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The defeat at the Battle of Maiwind-Afghanistan/Pakistan

NATO Lessons: 1880 UK defeat at Maiwand-Afghanistan

The Defeat at the Battle of Gandamak-Afghanistan/Pakistan

The British defeats in Afghanistan and Pakistan forgotten by the UK forces

ISAF forces in Afghanistan contol smaller and smaller territories

Mr. Karzai control smaller and smaller areas

It is amazing that even well educated Britishers are not taught about British defeats in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. British curricullums do not discuss Maiwind and Gandamak. This is the reason that NATO has just added a few hundred troops and now hopes that these few hundred troops will be able to quell a popular uprisign that controls more than 60% of the countrside. 

The Afghan tribesman firing on the British forces

Afghans using inferior weapons to defeat the British

A few voices of sanity are begining to make their mark.

“Nato has evidently got itself into a colossal muddle in Afghanistan. Everything that could possibly go wrong has gone wrong. It is far from clear why the alliance is fighting there at all, and what it is seeking to achieve. Talk of “victory” is a dangerous illusion.”

In 2003, there were 20,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan. By 2007, this number had trebled to 60,000 – and is shortly to increase further with the arrival of another 3,200 US Marines and a further 1,000 French soldiers. Has this vast increase in troop levels brought added security to the country? Is peace breaking out? Are reconstruction and development of the war-torn country progressing? Has opium growing been eradicated, or at least curbed? Alas, quite the contrary.

Violence and deaths have increased steadily over the past five years, with attacks on foreign troops now running at a rate of 500 a month. In 2007, there were no fewer than 140 suicide attacks – the most dreaded and lethal form of attack. As Westerners are often targeted, they live in fear, restrict their movements and therefore cannot help much with reconstruction and development. Far from being eradicated, opium production has increased year by year and narco-traffic is booming. Patrick Seale

The Russians had more than 150,000 regular troops and tens of thousands of other operatives in Pakistan. Imperial hubris and lack of information about Afghanistan and Pakistan lead some couch-potato analysts to assume that less than 50,000 NATO troops can defeat the Afghans.

In Afghanistan, fundamentalist Islam is a form of nationalism. The two are indistinguishable. The West may seek to demonise the Taliban as medieval barbarians, alien to Afghan society. The truth, however, would seem to be that they are very much a home-bred product. Although originally almost exclusively Pashtun, the insurgency has now spread beyond the Pashtun areas, pointing to the Taliban’s growing support.

In 2006-7, there was a notable change of sentiment in Afghanistan. The idea took hold that Nato and the Americans were losing the war. This alone should have persuaded the heads of state gathered in Bucharest this week that it was time to bring this thankless neo-colonial military adventure to a close.

An astonishing statistic is that American forces in Afghanistan cost the American tax-payer $100m a day – or, currently, $36bn a year. So far, since 2001, the US has spent $127bn on the war in Afghanistan. One can only weep at such a waste of resources.

In contrast, total international aid to Afghanistan – on which the Kabul government depends for 90 per cent of its expenditure – has averaged only $7m a day since 2001. Half the promised aid has failed to arrive – there is a $5bn shortfall – while two-third of the aid was not channelled through government institutions at all.

If seeking to impose a Western model on Afghanistan has aroused local opposition, another even greater source of hostility is the large-scale use of air strikes, especially by American forces. Millions of tonnes of bombs have been dropped on Afghanistan in pursuit of a policy of “killing the enemy”.

These have inevitably caused the death of hundreds of Afghan civilians and much material “collateral damage”. Breaking into homes, ignoring local customs and showing disrespect for ordinary Afghans has also created immense anger.

The result has been to bring large segments of the population over to the Taliban side. As in Iraq, far from pacifying the country, US strategy has created an enemy bent on revenge.

There is much talk in Washington these days of taking the war to the Taliban in the tribal areas of West Pakistan. Even Barack Obama, the leading Democratic presidential candidate and a stern critic of the Iraq war, has spoken of “cleaning out” Pakistan’s tribal areas.

This is dangerous talk. Pakistan is seething with angry opposition to the Nato campaign in Afghanistan and, more generally, to US President George W. Bush’s “war on terror”. Some experts believe that a large-scale Western ground incursion into Pakistan’s tribal areas could split the Pakistan army, bring down President General (retired) Pervez Musharraf, and put an end to any security cooperation with the West.

