Damascus have reached an agreement on the modernization of Syria’s air defenses as well as a program in support to its ground forces, the modernization of its MIG-29 fighters as well as its submarines. (Kommerzant, 2 June 2006). In the context of an escalating conflict, these developments have farreaching implications.

Mosul-Haifa pipeline has three US military bases protecting it

Here is why American kids are dying

H-3 has a combat regiment and an air wing

Camp Korean Village is located in a remote stretch of Iraq’s western desert, close to the Syrian-Iraq border, and near the highway that connects Jordan with Baghdad. Ar Rutbah is the closest town to Camp Korean Village, also dubbed “Camp KV”. Camp Korean Village is believed to be located at one of the H-3 facilities.
1st Marine Division’s Regimental Combat Team 7, which help the Iraqis run checkpoints along the Syrian and Jordanian borders and patrol western Iraq.

H-2 is an Airbase

H-2 Airbase is located in Southern Iraq approximately 350 kilometers West of Baghdad. The airfield is served by two runways 12,600 and 8,800 feet long. H-2 occupies a 41 square kilometer site and is protected by a 26 kilometers security perimeter.

H-1 is an airbase

H-1 Airbase is located in Southern Iraq. The 2d Air Defense Sector, also known as the Western Air Defense Sector, had a SOC at H-3 Airfield, with IOCs at H-1 Airfield, H-3 Airfield, and Ar Rutbah.
The US Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment captured H1 airfield in a night-time parachute assault on 25 March 2003.

H-1 US army base

H-2 US army base

H-3 US army base

Marines Suspect Intelligence

2 Responses to “Oil wars: Georgia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine”

david eichmann says:

January 19, 2010 at 7:29 pm

Oil to Israel trough Syria, or for Balkan, or China!
1. With a Bible in the War!
2. With a Bible for Oil and Israel!
3. Elca+WASP+AIPAC in Afghanistan!
4. Catholic Jesuits C.I.A. and Jesuits Pentagon in Iraqwar!
5. Jesuits Europa in Iraqwar!
6. For Oil and Israel with Ev. and Cath. Soldiers in Afgh.war!

Reply