| RUPEES NEWS | My 27th, 2008 | Moin Ansari | ???? ??????? | The next few months will be difficult for America as it goes through its prolonged system of choosing its next leader. With the Cold war back on and GWOT going nowhere, all eyes are on the new Pakistan as it defines itself and its dealings with the world. The Pakistanis themselves are going through its own convulsions. Within a few weeks new relaities will emerge. As the new leaders overcome their handicaps and deal with their weaknesses, they will emerge as formidable negotiators.
“In theory, working with an unruly, fractious coalition government is more difficult than working with someone who has most of the power in his own hands,” said Robert Hathaway of the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
“But the problem with the theory in this case is that it never worked very well with Musharraf,” he said.
“Musharraf worked with us when it suited his interest and to the extent it suited his interest, but I think most of us feel that our partnership with Musharraf did not produce the fruits that we had hoped for
AFP
The siuation is not simple. Its complex and nuanced, and it has many moving parts.
the resignation of Pervez Musharraf – the Pakistani military strongman who ignored the differences of opinion within his turbulent Muslim country and declared it to be an ally of the United States in the “war on terror”.
What it will do is to remove the automatic link in the Pakistani mind that any actions which are taken in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and in the frontier generally are American-dictated,” said Marvin Weinbaum, a former Pakistan intelligence analyst at the US State Department.
“Weakening that link means that decisions that Pakistan is going to take are in its own interest,” he said. “So, if it moves more aggressively, it wouldn’t be automatically seen as simply carrying out American command.”
AFP
American Thinktanks are the Western media is in a tizzy, trying to figure out the enigma on dealing with a democratic Pakistan.
Something in the Musharraf approach clearly struck a chord with George W Bush – at a practical level it would have been almost impossible for the US to conduct effective operations in Afghanistan without the co-operation of neighbouring Pakistan.
BBC News
Obviously using the Pakistanis as “the Little Brown boys” which can be subcontracted to fight America’s war has not worked. Gung Ho brute bombing has created more problems for America.
The American hope is that a democratically-elected government will be a more natural partner than a military dictatorship, but it is far from certain that things will work out that way.
In the fractious and sometimes dangerous world of Pakistani politics, the coalition may well find itself pre-occupied with its own survival. And it will have to be mindful of a strong streak of anti-Americanism in Pakistan which is not entirely confined to Islamic fundamentalists.</em>
BBC News
One word can define the policy makers. “Fear”. They could have overruled Pervez Musharraf and he may have gone along with some unpopular decision, but a popularly elected governmnt is a lot harder to deal with.
The reason why Pakistan is so different – and so difficult – for the United States is because within its own institutions of power there are competing impulses about where the country’s true interests lie.
One American foreign policy analyst put it like this: “Pakistan is probably the most difficult issue the next president will face. It is both a victim of Jihadist terrorism – as with the assassination of Mrs Bhutto – and a sponsor and safe haven of Jihadist terrorism and it is unclear who’s on which side at any given time.”
BBC News
The policy makers in Washington realize that winning the war on terror cannot be accomplished without Pakistan.
It will be difficult for America to step up operations in Afghanistan without being sure that the Pakistani-Afghan border is secure – and that will only happen if US relations with both the Pakistani military and the new civilian government are good.
As the new leaders in the US and the new leaders come together next year, they will realize that things are a bit more difficult than checkers. As the Obama or McCain team begins to learn to play chess, they will realize that there are no simple solutions for West Asia.
Afer Musharraf, a new U.S. role: Helping rebuild the fragile Pakistani democracy is the best antiterror plan for the US. By | The Monitor’s Editorial Board from the August 19, 2008 edition
In the seven years since Sept. 11, President Bush has relied heavily on dictators in Muslim nations to keep a lid on Al Qaeda. It was a quick and easy way to prevent another attack on his watch. But with Monday’s resignation of Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf, Mr. Bush must now deal with an angry democracy in a land that still harbors Al Qaeda.
Mr. Musharraf, a former Army chief of staff, tried not to be too dictatorial after overthrowing an elected leader in 1999 and arranging for himself to be president. But even though he built a thriving economy and was never seen as corrupt, he was forced to legitimize his rule by increasingly harsh measures. His mistakes created a backlash leading to parliamentary elections in February, then a threat of impeachment from a new anti-Musharaff government, and finally his forced resignation.
It was the best way for this US ally to go.
He was forced out by civilians using a constitution, with a nod of approval from an army that seems to prefer staying out of politics for now, and with probable mediation by Saudi Arabia and the United States.
What happens to Musharraf in private life, and who will replace him as elected president, will absorb Pakistani politics for a while. In the meantime, a lame-duck Bush administration must decide where to put its money and trust in Pakistan’s splintered elected leadership and in an army still riddled with sympathizers for Islamic radicals but receiving US military aid to suppress the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Bush, and soon either John McCain or Barack Obama, might be tempted to again back figures in Pakistan that promise quick suppression of jihadi extremists that thrive in the tribal, mountainous areas. While Musharraf did help in the capture of key Al Qaeda figures – which probably prevented some terrorist attacks – he failed to build up democratic institutions and popular support. This would have brought the largely lawless areas near Afghanistan into mainstream society or helped them see it as in their interest to repel militants.
A vast majority of Pakistanis do not support militant Islam but they do resent the way the US pushed Musharraf to target militants and reform the military. Only as Musharraf’s rule weakened did Bush begin to help the transition to civilian rule, such as aiding the return of Benazir Bhutto (who was later assassinated, most likely by Islamic militants).
Now the US role is left in limbo as two elected leaders, Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League and Asil Asif Zardari of Pakistan People’s Party, compete for supremacy after Musharraf.
Either leader – or a coalition of the two – must move quickly to restore the judiciary, civil service, and an economy in decline. Civilian rule over the military also must be strengthened.
The US must offer to assist this healing process and bolster democracy in Pakistan as the best bulwark against terrorists. Elected civilian leaders, without American pressure, will see it as in their country’s interest not to let Islamic militants jeopardize Pakistani democracy.
The best allies for the US, during the cold war and now in a war on terror, have been leaders elected in a fair manner. A heavy US hand in Pakistan only plays into the militants’ agenda.