On a visit to Islamabad in late March, John Negroponte, the US Deputy Secretary of State, was surprised to hear that the leaders of Pakistan’s new coalition government – former prime minister Nawaz Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari – want talks with the Taliban rather than military strikes.

“One is dealing with irreconcilable elements who want to destroy our very way of life. I don’t see how you can talk with those kinds of people,” Negroponte was quoted as saying. It would be in Nato’s, and Washington’s, interest to find out -and the sooner the better.

The Battle of Kabul and the retreat to Gandamak War: First Afghan War Date: January 1842.

Place: Central Afghanistan.

Combatants: British and Indians of the Bengal Army and the army of Shah Shuja against Afghans and Ghilzai tribesmen.

Afghans attacking the retreating British and Indian army

Generals: General Elphinstone against the Ameers of Kabul, particularly Akbar Khan, and the Ghilzai tribal chiefs.

Size of the armies: 4,500 British and Indian troops against an indeterminate number of Ghilzai tribesmen, possibly as many as 30,000.

Uniforms, arms and equipment:
The British infantry, wearing cut away red jackets, white trousers and shako hats, were armed with the old Brown Bess musket and bayonet. The Indian infantry were similarly armed and uniformed.

The Ghilzai tribesmen carried swords and jezail, long barrelled muskets.

Winner: The British and Indian force was wiped out other than a small number of prisoners and one survivor.

The route taken by the Kabul garrison during its disastrous retreat to India in January 1842

British Regiments:
44th Foot, later the Essex Regiment and now the Royal Anglian Regiment.
Regiments of the Bengal Army:
2nd Bengal Light Cavalry
1st Bengal European Infantry
37th Bengal Native Infantry
48th Bengal Native Infantry
2nd Bengal Native Infantry
27th Bengal Native Infantry.
Bengal Horse Artillery

The War:
The British colonies in India in the early 19th Century were held by the Honourable East India Company, a powerful trading corporation based in London, answerable to its shareholders and to the British Parliament.

In the first half of the century France as the British bogeyman gave way to Russia, leading finally to the Crimean War in 1854. In 1839 the obsession in British India was that the Russians, extending the Tsar’s empire east into Asia, would invade India through Afghanistan.

This widely held obsession led Lord Auckland, the British governor general in India, to enter into the First Afghan War, one of Britain’s most ill-advised and disastrous wars.

Until the First Afghan War the Sirkar (the Indian colloquial name for the East India Company) had an overwhelming reputation for efficiency and good luck. The British were considered to be unconquerable and omnipotent. The Afghan War severely undermined this view. The retreat from Kabul in January 1842 and the annihilation of Elphinstone’s Kabul garrison dealt a mortal blow to British prestige in the East only rivaled by the fall of Singapore 100 years later.

The causes of the disaster are easily stated: the difficulties of campaigning in Afghanistan’s inhospitable mountainous terrain with its extremes of weather, the turbulent politics of the country and its armed and refractory population and finally the failure of the British authorities to appoint senior officers capable of conducting the campaign competently and decisively.

The substantially Hindu East India Company army crossed the Indus with trepidation, fearing to lose caste by leaving Hindustan and appalled by the country they were entering. The troops died of heat, disease and lack of supplies on the desolate route to Kandahar, subject, in the mountain passes, to constant attack by the Afghan tribes. Once in Kabul the army was reduced to a perilously small force and left in the command of incompetents. As Sita Ram in his memoirs complained: “If only the army had been commanded by the memsahibs all might have been well.”

The disaster of the First Afghan War was a substantial contributing factor to the outbreak of the Great Mutiny in the Bengal Army in 1857.

The successful defence of Jellalabad and the progress of the Army of Retribution in 1842 could do only a little in retrieving the loss of the East India Company’s reputation.

Account:
Following the British capture of Kandahar and Ghuznee Dost Mohammed, whose replacement on the throne in Kabul by Shah Shujah was the purpose of the British expedition into Afghanistan, despairing of the support of his army fled to the hills. On 7th August 1839 Shah Shujah and the British and Indian Army entered Kabul.

The British official controlling the expedition was Sir William Macnaghten, the Viceroy’s Envoy, acting with his staff of political officers.

At first all went well. British money and the powerful Anglo-Indian Army kept the Afghan tribes in controllable bounds, pacifying the Ameers with bribes and forays into the surrounding districts.

