The mere suggestion that the "CIA" "knows" realties on the ground in Pakistan is laughable. The Pakistanis are not stupid. They are fully aware of American plans. The Hindukush mountains, the Himalayas, the inhospitable deserts, and the plains offer huge sites for hiding small missiles and the large terrain and cannot be bombed out of existence.

Categorized | Current Affairs, Pak CA, US CA, US Int Rel.

The mere suggestion that the "CIA" "knows" realties on the ground in Pakistan is laughable. The Pakistanis are not stupid. They are fully aware of American plans. The Hindukush mountains, the Himalayas, the inhospitable deserts, and the plains offer huge sites for hiding small missiles and the large terrain and cannot be bombed out of existence.

Posted on 14 June 2008. Tags: CIA, Nuclear Bombs, Pakistan

The mere suggestion that the “CIA” “knows” realties on the ground in Pakistan is laughable. The Pakistanis are not stupid. They are fully aware of American plans. The Hindukush mountains, the Himalayas, the inhospitable deserts, and the plains offer huge sites for hiding small missiles and the large terrain and cannot be bombed out of existence.

THE REPERCUSSIONS OF MEDDLING IN PAKISTAN IS A SPECTACULAR BLOWBACK THAT SHOULD NOT BE TRIED!

THE CIA INTERVENTION IS CONFIRMED BY THE NY TIMES OF JAN 6th, 2008

“At the White House and the Pentagon, officials see an opportunity in the changing power structure for the Americans to advocate for the expanded authority in Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country. “After years of focusing on Afghanistan, we think the extremists now see a chance for the big prize – creating chaos in Pakistan itself,” one senior official said.

The new options for expanded covert operations include loosening restrictions on the C.I.A. to strike selected targets in Pakistan, in some cases using intelligence provided by Pakistani sources, officials said. Most counterterrorism operations in Pakistan have been conducted by the C.I.A.; in Afghanistan, where military operations are under way, including some with NATO forces, the military can take the lead.

The legal status would not change if the administration decided to act more aggressively. However, if the C.I.A. were given broader authority, it could call for help from the military or deputize some forces of the Special Operations Command to act under the authority of the agency. NY Times Jan. 6th, 2007

The mere suggestion that the “CIA” (includes all agencies) “knows” realties on the ground in Pakistan is laughable. The Pakistanis are not stupid. They are fully aware of American plans. The Hindukush mountains, the Himalyas, the inhospitable deserts, and the plains offer huge sites for hiding small missiles and the large terrain and cannot be bombed out of existence.

Do we have similar plans for Britain, France and Israel or is this nonsense reserved for the “little brown boys” of Pakistan. This entire train of thought is racist and bigoted.

Pakistan developed a nuclear program as a result of the 1971 debacle (half the country was lost) when the USA failed to help Pakistan despite membership of CENTO and SEATO and two executive defense agreements. Pakistanis pledged “never again” and wanted to defend their freedom and their land.

Pakistanis helped the USA in her war with the USSR. Pakistan was sanctioned as a reward for the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan and it’s ultimate implosion.

Ingrates in the administration should appreciate Pakistan and Pakistani measures to support the USA.

From SEATO, CENTO to the destruction of the USSR, Pakistan has been an ally. This is no way to treat an ally. Pakistan has more than 30,000 scientists working in the nuclear field. Entire universities are devoted to materials and nuclear research. To think that all depends on the much maligned Mr. Khan is stupid and silly. Mr. Khan is a hero is Pakistan and Pakistanis developed the bomb when Pakistan was under sanctions (by its allies of the cold war). The program at the time was clandestine, and no one is sorry that a nuclear program was developed.

Historical records are full of “CIA” incompetence.

1) The “CIA” failed to see the implosion of the USSR.

2) The “CIA” funded Castro and failed to see the rise of Fidel as in anti-American.

3) Most recently the “CIA” failed to forsee Pakistan’s nuclear explosions

4) The “CIA” failed to see the realities of Iraq and Afghanistan.

