When I wrote India’s External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing, I intended to bring out the anomalies in RAW’s functioning, its lack of accountability, transparency and effective leadership. But the book has generated a specific controversy about the Kargil tapes released by the NDA government in 1999 and sent to then Pakistan premier Nawaz Sharif. I wish to clarify certain points about the tapes, the double standards in publicising classified information for short-term gains, and the Official Secrets Act (OSA).

Take the case of Brig Ujjal Dasgupta, director, computers, RAW. He returned from the US on June 14, 2006. After searching his office and interrogating him for over a month, IB officials arrested him on July 19. Significantly, RAW accorded sanction for his prosecution nine months after his arrest. He’s alleged to have passed on sensitive information to Rosanna Minchew, a US embassy staffer working for the CIA. Dasgupta and Minchew were members of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum, set up to deal with cyber-terrorism and information security. He is presently in Tihar; his trial is yet to begin.

Charges against Dasgupta have been framed under OSA. As per the act, if an Indian has any sort of communication with a foreign national, he’s presumed to have passed on information useful to an enemy. To prove communication, it is enough if the name or address of a foreigner is found in his possession. So, if a foreigner’s phone number is found in the diary or SIM card of an Indian, he can be branded a spy. Since Minchew and Dasgupta were members of the same committee, they quite likely exchanged numbers and communicated.

After the Kargil intrusion in 1999, Pakistan denied Indian accusations of aggression, saying that the intruders were not Pak soldiers but militants. This lie was exposed when RAW intercepted a conversation between Gen Pervez Musharraf, then in Beijing, and his Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, in Islamabad. The government decided to make the intercept public—it was broadcast on radio and TV, its transcripts were distributed to the media and foreign embassies in Delhi, a tape was sent to Nawaz Sharif. The intercept proved that Pakistan was the aggressor, and increased international pressure on it to withdraw. By this time the Indian army had recaptured most of the posts, incurring heavy casualties. The battle ended with considerable loss of face for Pakistan.

The NDA government hailed the broadcast of the intercept as a diplomatic victory. Commenting on my book, a former RAW officer has written that, “The Kargil tape was the greatest PSYWAR (psychological warfare) coup ever scored by RAW.” The presence of regular soldiers and differences between Sharif and the service chiefs was a useful piece of intelligence. How does it become PSYWAR? Anyhow, RAW’s job is to collect intelligence, not PSYWAR. The same officer goes on to say that the government’s decision to publicise the intercept had beneficial effects, such as convincing the US and China of Pak complicity and damaging its credibility. Are India and Pakistan schoolchildren and the US and China headmasters that we have to complain against each other to them?

Many people in the intelligence community and defence forces disagree with the wisdom of making the intercept public. With the resources at its disposal, the US would have discovered the Pak intrusion much earlier than we did. Nor do we know what part the intercepts played in the Pak army’s decision to withdraw; it really had no other option, being severely mauled in the battle. However, the decision to publicise the intercept definitely damaged our intelligence capability.As soon as Pakistan came to know that the particular satellite link between Beijing and Islamabad was being intercepted by RAW, it closed it. A valuable source of SIGINT (signal intelligence) dried up. The same RAW officer says, “This could have dried up at least temporarily the flow of intelligence from such instances of lax communications security. This is a danger, which would have been factored into the decision to release the tape.” Just what does temporarily mean? One year, ten or more? Who knows how much more intelligence, and for how long, the link would have yielded had it continued?

The legal aspect of the decision also needs to be considered. Doesn’t making the intercept public violate the OSA? Pakistan was definitely an enemy country, giving it information acquired by RAW would fall within the OSA ambit. After all, Dasgupta also stands accused of passing on information held by RAW. In his case, the alleged beneficiary isn’t an enemy country. There is no evidence of him having passed on information. Surprisingly, none in the legal fraternity has commented on this conundrum; nor has the issue been raised in Parliament. Meanwhile, Dasgupta continues to be incarcerated, without bail, charged with an offence there is no evidence for. Are we turning him into our own Captain Dreyfus?

(The writer served in the technical wing of RAW.)