Afghan tribesmen waiting to attack the Kabul Brigade during the agonising retreat to India

In November 1840 during a raid into Kohistan two squadrons of Bengal cavalry failed to follow their officers in a charge against a small force of Afghans led by Dost Mohammed himself. Soon afterwards, despairing of his life in the mountains, Dost Mohammed surrendered to Macnaghten and went into exile in India, escorted by a division of British and Indian troops no longer required in Afghanistan and accompanied by the commander in chief Sir Willoughby Cotton.

In December 1840 Shah Shujah and Macnaghten withdrew to Jellalabad for the ferocious Afghan winter, returning to Kabul in the spring of 1841.

In the assumption that the establishment of Shah Shujah as Ameer was complete, the British and Indian troops were required to move out of the Balla Hissar, a fortified palace of considerable strength outside Kabul, and build for themselves conventional cantonments. A further complete brigade of the force was withdrawn, leaving the remaining regiments to settle into garrison life as if in India, summoning families to join them, building a race course and disporting themselves under the increasingly menacing Afghan gaze.

There were plenty of signs of trouble. The Ghilzai tribes in the Khyber repeatedly attacked British supply columns from India. Tribal revolt made Northern Baluchistan virtually ungovernable. Shah Shujah’s writ did not run outside the main cities, particularly in the South Western areas around the Helmond River.

Sir William Cotton was replaced as commander in chief of the British and Indian forces by General Elphinstone, an elderly invalid now incapable of directing an army in the field, but with sufficient spirit to prevent any other officer from exercising proper command in his place.

Afghan tribesmen armed with jezails

The fate of the British and Indian forces in Afghanistan in the winter of 1840 to 1841 provides a striking illustration of the collapse of morale and military efficiency where the officers in command are indecisive and wholly lacking in initiative and self-confidence. The only senior officer left in Afghanistan with any ability was Brigadier Nott, the garrison commander at Kandahar.

Crisis struck in October 1841. In that month Brigadier Sale took his brigade out of Kabul as part of the force reductions and began the march through the mountain passes to Peshawar and India. Throughout the journey his column was subjected to continuing attack by Ghilzai tribesmen and the armed retainers of the Kabul Ameers. Sale’s brigade, which included the 13th Foot, fought through to Gandamak, where a message was received summoning the force back to Kabul, Sale did not comply with the order and continued to Jellalabad.

In Kabul serious trouble had broken out. On 2nd November 1841 an Afghan mob stormed the house of Sir Alexander Burnes, one of the senior British political officers, and murdered him and several of his staff. It is the authoritative assessment that if the British had reacted with vigour and severity the Kabul rising could have been controlled. But such a reaction was beyond Elphinstone’s abilities. All he could do was refuse to give his deputy, Brigadier Shelton, the discretion to take such measures.

Until the end of the year the situation of the Kabul force deteriorated as the Afghans harried them and deprived them of supplies and pressed them more closely.

On 23rd December 1841 Macnaghten was lured to a meeting with several Afghan Ameers and murdered. While the Kabulis awaited a swift retribution the British and Indian regiments cowered fearful in their cantonments.

Attempts to clear the high ground that enabled the Afghans to dominate the cantonments failed miserably, because the troops were too cowed to be capable of aggressive action.

The beginning of the end came on 6th January 1842 when the British and Indian garrison, 4,500 soldiers, including 690 Europeans, and 12,000 wives, children and civilian servants, following a purported agreement with the Ameers guaranteeing safe conduct to India, marched out of the cantonments and began the terrible journey to the Khyber Pass and on to India. As part of the agreement with the Ameers all the guns had to be left to the Afghans except for one horse artillery battery and 3 mountain guns and a number of British officers and their families were required to surrender as hostages, taking them from the nightmare slaughter of the march into relative security.

In spite of the binding undertaking to protect the retreating army, the column was attacked from the moment it left the Kabul cantonments.

The army managed to march 6 miles on the first day. The night was spent without tents or cover, many troops and camp followers dying of cold.

The next day the march continued, Brigadier Shelton, after his ineffectiveness as Elphinstone’s deputy, showing his worth leading the counter attacks of the rearguard to cover the main body.

At Bootkhak the Kabul Ameer, Akbar Khan, arrived claiming he had been deputed to ensure the army completed its journey without further harassment. He insisted that the column halt and camp, extorting a large sum of money and insisting that further officers be given up as hostages. One of the conditions negotiated with the Ameers was that the British abandon Kandahar and Jellalabad. Akbar Khan required the hostages to ensure Brigadier Sale left Jellalabad and withdrew to India.