5) The “CIA” has no clue about OBL and was unable to nab him

To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al-Qaeda, by Derek Leebaert. New York/Boston: Little, Brown, 2006. $29.95, 688 pp. ISBN 0-316-14384-7

As the title implies, Leebaert, a government professor at Georgetown and author of The Fifty-Year Wound, a history of the Cold War, sets out to write a comprehensive history of special operations in the west and show how they have “been able repeatedly to redirect history.” It’s a tall order, but Leebaert is up to the challenge.

Leebaert begins with Homer’s account of how the Greeks toppled Troy not by a mass assault against the city’s walls but through stealth and deception. The Trojan Horse and the twenty-three Greek warriors hidden inside became “the fountainhead for all special operations ever since.”

Greeks bearing gifts is just the first of countless stories of special operations and operators that Leebaert recounts. There’s Alexander the Great at the Sogdian Rock in the Kabul Valley; the greatly-outnumbered Spanish conquistadors in Mexico and Peru; Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox” of the American Revolution; Nathan Bedford Forrest, the “apostle of mobility,” and John Singleton Mosby, the “Gray Ghost,” in the American Civil War; T.E. Lawrence, the famous “Lawrence of Arabia” of World War I fame; the legendary World War II special operators including the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the U.K. Special Operations Executive (SOE); the little-known airman Donald Nichols, the “Lawrence of Korea”; and the 315 contemporary special operators who sent the Taliban fleeing in weeks.

Leebaert notes Alexander’s unprecedented use of civil affairs and psychological operations, and he shows how the Conquistadors were able “to exploit the virtues of small size [they were never more than 400 strong] . . . [by] improvising continuously.” He singles out Mosby for his use of stealth and mobility and Lawrence as an early example of the value of advisors in “turning disordered locals into well-directed fighters.”

Before World War II, special operations tended to have an ad hoc quality about them. Early in the struggle against Germany, however, they “assumed an ongoing strategic importance” with the establishment of agencies like the OSS and the SAS (the British Special Air Services). With typical shortsightedness, these units were disbanded after the war, only to be permanently revived during the Cold War. The OSS wasn’t revived but the U.S. established first the CIA and later the Army Special Forces in its stead.

The author is no fan of the CIA and their Clandestine Service. If you think CIA ineptness began with 9/11 and Iraqi WMD’s, think again. Leebaert records a litany of CIA blunders including missing the warning signs of a North Korean invasion of South Korea and the subsequent Chinese intervention, failing to note the Soviet rocket program (which became all too apparent with the launch of Sputnik), and botching operations like the infamous Bay of Pigs. Leebaert ridicules the latter as “‘special’ only in its ineptness, and he blasts “the casual corruption and lackadaisical standards that characterized the agency’s Clandestine Service.”

Special operations were cut back sharply following Vietnam, but after the Desert One fiasco and the chaos of Grenada, the Reagan administration oversaw a renaissance including the creation in 1985 of the U.S. Special Operations Command, an umbrella for military special operations. And, 9/11 and the Global War on Terror have moved special operators to center stage as “the preeminent means of dealing with those hidden evil powers of compact destruction.” The biggest challenge facing special operations now is to continue attracting “the tiny fraction of people who are up to such ventures.”

Special operations are as old as Homer and have often been the tipping point in history. Today’s twilight struggles against terrorists, criminals, and drug lords, likely will turn more on the “nuanced war” of special operators than the conventions campaigns of massed armies. In this encyclopedic account of special operations from the Iliad to Iraq, Leebaert details the unique advantages of special operators and documents their countless successes. Given the condition of today’s world, special operators will continue to add new chapters to their storied history.

To think that the “CIA” knows about Pakistani war heads is as silly as knowing that the CIA knew about Iraqi WMDs.

Pakistan has 160 million people who are proud and can defend the country. President Ayub Khan said it best when he said in his book “Friends Not Master”.

The way to help Pakistan is to create a Marshall Plan for Pakistan.

The only way to secure Pakistani nukes is to eliminate bias, contempt and mistrust of the Pakistanis. For the past 60 years, Pakistan is the most mis-treated friend of the USA. It is un-American to treat Pakistan this way.

http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/12/11/the-plan-to-topple-pakistans-military/