The next day found the force so debilitated by the freezing night that few of the soldiers were fit for duty. The column struggled into the narrow five mile long Khoord Cabul pass to be fired on for its whole length by the tribesmen posted on the heights on each side. The rearguard was found by the 44th Regiment who fought to keep the tribesmen at bay. 3,000 casualties were left in the gorge.

On 9th January 1842 Akbar Khan required further hostages in the form of the remaining married officers with their families. For the next two days the column pushed through the passes and fought off the incessant attacks of the tribesmen.

On the evening of 11th January 1842 Akbar Khan compelled General Elphinstone and Brigadier Shelton to surrender as hostages, leaving the command to Brigadier Anquetil. The troops reached the Jugdulluk crest to find the road blocked by a thorn abattis manned by Ghilzai tribesmen. A desperate attack was mounted, the horse artillery driving their remaining guns at the abattis, but few managed to pass this fatal obstruction.

The last stand of the survivors of Her Majesty’s 44th Foot at Gandamak

The final stand took place at Gandamak on the morning of 13th January 1842 in the snow. 20 officers and 45 European soldiers, mostly of the 44th Foot, found themselves surrounded on a hillock. The Afghans attempted to persuade the soldiers that they intended them no harm. Then the sniping began followed a series of rushes. Captain Souter wrapped the colours of the regiment around his body and was dragged into captivity with two or three soldiers. The remainder were shot or cut down. Only 6 mounted officers escaped. Of these 5 were murdered along the road.

On the afternoon of 13th January 1842 the British troops in Jellalabad, watching for their comrades of the Kabul garrison, saw a single figure ride up to the town walls. It was Dr Brydon, the sole survivor of the column.

Dr Brydon arrives at Jellalabad, the last survivor of an
army of 16,500 soldiers and civilians

Casualties:
The entire force of 690 British soldiers, 2,840 Indian soldiers and 12,000 followers were killed or in a few cases taken prisoner. The 44th Foot lost 22 officers and 645 soldiers, mostly killed. Afghan casualties, largely Ghilzai tribesmen, are unknown.

Follow-up:
The massacre of this substantial British and Indian force caused a profound shock throughout the British Empire. Lord Auckland, the Viceroy of India, is said to have suffered a stroke on hearing the news. Brigadier Sale and his troops in Jellalabad for a time contemplated retreating to India, but more resolute councils prevailed, particularly from Captains Broadfoot and Havelock, and the garrison hung on to act as the springboard for the entry of the “Army of Retribution” into Afghanistan the next year.

Regimental anecdotes and traditions:

The First Afghan War provided the clear lesson to the British authorities that while it may be relatively straightforward to invade Afghanistan it is wholly impracticable to occupy the country or attempt to impose a government not welcomed by the inhabitants. The only result will be failure and great expense in treasure and lives.

The British Army learnt a number of lessons from this sorry episode. One was that the political officers must not be permitted to predominate over military judgments.
The War provides a fascinating illustration of how the character and determination of its leaders can be decisive in determining the morale and success of a military expedition.

It is extraordinary that officers, particularly senior officers like Elphinstone and Shelton, felt able to surrender themselves as hostages, thereby ensuring their survival, while their soldiers struggled on to be massacred by the Afghans.

References:
Afghanistan From Darius to Amanullah by Lieutenant General Sir George McMunn.
The Afghan Wars by Archibald Forbes.
britishbattles.com 2005.
britishbattles.com 2007. Email : info@britishbattles.co.uk

Khyber’s forgotten cemetery

Dr Ali Jan

The legendary Khyber Pass in the North West Frontier of Pakistan is the most famous passageway in the Himalayas. No other pass in the world has possessed such strategic importance or retains so many historic associations and romance as this gateway. It is the fabled ancient route that led into Afghanistan from the British India of yore and it was in this rugged terrain of slate and rock that the actual strategies of the ‘Great Game’ of Imperial conquest were played out and where several battles of the Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1839-42, 1879-80 and 1919 were fought. Carved on rocks, alongside the road are numerous military crests which remind visitors of the many battalions that once passed through here a long time ago.

The pass is 33 miles long and lies in the ‘forbidden’ Tribal Territory mainly inhabited by the warlike Afridi and Shinwari etc Pakhtun tribes. The plains of Peshawar in Pakistan stretch from its eastern mouth, and those of Jalalabad in Afghanistan from the western. The pass itself begins at Jamrud where a symbolic gateway (Bab-e-Khyber, constructed in 1963) stands on the main road about ten miles north west of Peshawar and twists through the hills for about 33 miles and ends near Dakka. The most important points en route are: Ali Masjid ten miles from Jamrud, Landi Kotal, the summit of the pass ten miles further, and Torkham at which point the pass enters Afghan territory.

Three old British-era cemeteries have survived in Khyber Pass in one form or the other and are a poignant reminder of the British lives lost in the tribal region. These are: 1. Jamrud Cemetery (near Jamrud Fort about 11 miles from Peshawar. Now almost non-existent) 2. Ali Masjid Cemetery (near Ali Masjid Mosque and Fort. It has ten surviving graves of English soldiers in a dilapidated state) 3. Landi Kotal Cemetery (near the Khyber Rifles Mess at Landi Kotal cantonment)

The cemetery at Landi Kotal is the largest of the three English burial-grounds in the Khyber Pass and is approachable by road from Peshawar. It is accessible by railway as well. However, the ‘Khyber Steam Safari’ which is an internationally known and famous tourist attraction is temporarily suspended these days due to the prevailing regional security situation. Moreover, the historical rail track that got damaged at a few places as a result of floods last year has regrettably still not been repaired by the authorities concerned.

A general interest in travel and history, pepped up by a desire to add this cemetery to an extensive database I maintain of burial records of cemeteries in Pakistan prompted me to undertake a journey to Landi Kotal. I first arrived at the famed Khyber Rifles Mess. Even during the British period, their headquarters was at Landi Kotal as is now. The three main Khyber Rifles garrisons were Landi Kotal at the western end of the Pass, Fort Maude to the east and Ali Masjid in the middle.

I learned that the cemetery was close by the military mess at walking distance. While its main gate is kept locked by order of the Diocese of Peshawar, however fortunately a Christian family that looks after a small chapel behind the Khyber Rifles’ Mess had a spare key. Couple of members of this family work in the Photography Section at the Mess. They are cooperative and can be easily reached there if one wants to visit the graveyard.

The cemetery itself is about the size of a soccer field. Its burials date mainly from 1879-80 (Second Afghan War) and 1898 (Tirah Campaign and Afridi uprisings 1896-1898) and 1919 (Third Afghan War). Many regiments and battalions are represented here. Two stone obelisks stand in the middle each bearing a plaque. The inscription on one is almost faded and the other records: “Sacred to the memory of the British soldiers of all ranks who lie buried near this spot 187 of whom died at Landi Kotal from the result of wounds received in action and from disease during the Afghan Campaign of 1879-80 and the remainder since the reoccupation of the Khyber in 1898”.

The older graves lying towards the far end are unfortunately not very well preserved and sometimes it is not even possible to tell who is buried underneath. Many headstones have disappeared altogether. At few places, piles of rocks mark the broken stumps where perhaps crosses had once stood. Presence of a few recent burials indicates the cemetery is still in use by a small settled community of Christians.

The newer graves dating from 1898 onwards which are closer to the entrance, are in a relatively better-preserved state. A good number of them belong to the soldiers of 2nd battalion of the Oxford Light Infantry, and they appear to have been restored by that unit in more recent times. This battalion had lost many young soldiers particularly during the Tirah Campaign 1897-98. For instance, on 30th December 1897, the 2nd O.L.I. was ambushed at a village near Landi Kotal. It sustained heavy casualties and the military annals record that it fought a ‘fighting retreat to extricate itself from a closing trap’.

Interviews with a Christian family that looks after the Landi Kotal cemetery revealed that there has been no funding from any quarter for its upkeep in the last two or three decades and therefore the cemetery has gone into gradual decline. It is a real pity considering this is one of the most important cemeteries in the North West Frontier from both historical and tourism points of view and is invaluable for family history research as well.

The Khyber Pass cemeteries ought to be notified as threatened monuments and they must be included in the list of protected national heritage sites under the Federal Antiquity Act of 1975. Besides local initiatives by Frontier Corps and Khyber Rifles, the British and Pakistan governments and their agencies need to play a more proactive role in their upkeep. Moreover, the involvement of national and international NGOs in their conservation is also necessary to seek a broader base of support. It is essential to preserve all such surviving Victorian-era cemeteries in the Frontier region before it is too late, as in another few years these irreplaceable landmarks and memorials might be lost forever due to sheer neglect.